Following the meeting held in Brussels on July 2, 2025, the statements made by Kaja Kallas, the High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, not only serve as a diplomatic warning but also offer significant clues about the sharpening nature of the global power struggle.[1] Expressing concerns over the indirect support provided by Chinese firms for Russia’s war in Ukraine, Kallas also directly brought Europe’s strategic vulnerabilities to the forefront by stating that China must end the restrictions it has imposed on the export of rare earth elements.
This explicit warning from the EU to China encompasses two distinct yet interrelated security concerns. The first is the growing allegations that Chinese companies are providing military or technological support to Russia and the impact of this support on European security. The second factor is the fact that rare earth elements, which are central to global technological production, are under Chinese control, and that restricting the export of these strategic materials could cause a bottleneck in many of Europe’s sectors, particularly the green transition and the defense industry. Both threats are directly aimed at Europe’s technological independence and geopolitical position.
China produces approximately 60% and processes 85% of the world’s rare earth elements. These elements are fundamental components of many advanced technology products, from wind turbines and electric vehicle motors to missile systems and smartphones. China’s dominant position in this field transforms the West’s dependence on China into a chronic vulnerability. In late 2024, the Chinese government imposed an export licensing requirement on certain types of these elements for “national security purposes”, which triggered supply chain crises in Western economies. In this context, the EU’s call to China is not merely a commercial demand but a vital reflection of its efforts towards strategic autonomy. Brussels aims to build its own strategic capacity, particularly without taking sides in the ongoing trade and technology wars between the US and China. However, China’s control over these resources forces Europe to reconsider its position during every crisis.
The second sensitive topic Europe brought up is China’s ongoing defense industry trade with Russia. By demanding an end to this support, Europe is not only applying diplomatic pressure on China but also compelling the international community to take a stance on China’s global responsibilities. On the other hand, another parameter that must be noted is the timing of the meeting. Along with the return of Donald Trump to the presidency, the re-imposition of high tariffs against China and the disruption of global supply chains, has pushed the EU towards more cautious diplomacy. Europe seeks to both preserve its economic ties with China without cutting them off and establish its own red lines on the geopolitical stage. In this sense, Kallas’s message, while emphasizing a “desire to improve relations,” also implies that Europe could adopt a tougher attitude if China does not change its policies.
This dual stance is a natural consequence of Europe’s effort to forge its own independent geopolitical path without being caught between the US and China. However, the success of this effort will depend on whether Europe can reduce its strategic vulnerabilities against China.
It appears inevitable that strategic tensions between the EU and China will escalate in the period ahead. It is anticipated that the EU will accelerate its moves to diversify supply chains, driven by the goal of breaking China’s global monopoly, particularly in the field of rare earth elements. In this regard, establishing new partnerships with countries possessing alternative mining capacities, such as Australia, Canada, and Brazil, will likely be on the agenda. On the other hand, China’s ongoing cooperation with Russia could become a serious breaking point in West-China relations. If Europe can present concrete intelligence reports to the international community confirming China’s continued support, new enforcements against Beijing will be inevitable. In addition to this, the stricter trade policies following Donald Trump’s return to the presidency will compel the EU to adopt a more cautious and balancing diplomacy towards China. However, this could mean that the EU is entering a period that will seriously test its strategic compass, as it carries the potential for conflict with an ‘anti-China’ line in terms of security and values policy.
Deep divisions are expected to surface within the EU regarding the policies to be pursued towards China. While countries like Germany and Hungary will want to protect their economic ties, France and the Baltic states will display a tougher, security-focused stance. This internal division could weaken the EU’s capacity to develop a common foreign policy. Lastly, it is clear that the new front in the global supply wars will be technological metals and rare earths. China may continue to use its superiority in this area as geopolitical leverage. This situation could make the concept of economic security a defining strategic priority in the West, at least as important as defense policy.
In conclusion, Kaja Kallas’s statement towards China demonstrates that Europe will no longer act solely on the principle of “soft power” and can adopt a clear and strategic stance when its interests are threatened. China’s monopoly on rare earth elements and its indirect support for Russia reveal the strong relation between economic dependency and geopolitical vulnerability for Europe. This process points to a period that will determine not only the direction of China-EU relations but also how the multipolar world order will be shaped. If Europe fails to enhance its strategic autonomy during this process, it is destined to remain an actor dependent on external powers in both trade and security.
[1] “EU presses China on rare-earth elements and Ukraine war”, Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2025/7/2/eu-presses-china-on-rare-earth-elements-and-ukraine-war, (Date Accessed: 04.07.2025).
