Just prior to Xi Jinping’s visit to Washington on September 23–25, 2026, Donald Trump announced that the administration would use the term “Superintelligence” instead of “Artificial Intelligence” in official communications, and later claimed that Xi liked this designation after their meetings.[i] The Chinese side neither confirmed nor denied this characterization. In a statement released on September 26, 2026, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to use the term “Artificial Intelligence,” merely stating that it attaches importance to and “respects” the US preference.[ii] It would be incorrect to interpret this difference, which might seem like a terminological detail, as a mere translation matter. In techno-geopolitical competition where technology dictates the balance of power, this difference represents a struggle over who gets to define the scope of governance. Within this framework, the lasting outcome of the summit can be evaluated as a decoupling that institutionalizes a dialogue discussing AI risks while leaving the power struggle over chips, processing power, and critical minerals off the table.
The institutional positioning of the dialogue reinforces this decoupling. According to a statement by the Ministry of Commerce of China on September 28, 2026, the new AI dialogue was established under the economic and trade negotiation framework, co-led by Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng and US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. The parties also agreed to hold the next round by the end of November and to set up a communication channel for AI-related incidents.[iii] By entrusting the dialogue to trade negotiators rather than foreign policy or defense agencies, AI was brought to the same bargaining table as tariffs and rare earth elements.
The commercial outcomes of the summit drew the same boundaries. The two countries agreed on tariff reductions for approximately $30 billion worth of goods in both directions; these items include agricultural products, personal care products, timber, medical devices, tableware, and toys. Strategic sectors such as chips, electric vehicles, and batteries were excluded from the scope, and the truce was extended for only two months, postponing it to January 2027.[iv] Consequently, even though tensions eased in low-tech trade, the high-tech field—which encompasses AI technology—is deliberately kept in the “sensitive” category.
From the perspective of the US, the concept of “superintelligence” focuses the dialogue on the risks that future systems capable of exceeding human capacity might create. This framework is evaluated as providing Washington the opportunity to conduct a security dialogue with Beijing without opening chip export controls to negotiation. Indeed, the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security opened the export of Nvidia H200 chips to China to case-by-case review, but tied this to conditions such as independent third-party testing within the US.[v] In other words, Washington insists on treating the chip issue as a licensing matter managed on its own terms, rather than a topic for negotiation.
China’s approach can be anchored to a different rationale. During the meeting on September 24, 2026, Xi noted that both countries are major powers in AI and that despite their competition, there are greater opportunities for cooperation; he emphasized that the parties should showcase their respective strengths rather than building lines of defense against one another. In the same meeting, Xi also called for joint measures against the misuse of AI and the preservation of human oversight.[vi] The phrase “building lines of defense” can be interpreted as an implicit reference to technological restrictions such as export controls and sanction lists. These calls demonstrate that Beijing does not reject the risk agenda, but wants this agenda to cover the rules of competition as well.
The pattern of “respect” in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement was also a deliberate choice. This phrasing can be accepted as an established diplomatic formula for noting a stance without adopting it. The Ministry further left the matter open by adding that AI technology continues to develop and that the parties can seek consensus based on the evolving situation. This formula recalls the language of constructive ambiguity used by the US in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, where it “acknowledged” rather than endorsed China’s position on Taiwan. This time, however, it is Beijing establishing the ambiguity.
The priority placed on terminology is also driven by concerns over standard-setting. An article by Prof. Dr. Cai Cuihong of Fudan University’s Institute of International Studies, published in May 2026, notes openness to cooperation in areas such as risk classification and the notification of security incidents. However, according to the same article, AI governance cannot turn into a process where one side sets the standards and inspects the other. The paper also opposes taking a single country’s test results as international standards and using security evaluations as justification for inspecting model weights and training data, while listing the “mutual recognition of risk terminology” among areas of potential cooperation.[vii] The summit’s divergence precisely over terminology creates a striking contrast in this regard.
Critical minerals constitute the other side of the competition kept off the bargaining table. The rare earths heading included in the post-summit statement by the US was entirely absent from the statements made by the Chinese side.[viii] According to AlixPartners, China controls approximately 90% of global rare earth alloy and magnet production.[ix] Considering this data, it is evident that both parties hold a “chokepoint” against each other: the US controls processing power, while China controls the physical inputs of that power.
It would also be wrong to interpret the technology dimension of the summit solely through the lens of decoupling. The communication channel agreed upon for AI-related incidents can be seen as a first step carrying the Cold War “hotline” logic into the technology sphere. However, as noted by Scott Kennedy of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the deliverables across all headings—including AI—are quite limited and temporary in nature.[x]
In conclusion, the Washington Summit institutionalized a new division of labor in the two countries’ technology competition: risks are discussed, but power is not negotiated. The gap between “superintelligence” and “artificial intelligence” shows that the boundaries of this division of labor have not yet been drawn. Washington wants the dialogue to limit future catastrophe scenarios, while Beijing is trying to expand it to cover present-day restrictions. Placing the dialogue within the trade channel indicates that this struggle over scope will be conducted under the same bargaining logic as rare earth elements and tariffs.
Within this framework, it is evaluated that the real test will be the second round to be held by the end of November. If the parties can develop a common language on technical topics such as the definition of “incidents” and evaluation methodologies, the foundations of a narrow yet functional security regime could be laid. Conversely, the US continues to restrict the dialogue to superintelligence risks. If China insists on bringing export controls to the table, a different picture may emerge. In that case, the dialogue could turn into a new arena for bargaining between technology and critical minerals alongside the truce expiring in January.
[i] “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Advances a Fair and Reciprocal Relationship with China While Hosting Historic State Visit”, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/09/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-advances-a-fair-and-reciprocal-relationship-with-china-while-hosting-historic-state-visit/, (Access Date: 02.10.2026).
[ii] “China says it respects Trump’s ‘super intelligence’ switch from AI”, Gulf News, https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/china/china-says-it-respects-trumps-super-intelligence-switch-from-ai-1.500688763, (Access Date: 02.10.2026).
[iii] “Eighth round of China-U.S. economic and trade consultations yields positive consensus: commerceministry”, English.news.cn, https://english.news.cn/20260928/855e04af2402404b8c1f5c9417bc4dcd/c.html, (Access Date: 02.10.2026).
[iv] “US and China Detail List of Products Agreed Under $30 Billion Tariff Cut Deal After Trump-Xi Meeting”, U.S. News & World Report, https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2026-09-28/us-and-china-detail-list-of-products-agreed-under-30-billion-tariff-cut-deal-after-trump-xi-meeting, (Access Date: 02.10.2026).
[v] Bureau of Industry and Security, “Department of Commerce Revises License Review Policy for Semiconductors Exported to China”, U.S. Department of Commerce, https://www.bis.gov/press-release/department-commerce-revises-license-review-policy-semiconductors-exported-china, (Access Date: 02.10.2026).
[vi] “习近平同美国总统特朗普会谈”, News.cn, https://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/20260925/9cf2a7ba302648b2a63473a3c00b607a/c.html, (Access Date: 02.10.2026).
[vii] Fudan Development Institute (FDDI), “全球AI创新治理｜共同安全责任：中美AI对话的新博弈与新共识”, Fudan University, https://fddi.fudan.edu.cn/e6/ad/c21253a779949/page.htm, (Access Date: 02.10.2026).
[viii] “Trump Rolls Out Red Carpet, But Xi Presses US to Oppose…”, Seoul Economic Daily, https://en.sedaily.com/international/2026/09/27/trump-rolls-out-red-carpet-but-xi-presses-us-to-oppose, (Access Date: 02.10.2026).
[ix] “Analysis: Rare Earths Force Trump to be Less Hostile Before Xi Summit”, U.S. News & World Report, https://www.usnews.com/news/top-news/articles/2026-09-21/analysis-rare-earths-force-trump-to-be-less-hostile-before-xi-summit, (Access Date: 02.10.2026).
[x] “Trump-Xi Summit: Tangible Outcomes of US-China Truce”, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2026/09/28/trump-xi-summit-tangible-outcomes-us-china-truce.html, (Access Date: 02.10.2026).
