Chinese President Xi Jinping’s statement, “Africa’s resources belong to Africa,” during his meeting with Botswana’s President Duma Boko in Beijing on 13 October 2026, reflects China’s efforts to redirect its mining policy on the continent. The four-point approach announced during the meeting envisages African countries developing mineral strategies suited to their own circumstances, the transfer of green technologies, and the establishment of more integrated value chains.[i] This statement shifts the debate, which has revolved around raw material extraction for years, directly towards ownership, sovereignty, and development.
Africa’s mineral wealth is no longer viewed merely as an immense fortune lying beneath the ground. Although the continent holds approximately 30% of the reserves considered critical to the energy transition, it captures less than 5% of the associated value added.[ii] This gap highlights the distance between where minerals are extracted and where the economic gains are concentrated. Cobalt may be mined in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, manganese in Gabon, or diamonds in Botswana; however, when ore processing, technology manufacturing, and final sales take place in other countries, a large share of the revenue also flows out the continent.
Beijing’s new rhetoric accurately reflects the discontent generated by this long-standing arrangement. African governments are now more concerned with how many factories are built within their borders, how many engineers are trained, and how much tax revenue is generated than with how many tonnes of ore they export. Therefore, China’s proposed partnership will fall short of expectations if it remains limited to roads or ports providing access to mining sites. Meaningful change could begin with the separation and processing of ore at local facilities, its refining, and, where possible, its transformation into industrial products.
For China, establishing a new narrative has also become a necessity. As Western countries conclude more agreements with Africa over critical minerals, Beijing’s long-standing commercial presence alone no longer provides sufficient assurance. Local communities are demanding clearer terms regarding employment, the environment, and revenue sharing, while governments are using competition among foreign partners to secure more favourable contracts. The statement “Africa’s resources belong to Africa” can be interpreted as a political response to this shift.
Botswana is a suitable country in which to test this approach. Diamond revenues have played a decisive role in the country’s investments in education, healthcare, and infrastructure; however, dependence on rough diamonds has left the economy vulnerable to price fluctuations. The government in Gaborone is reportedly nearing an agreement that would increase its stake in De Beers to approximately 25%.[iii] Such a move could enable the state to secure a larger share of the revenue; however, lasting economic gains depend on the development of cutting, polishing, jewellery design, and sales channels within the country.
Although local processing may seem straightforward on paper, industrial infrastructure entails substantial costs. A refinery requires a reliable electricity supply, abundant water, dependable transport, and a skilled workforce. If any one of these requirements is not met, shipping extracted minerals to the nearest port remains a cheaper option for companies. Therefore, mining policy must be developed in conjunction with energy, transport, and vocational training programmes. Disjointed investments by separate institutions can leave an expensive facility operating below capacity for months. China’s support in technology and planning will become meaningful to the extent that it helps overcome these bottlenecks. Otherwise, promises of new facilities may be delayed, and African countries may remain suppliers of minimally processed products.
Moreover, it does not appear economically feasible for every country to establish all stages of production independently. A more practical approach is to promote regional specialisations. Copper extracted in one country could be processed at a facility in a neighbouring country, exported through a port in another, and supported by personnel trained at shared educational centres serving the entire value chain. If the African Continental Free Trade Area facilitates these connections, the continent’s mineral wealth could be transformed from a source of competition among countries into a shared resource that supports regional industrial development.
The quality of technology transfer also warrants close scrutiny. Establishing a turnkey facility can enable production to begin within a short period; however, technological dependence persists if maintenance software, laboratory expertise, and critical equipment continue to be sourced from abroad. More lasting results could be achieved by ensuring that African engineers participate in decision-making processes within joint ventures, making vocational training a contractual requirement, and gradually increasing local sourcing requirements. In this way, the transfer would extend beyond machinery to include the knowledge needed to improve and develop it.
Financing will determine the pace of this transformation. The World Bank aims to increase its funding for critical minerals to $19 billion in the 2026–2030 period, up from $3.6 billion in the previous five-year period, and to work with 20 countries.[iv] Chinese loans, multilateral development banks, and private capital may converge on the same projects. Nevertheless, large funding commitments do not guarantee development unless it is clear who assumes the debt, how revenue guarantees are structured, and who bears the losses if prices fall.
Competition among the United States, the European Union, and China is opening up new bargaining opportunities for African countries. Making effective use of these opportunities requires a more comprehensive mineral diplomacy than simply playing one partner against another. Long-term off take agreements could be made conditional on local processing, public revenues could be independently audited, and neighbouring countries could develop common pricing or export policies. Without a coordinated approach, competition among external actors could intensify the race among African countries to offer concessions rather than improve contractual terms.
The social and environmental costs of mining will also determine the credibility of the new doctrine. If the extraction of a mineral for green energy depletes village water supplies, contaminates agricultural land, or deprives people of their livelihoods, the energy transition cannot be considered just from the perspective of local communities. Consulting communities during licensing processes, ensuring that revenues benefit mining regions, and determining in advance how land will be rehabilitated after mine closures are integral components of an economic partnership.
Beijing’s statement, “Africa’s resources belong to Africa,” is a strong starting point. Its value will be measured by the agreements implemented on the ground. If African countries establish their own industrial objectives, build regional production networks, and make technology transfer subject to concrete obligations, cooperation with China could move beyond the conventional limits of raw material trade. If such a transformation takes place, the continent will use its mineral wealth not merely as a resource that fuels the industries of others, but as a strategic asset for building its own productive capacity.
[i] “China, Botswana Establish Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”, The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202610/13/content_WS6ace4358c6d00ca5f9a0da84.html, (Access Date: 18.10.2026).
[ii] “Opening Remarks at the Ministerial Forum on Critical Minerals, Value Chain, and Beneficiation”, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, https://www.uneca.org/stories/opening-remarks-by-ms.-hanan-morsy-at-the-ministerial-forum-on-critical-minerals%2C-value, (Access Date: 18.10.2026).
[iii] “Botswana Nearing Deal to Raise De Beers Stake to About 25%”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/botswana-nearing-deal-raise-de-beers-stake-about-25-bloomberg-reports-2026-10-13/, (Access Date: 18.10.2026).
[iv] “World Bank’s Banga Sets Goal of Quintupling Critical Minerals Financing in Five Years”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/world-banks-banga-sets-goal-quintupling-critical-minerals-financing-five-years-2026-10-16/, (Access Date: 18.10.2026).
