As of July 2025, the price of Brent crude oil has stabilized at $71.28 per barrel, while Azerbaijan’s Azeri LT crude has declined to $70.87 FOB at Turkey’s Ceyhan port. This decrease corresponds to a 0.68% drop over the past 24 hours. Although Azerbaijan’s 2025 state budget was planned based on an average price of $70, the ongoing uncertainty in international markets makes any drop below this threshold a significant indicator of vulnerability. As a reminder, Azeri Light crude fell to a historic low of $15.81 on April 21, 2020, due to the pandemic shock, while it had previously peaked at $149.66 in July 2008.
This price volatility affects not only economic balances but also directly impacts the on-the-ground dynamics of the Turkey-Azerbaijan energy strategy. Ceyhan, the key point where Azerbaijani oil reaches the Mediterranean, is not merely an export terminal; it is also the strategic gateway through which the Caucasus energy diplomacy network connects to the West. Therefore, price fluctuations in Ceyhan are significant not only for Azerbaijan’s budget but also for Turkey’s role as an energy transit country, the European Union’s energy diversification efforts, and the broader dynamics of regional security.
Located on Turkey’s southern coast, the Port of Ceyhan has become more than just a terminal through which Azerbaijani oil reaches the Mediterranean; it has emerged as one of the nerve centers of regional energy security. Azerbaijani LT crude transported via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline reaches the Mediterranean directly by passing through Georgia and Turkey, and this route has secured a privileged position within Europe’s energy architecture as an alternative that bypasses Russia. For Turkey, Ceyhan represents not only an economic asset but also a symbol of its ambition to become a regional energy hub.
The recent decline in oil prices to around $70 has raised various vulnerabilities for both Azerbaijan and Turkey. While Azerbaijan’s state budget heavily relies on oil revenues, Ceyhan’s throughput directly impacts Turkey’s return on logistical investments and its regional influence capacity. In particular, if oil prices fall below this threshold, Turkey may be compelled to reassess the cost-benefit balance of its operations at the Port of Ceyhan. On the other hand, there is also a strong expectation that this downturn will not be permanent, as it is largely attributed to cyclical supply-demand imbalances in global energy markets.
The transfer of Azerbaijani oil from Ceyhan to European markets is not merely an economic activity but the result of a geopolitical design. In the aftermath of the Russia-Ukraine War, the European Union’s efforts to reduce its dependency on Russian oil have added greater strategic depth to the Azerbaijan-Turkey partnership. Countries such as Germany, Hungary, and Romania have shown openness to integrating oil and natural gas supplied via Azerbaijan into next-generation energy projects. In this context, Turkey is not only a transit country but also a potential architect of the new energy order.
Turkey’s investments in energy infrastructure have played a major role in elevating the Port of Ceyhan to such a critical position. In recent years, both port expansion and pipeline rehabilitation projects have been implemented in the region, creating a faster and more secure export route for Azerbaijani oil. Additionally, the occasional export of oil from Northern Iraq via Ceyhan has further reinforced the port’s strategic importance. This multidirectional flow has positioned Turkey as an indispensable actor not only in Azerbaijani energy geopolitics but also in the broader Middle Eastern and Central Asian energy landscape.
However, this aspiration to be a strategic hub also increases Turkey’s exposure to geopolitical risks. The Ceyhan corridor is vulnerable to both physical and cyberattacks. In this context, energy security is not solely about the physical protection of pipelines, but also hinges on the safeguarding of cyber infrastructure, the maintenance of regional political stability, and the continuity of energy diplomacy. For this reason, Turkey must view Ceyhan not just as a port, but as the “heart of energy diplomacy” and engage in strategic planning with this awareness in mind.
For Azerbaijan, Ceyhan is not merely an export point but also the most visible interface of its energy policy’s strategic link with the West. The protection and operation of this gateway to Europe through Turkey reinforce Baku’s energy independence and expand its maneuvering space against Russia. Therefore, the sustainability of Azerbaijan’s energy strategy is closely tied to the depth of its relationship with Turkey. In particular, the natural gas diplomacy corridor established via the TANAP-TAP connections could evolve into a similar multi-coordination model for oil as well.
The energy route through which Azerbaijani oil reaches global markets via Turkey’s Port of Ceyhan will become a fundamental component not only of supply chains but also of the regional power architecture in 2025 and beyond. While current price fluctuations may cause budget vulnerabilities in the short term, they signal the advent of a multipolar era in which energy diplomacy will evolve into new formats. Turkey and Azerbaijan are poised to transform this Ceyhan-centered energy corridor into a new infrastructure focused not only on economic factors but also on strategic, digital, and environmental transformation.
In the next five years, Azerbaijan’s plan to increase its daily oil export capacity from Ceyhan and push the annual limit back toward 40 million tons will strengthen Baku’s position amid accelerating global searches for alternative energy sources. Turkey, in turn, can transform the port into not just a transit point but a regional energy hub by integrating new storage facilities, digital monitoring systems, and carbon footprint tracking infrastructure around Ceyhan to support this capacity increase.
This transformation will extend beyond infrastructure investments and carry diplomatic implications as well. The continuity and security of energy flows centered on Ceyhan could enable Turkey to establish a new energy security agreement framework with the European Union. Particularly under the REPowerEU strategy, the Azerbaijan-Turkey-EU triangle may focus on joint projects aimed at sustainable energy supply chains and green transition. This would pave the way for Turkey to evolve not only as a physical energy carrier but also as a key architect of energy diplomacy.
In the geopolitical context, Ceyhan’s importance could grow beyond just serving Azerbaijani oil to becoming a multimodal terminal capable of transporting resources from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and even Iran to the West. This potential would strengthen Turkey’s energy dimension in both its Central Asia outreach and its “Reengaging Asia” policy, permanently influencing regional power balances. Simultaneously, by managing multiple sources, Turkey could seize the opportunity to pursue a balancing energy diplomacy without being caught between the US and China.
The realization of these prospects depends not only on energy reserves but also on political will, environmental balance, and technological capacity. In this process, Turkey may need to transform the Port of Ceyhan into an integrated energy center equipped not only as an export terminal but also with decarbonization technologies, digital energy management, and cybersecurity measures. This transformation could elevate Turkey as a rising actor not only in regional energy politics but also in climate diplomacy.
For Azerbaijan, this new era represents not only a balance for the state budget but also a process of establishing an independent energy foreign policy. For Baku, which aims to reduce its geoeconomic dependence on Russia, Ceyhan is more than just a port; it is the key to building sovereignty. Therefore, Turkey-Azerbaijan energy cooperation may expand in the future beyond oil and gas to encompass multilayered fields such as energy investments, academic collaborations, renewable projects, and digital energy management. In conclusion, short-term fluctuations in Brent and Azeri LT prices could trigger far more comprehensive transformations in the long run. If Turkey and Azerbaijan succeed in expanding their energy relationship centered on Ceyhan along geopolitical, environmental, and digital dimensions, they could become the two main actors shaping the region’s energy architecture into the 2030s. In this era where energy is not only a reserve but a strategy, the Port of Ceyhan could become both the center and the stage of future energy diplomacy
