The rhetoric of the “Hexagonal Alliance” aims to reverse Israel’s classic narrative, which presents itself as a victim of regional encirclement. At a time when severe humanitarian destruction continues in Gaza, Tel Aviv is attempting to create diplomatic space by shifting the agenda from “accountability for the war” to the “map of the alliance.” Netanyahu’s announcement of this vision prior to the weekly cabinet meeting on February 22, 2026, makes the intention to counterbalance the pressure on the ground even more visible.[1]
The framework drawn by Benjamin Netanyahu prior to the cabinet meeting is based on the claim that an alliance system will be established “within or around the Middle East.” Netanyahu has positioned India, certain Arab and African countries, Greece and South Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean, and some unnamed Asian countries at the corners of this same geometry.[2] The objective is to establish a flexible and multi-layered cooperation scheme that integrates economic, diplomatic, and security dimensions.
However, the context in which this vision is discussed does not offer a diplomatic table cleansed of the grim statistics of war. According to current United Nations humanitarian situation reports, since October 7, 2023, the death toll in Gaza has exceeded 72,000, with injuries surpassing 171,000, and reports indicate that fatalities continue even during ceasefire periods.[3] This situation casts a heavy shadow over the rhetoric of regional partnership and confronts the claim of a “new architecture” with a moral-political inquiry.
On the international law front, a context has emerged that narrows Israel’s room for maneuver. The information that the International Criminal Court has rejected Israel’s request for the withdrawal of the arrest warrant for Netanyahu, and that the arrest warrants remain in effect, further escalates the diplomatic costs.[4] The framework within the official summary regarding the International Court of Justice’s decision dated January 26, 2024, demonstrates that provisional measures of an urgent nature were ruled upon within the context of obligations under the Genocide Convention.[5] The “hexagon” rhetoric serves as a meta-narrative aimed at producing a veneer of “diplomatic normalization” amidst this environment of pressure.
Confining the issue to a classic defense pact template generates conceptual blindness. The model indicated by Netanyahu is designed less as a binding treaty and more as a total of simultaneous coordination conducted under different headings. Joint exercises, intelligence contacts, defense industry procurement, energy-maritime security cooperation, and technology consortiums are the headings that could constitute the fragmented backbone of this scheme. Such a construct offers the parties “select-and-adapt” flexibility while opening separate channels of influence for Israel across different files.
It should not be considered a coincidence that India is positioned at the center of the rhetoric. Instead of a security narrative dependent on the Washington line, Tel Aviv positions Asia’s rising power capacity as the engine of its own strategic ecosystem. The emphasis on artificial intelligence, quantum computing, informatics, and advanced technology proposes a framework that does not limit security to missile defense, but transforms data, algorithms, and supply chains into geopolitical instruments. This line, which reinforces Israel’s “start-up nation” image, also aims to alleviate the political burden created by the genocide they are committing in Gaza through the language of technology.
The continuation of the “historic alliance” emphasis with the US in the background makes the hexagonal design more meaningful. While Tel Aviv maintains American support as a guarantee, it seeks to distribute the strategic costs carried through a single sponsor. Thus, potential sanction debates, vulnerabilities in arms procurement, or reactions in Western public opinion can be balanced through different partnership channels. Network diplomacy is transforming into a “risk-sharing” technique that replaces classic alliance politics.
The rhetoric of radical axes forms the hard core of the hexagon. Targeting Iran and linked actors with the expression “Radical Shiite axis” is a known extension of the deterrence competition in the region. The emphasis on a “rising radical Sunni axis,” on the other hand, stands out with its ambiguity, expanding the threat category and gaining a new area of maneuver for Israel’s security rhetoric. This expansion carries a risk that could drag countries wishing to establish partnerships into a position that is difficult to defend before their own domestic public.
For the Arab countries invited to the alliance, the equation proceeds more fragilely. The destruction in Gaza keeps the street reaction and collective memory constantly alive. In such an atmosphere, a visible strategic coordination with Israel can produce a cost that could erode the internal legitimacy of governments. The hexagon might grow behind closed doors through technical cooperation, whereas the space for symbolic photographs and high-profile ceremonies may remain narrow.
The detail of unnamed Asian countries should also be read carefully. This uncertainty both keeps the diplomatic bargaining space open and turns the alliance into an “open-ended” platform. The platform logic provides visibility through participation in specific projects without imposing heavy burdens like full membership on countries. For Israel, this means the capacity to walk the path with a new partner in every new file.
The highlighting of Greece and South Cyprus on the Eastern Mediterranean line reflects the desire to link existing triple/multiple formats to a broader geopolitical umbrella. Maritime jurisdiction areas, energy security, protection of critical infrastructures, and regional exercises stand out as the natural agenda items of this line. By articulating these files into the Middle East-Red Sea-Indian Ocean chain, the hexagon constructs the Mediterranean as part of a larger geostrategic corridor. In such a construction, the language of regional competition can become even harsher.
The African dimension should not be considered a symbolic footnote either. The vast belt stretching from the Sahel to the Red Sea coast offers an area open to the dynamic of “rapid alignment” due to fragile state capacity, security gaps, and the need for external partnerships. The influence Israel seeks here is as much the desire to produce permanent influence through the security of logistic routes and technology-based security cooperation as it is the limitation of Iran-linked networks. Nevertheless, African capitals will have to weigh the risk of instrumentalization in great power competition alongside the perceptual cost resulting from Gaza.
Viewed from a broader framework, the hexagon is an attempt at a network architecture that claims to re-establish Israel’s claim to regional leadership. However, this attempt cannot proceed independently of the ethical and legal debates of the war. For every link of the alliance directly affects internal politics and search for external balance of the partners. In one scenario, the hexagon could gain an institutional rhythm with low-profile but continuous technical cooperation. In the other scenario, the pressure created by the Gaza issue distances partners from visible rapprochement, and the project remains an empty metaphor.
Ultimately, the “hexagonal alliance” stands out as the name of the search for perception and influence managed by Tel Aviv during a crisis period rather than a drawn-up agreement text. The geopolitics of the Middle East is now determined as much by supply chains, data infrastructures, and waves of social legitimacy as by lines and blocks. Therefore, the true strength of the hexagon will depend not on how many countries sit at the table, but on what political results the destruction caused by the war produces and to what extent regional actors can carry these results.
[1] “Netanyahu unveils ‘hexagon’ alliance bid against ‘radical’ adversaries.” Hürriyet Daily News. 23 Şubat 2026. https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/netanyahu-unveils-hexagon-alliance-bid-against-radical-adversaries-219233, (Access Date: 23.02.2026).
[2] ibid.
[3] “OCHA Humanitarian Situation Update #357 – Gaza Strip: Question of Palestine”, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 11 Şubat 2026. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/ocha-humanitarian-situation-update-357-gaza-strip/, (Access Date: 23.02.2026).
[4] “ICC judges reject Israel’s request to withdraw Netanyahu arrest warrant.” Reuters. 16 Temmuz 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/icc-judges-reject-israels-request-withdraw-netanyahu-arrest-warrant-2025-07-16/, (Access Date: 23.02.2026).
[5] “Summary of the Order of 26 January 2024.” International Court of Justice. 26 Ocak 2024. https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203454, (Access Date: 23.02.2026).
