The international system is undergoing a period of crisis in which the asymmetries in the distribution of power and the capacity margins of hegemonic actors are being structurally questioned. The 52nd G7 Summit, held in Évian-les-Bains, France, on June 15–17, 2026, serves as a macro-historical laboratory for examining the dialectical tension between the institutional foundations of the global political economy and the projection of hard power on the ground.
According to Robert Gilpin, the global system achieves stability through public goods provided by a hegemonic power (security, open free-trade routes, and a stable reserve currency). However, the hegemonic power faces an inevitable widening gap between the system’s subsidy costs and the erosion of its own internal economic capacity. The Évian G7 Summit took place at a critical juncture, precisely as the US refused to shoulder unilateral military costs, accused its allies of disloyalty, and imposed a revisionist institutional hierarchy on the global governance table.[i]
US President Donald Trump, who arrived late to the summit’s opening session, uttered the phrase “I’m the boss” as he entered the hall; this statement, beyond being mere populist rhetoric, can be interpreted as a crisis of hegemonic legitimacy from the perspective of the discipline of international relations. In the literature on hegemony, hegemony is not merely a capacity for raw military and economic coercion; it is an institutional leadership framework that secures the consent of allies. Trump’s ego-driven outburst can be framed as a form of personalization that undermines the rational foundation of institutional cooperation in diplomatic discourse.[ii] The fact that G7 partners brushed off this statement with a smile reflects not the institutionalized flexibility of the transatlantic alliance structure, but rather a rational damage-control strategy developed by European powers in the face of Washington’s unpredictable unilateral policies. The image of a hegemon losing its legitimacy is accelerating allies’ pursuit of strategic autonomy.[iii]
The fact that the war—which escalated in February 2026 following a military intervention by the US and Israel against Iran and shook global energy markets with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz—was transformed into a draft agreement in Évian aligns directly with Gilpin’s assumption of cost-benefit maximization. Gilpin argues that states will seek to withdraw or reach a compromise as soon as the marginal cost of changing or maintaining the status quo exceeds its marginal benefit. From Washington’s perspective, the blockade and military operations against Iran have paralyzed global supply chains, driven up fertilizer and food prices, and undermined the Trump administration’s political legitimacy and approval ratings at home.
The compromise, to be formalized in Geneva, involves lifting the US naval blockade in exchange for preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Trump’s presentation of this agreement as a “victory that lowers oil prices and sends the stock market soaring” represents the integration of rational political economy with domestic political mechanisms. However, this peace is less a matter of systemic stability and more a strategic retreat by the hegemon from a crisis of its own making that has come at an exorbitant cost. Iran’s potential to demand transit fees for the waterway and Israel’s violations of the ceasefire in Lebanon demonstrate that hegemonic stability cannot be structurally established in the region and that only a temporary balance has been achieved.[iv]
One of the agenda items skillfully crafted by summit host Emmanuel Macron is China’s domination of export markets with state-subsidized products and its exacerbation of global macroeconomic imbalances. Gilpin views the shift in global wealth and industrial capacity away from the hegemon and toward the rising revisionist power as “the root cause of global conflicts and systemic instability.” China’s massive trade surplus and industrial capacity threaten the employment structures and technological superiority of G7 economies.
Macron has aimed to transform the US’s unilateral tariffs and tendency to erect protectionist barriers into a common strategy for economic security and supply chain diversification under the G7 umbrella. This aligns with Gilpin’s thesis that international regimes can function as a forum for coordination against common threats even during periods when the hegemonic power is weakening. The Western bloc is using the G7 platform as a collective tool to legitimize its own protectionist measures against Chinese mercantilism.[v]
The closing sessions of the Évian G7 Summit were devoted not to weapons but to the factors of production of the future and the global struggle for dominance in the artificial intelligence (AI) industry. The participation of top executives from US-based tech giants such as OpenAI, Google DeepMind, and Anthropic at the summit highlights the role of transnational actors in the accumulation of hegemonic power. The US is imposing its absolute supremacy in the AI sector on its allies as a new lever of global economic governance. In response, the European Union—and France in particular (through Mistral AI)—is striving to counterbalance this technological hegemony through normative regulations, data sovereignty, and digital security rules. The battle over AI regulation is, in fact, the reflection in cyberspace of the struggle for “control over the ability to generate surplus value” that Gilpin refers to. Since technological hegemony determines the logistical and intelligence infrastructure for military power projection, this rift within the G7 could trigger future shifts in the hierarchy.
The presence of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who attended the summit as a guest, has highlighted the cracks in the G7’s security architecture and reignited Gilpin’s concerns about the issue of burden-sharing among alliances. Threats by the Trump administration to rationalize—or even cut—financial and military aid to Ukraine under the “America First” doctrine have forced European actors to finance their own security expenditures. Macron’s emphasis that it was the European Union, not the United States, that saved Ukraine from bankruptcy points to a systemic transformation.[vi]
In the context of the Theory of Hegemonic Stability, when the hegemon is unwilling to bear the cost of global security alone, systemic stability gives way to problems of collective action. While the rationalization of sanctions against Russia and the use of frozen Russian assets for Ukraine’s reconstruction demonstrate the G7’s ability to use the financial system as a weapon, the attrition war on the ground is being paralyzed by the hegemon’s reluctance to finance its allies. The shift in US geopolitical priorities toward the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific axis is creating a security challenge for Europe in the sense described by Gilpin.[vii]
The participant profile of the Évian G7 Summit confirms that the G7’s traditional homogeneous structure and its claims to Western-centric global governance have been structurally shaken. However, the diplomatic protest notes sent by New Delhi to Washington following the deaths of Indian sailors in the US blockade operation in the Gulf of Oman highlights the limits of these efforts. Actors from the Global South are seeking to maximize their own national mercantilist interests rather than integrating into the West’s security architecture. The fact that the G7 was unable to issue a unilateral joint statement and was forced to settle for a leaders’ summary by Macron is the most concrete indication that systemic consensus, in the Gilpin sense, has dissolved and that a multipolar international political-economic order is becoming institutionalized.[viii]
As a result, the G7 has ceased to be a hierarchical governing body that regulates the global political economy on its own and has transformed into a loose coalition where protectionist reflexes against rising Chinese mercantilism are coordinated and attempts are made to counterbalance the hegemon’s whims. The Évian Summit represents an inevitable phase of the hegemonic cycle predicted by Gilpin: the institutions of the old order persist, but their interiors are being hollowed out by the new realities of power distribution and the inevitable dynamics of multipolarity.
[i] “Live Updates: After G7 Leaders Praise U.S.-Iran Deal, Trump Threatens Iran Again”, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/06/17/world/g7-summit-trump-france, (Date of Access: June 17, 2026): Gilpin, R. G. (2016). The political economy of international relations. Princeton University Press.
[ii] “Trump says ‘I am the boss’ at G7 summit as leaders agree ‘new steps to put pressure’ on Russia – Europe live”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2026/jun/17/g7-leaders-evian-donald-trump-ukraine-russia-war-iran-latest-news-updates, (Date of Access: June 17, 2026).
[iii] “The Latest: G7 summit focuses on contentious future of AI and US dominance of the industry”, Click2Houston, https://www.click2houston.com/news/world/2026/06/17/the-latest-g7-summit-focuses-on-contentious-future-of-ai-and-us-dominance-of-the-industry/, (Date of Access: June 17, 2026).
[iv] “Trump declares US-Iran peace deal ‘all signed’ as G7 leaders battle to tie up loose ends”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/15/trump-declares-us-iran-peace-deal-all-signed-g7, (Date of Access: June 17, 2026).
[v] “Macron frames Évian G7 agenda in hope Trump will stay for whole summit”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/15/macron-evian-g7-agenda-summit-trump, (Date of Access: June 17, 2026).
[vi] “Macron’s Agenda Meets Trump’s at the G7 Summit”, CFR, https://www.cfr.org/articles/macrons-agenda-meets-trumps-at-the-g7-summit, (Date of Access: June 17, 2026).
[vii] Ibid.
[viii] “G7 leaders’ statement on geopolitical issues.”, Elysee, https://www.elysee.fr/en/G7evian/2026/06/17/g7-leaders-statement-on-geopolitical-issues, (Date of Access: June 17, 2026).
