On September 22, 2025, a new fracture occurred in the architecture of international criminal justice with the decision of the three military governments of the Sahel to withdraw from the Rome Statute. [i] The joint statement by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger frames the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a “neo-colonial instrument of oppression,” and combines an emphasis on sovereignty with a strategy of distancing themselves from transnational judicial ties in the management of the security crisis. This move points to a broader geopolitical orientation that coincides with the 2020-2023 coups, the breakaway from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the institutionalization of the Sahel States Organization (AES), and the deepening of military cooperation with Moscow.[ii]
In legal terms, the process operates independently of political rhetoric. According to Article 127 of the Rome Statute, withdrawal takes effect one year after the written notification is received by the United Nations Secretary-General. During this period, cooperation obligations remain in force; ongoing investigations are not affected. As confirmed in the cases of Burundi and the Philippines, retroactive jurisdiction is preserved, and the Court may continue to advance cases as necessary. Therefore, announcements in AES capitals will produce concrete results based on the date of submission of the notification and the subsequent one-year timeline.[iii]
In this regard, an asymmetry is evident in the concrete case file. The ICC is currently on the ground conducting investigations based on its 2012 authorization in Mali. There is no public investigation in Burkina Faso and Niger. This distinction shows that even if the withdrawal comes into effect, judicial competence for serious crimes committed in the past will not disappear entirely, and that gray areas may grow, particularly in the Mali scenario, in areas such as evidence preservation, arrest requests, and mutual legal assistance. [iv]
The narrative of legitimacy surrounding the decision is built around the concepts of “sovereignty” and “selective justice.” The AES administrations argue that the ICC has failed to address the local architecture of violence fairly and has produced external interference in state capacity. Human rights organizations emphasize that new barriers to victims’ access to justice will arise, deterrence will be eroded, and the evidence ecosystem will be weakened. This tension generates mobilization domestically while increasing concerns that accountability standards will decline internationally.
The withdrawal decision of the three Sahel countries has three possible outcomes in terms of geo-legal grounds. The first is the breakdown of institutional cohesion. While building a confederative security architecture, AES is increasing the distance from the regional normative framework. Withdrawal from the ICC entails the continuation of a common political language in regional and global forums with more rigid references to sovereignty, weakening the connection between the triangle of truth, justice, and security with transnational oversight. Second, the geography of criminal justice is expanding. European countries with universal jurisdiction regimes can open investigations into war crimes and crimes against humanity based on conditions of entry into the country and sufficiency of evidence. This situation creates a risk matrix that could increase diplomatic friction through travel restrictions, extradition requests, and targeted sanctions.
Thirdly, pressures on the use of force and disciplinary regimes in field practice are diverging. The legal risk perception of command levels does not disappear entirely in the short term; however, when judicial oversight weakens in the design of the security apparatus, the chain of evidence and victim-centered procedural safeguards can rapidly erode.
The decision demonstrates that it functions as a political tool that strengthens regime security in the short term, poses a risk of erosion in the capacity for justice in the medium term, and produces leverage that can be converted into bargaining power in geopolitical negotiations in the long term. The discourse of sovereignty derives legitimacy through national unity and opposition to foreign intervention domestically; however, the diminished visibility of justice lowers the behavioral cost within local criminal networks, thereby increasing the fragility of the social contract.
Local justice mechanisms are divided into two approaches in practice. A hybrid court-like model, designed as a scheme that brings together local judges and external technical support teams under one roof, guarantees prosecutorial independence, strengthens witness protection and forensic capacity, and aligns evidentiary standards with the Rome Statute threshold, can function as a complementary forum consistent with the principle of complementarity. On the other hand, a design that reinforces executive control and curtails procedural safeguards entrenches perceptions of selective justice, thereby accelerating the cycle of impunity. The decisive factor for decision-makers is the courage to opt for an architecture that includes transparent appointment procedures, an independent budget line, and external oversight mechanisms at this crossroads.
On the other hand, coordination with the African Union can provide a window for monitoring and evaluation. A calendar-based mechanism to be established in Addis Ababa can narrow the gap between the political calendar and the legal calendar by opening channels for return and hybrid solutions for negotiation until the withdrawal date. In this context, archiving protocols that preserve file integrity, digital evidence verification standards, and victim compensation programs should be rapidly prepared as a technical package.
The universal judicial factor functions as an external balancing mechanism that limits the assumption of a “judicial vacuum.” Civil actors in Europe who can transfer the chain of evidence to courts through strategic litigation techniques can create new vulnerabilities for AES security elites in travel and diplomatic engagements. This reality enables a period of dual justice: sovereign judicial policy internally, risk management through universal justice externally. Rational design lies in establishing procedural safeguards and information sharing protocols from the outset that will bridge these two paths.
At the policy level, three tiers can be suggested. In the first tier, evidence-based dialogue channels should remain open until the withdrawal takes effect; a transitional justice package should be prepared that includes victim compensation, witness protection, digital archiving, and open-source verification standards. In the second layer, if local justice is to be designed, the minimum procedural guarantees of the hybrid model must be reinforced with an independent budget and international observation. In the third layer, civil society’s evidence security and forensic capacity should be supported by open-source intelligence and chain verification tools. This will establish a permanent bridge between security policies and the minimum common ground of the law.
As a result, the geo-legal orientation of the AES towards separation from the ICC carries the potential to weaken the deterrent effect of transnational criminal justice while generating internal legitimacy through sovereignty rhetoric. When creative arrangements that bridge the gap between the legal calendar and the political calendar are not implemented, the spiral of “justice delayed for the sake of security” deepens. On the contrary, when procedural safeguards, high local models, and cooperation with universal justice are adopted, the security-justice equation can be reestablished. This balance will contribute most to the region’s medium-term stability.
[i] “Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger announce exit from International Criminal Court”, Reuters, 23 Eylül 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-burkina-faso-niger-announce-exit-international-criminal-court-2025-09-23/, (Date Accessed: 26.09.2025).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”. International Criminal Court, The Hague: ICC, 2011. https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf, (Date Accessed: 26.09.2025).
[iv] Stephanie Maupas, “Les pays du Sahel, sous influence de la Russie, annoncent quitter la CPI”, Le Monde, 24 Eylül 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/09/24/les-pays-du-sahel-sous-influence-de-la-russie-annoncent-quitter-la-cour-penale-internationale_6642837_3212.html, (Date Accessed: 26.09.2025).
