The period after 2020 marks a time when younger generations have become the driving force behind both technological advancements and political as well as social transformations. The term “Gen Z” does not merely describe a biological age group but rather a new type of community organized through digital networks, rapidly scalable, decentralized, and leaderless. Protest movements emerging across a wide geographic range, from Nepal to Morocco, from Madagascar to Latin America, differ from traditional forms of organization and appeal to a sense of justice rooted in everyday life. Common themes include education, healthcare, unemployment, high living costs, difficulties in accessing public services, and demands for greater accountability.
One of the strongest reflections of this global wave in Africa is the recent youth-led movement in Morocco. The cities of Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakech, Fez, Tangier, and Agadir have witnessed a spread that also extends to provincial areas and suburbs. At this stage, the technology of organization plays a crucial role. Through platforms such as TikTok, Instagram, and Discord, young people can quickly determine meeting times and locations, allowing them to organize large gatherings in a short period of time.[i] One of the most significant points to note here is that this system does not have a visible leader. The absence of spokespersons limits traditional forms of mediation and reduces the movement’s flexibility. However, on the other hand, it allows for faster decision-making and greater visibility. Therefore, it may become easier to direct or adapt to sudden changes.
In the Moroccan context, there are three main areas of demand. The first concerns the expansion of programs that promote entrepreneurship and youth employment. The second focuses on the quality, accessibility, and regional balance of education and healthcare services. The third involves the implementation of policy measures to reduce the cost of daily life. Within this framework, young people view the infrastructure investments for the 2030 World Cup as a symbolic issue. The main concern here is not sports or football itself, but rather how public resources are prioritized and how these decisions affect rural and urban areas, as well as the center–periphery balance. Young people emphasize the need for a more balanced distribution of resources between basic social services and large-scale projects.[ii]
The discourse and aesthetic language of this movement differ from those of previous generations of protests. Instead of banners, participants use short videos, infographics, humorous visuals, and images resembling graphic novel aesthetics. Complex emotions and messages are simplified through pop culture references. This hybrid language unites different sociological groups around a shared vision of the future and helps to reduce ideological conflicts. The digital dimension of the protest repertoire expands the real boundaries of street action and creates low-cost channels of participation in everyday life. Therefore, the movement has a higher potential for growth. However, Morocco’s regional development agenda and vision of stability are positively supported by the institutional dialogue channels established with young people.
The experience of Madagascar is quite different from that of Morocco. The events in this country offer important lessons about the ability of youth movements in Africa to produce political outcomes. When service crises such as electricity and water shortages combined with corruption allegations, the public reacted swiftly. Digital networks quickly expanded beyond major urban centers. The government attempted to ease tensions through cabinet reshuffles and emergency service plans, yet these measures were insufficient for the protesting youth. Following the support of a faction within the military, President Andry Rajoelina dissolved the parliament and later fled the country.[iii] . This example demonstrates the importance of service delivery and social consent in maintaining stability. Following the assumption of the presidency by Colonel Michael Randrianirina, commander of the Operational, Administrative, and Technical Services Corps (CAPSAT) within the army[iv] , the situation has, for now, calmed down. At this stage, it is crucial that the transition process be managed effectively for both the youth and society as a whole. If the process is poorly managed and short-term initiatives fail to build lasting trust, new waves of unrest may emerge.
At this point, three main factors can explain the potential spread of the Gen Z movement across Africa. First is the intensity of economic pressure. The lowering of the protest threshold is a result of rising inflation, youth unemployment, and basic living costs. Second is internet accessibility. The scale of network-based movements increases due to affordable internet, widespread smartphone use, and the interactive nature of digital platforms. Third is the level of political openness. As freedom of peaceful assembly and expression becomes more common, leaderless movements can gain a clearer framework. According to these three criteria, Senegal, Kenya, and Tunisia stand out. In Senegal, young people seek to participate in democracy and place great importance on freedom of expression. In Kenya, changes in living costs may trigger new cycles of protest, while in Tunisia, economic difficulties and youth unemployment are major drivers of demonstrations. These three countries possess the sociological and technological resources to quickly replicate the digital network logic observed in Morocco.
Ghana, Nigeria, and South Africa fall into a medium-probability group. In Ghana, the expectations of young people are rising due to macroeconomic fluctuations and debates over foreign debt. As a result of #EndSARS, Nigeria has developed a social structure familiar with digital youth mobilization. However, nationwide and simultaneous waves of protest may be limited by spatial and regional security concerns. In South Africa, the threshold of discontent is increasing because of service disruptions, infrastructure problems, and high youth unemployment. The spread of digital leaderless movements sometimes draws support from strong trade union traditions and institutional opposition channels. In contrast, in countries such as Egypt and Ethiopia, where state control and surveillance capacity are high, the likelihood of such movements spreading is lower. The difficulty of transferring online calls into real-world action stems from internet restrictions and the shrinking of public space.
The cultural codes of the Gen Z wave make the movement more inclusive. Popular culture symbols, humor, and irony enable young people to transform complex political issues into simple, striking, and shareable messages. This language replaces rigid ideologies with a basic sense of justice. Such a framework reduces both the alienation of broad audiences and the cost of participation. Moreover, many young people actively take part in the process by creating and sharing content. This flexible form of digital participation helps sustain the continuity and intensity of the protests.
Although there are superficial similarities with the Arab Spring, the comparison is analytically limited. The demand structure of the Gen Z wave focuses less on regime change and more on improving governance quality. Young people expect greater transparency in local government processes, better education, more job opportunities, and improved healthcare services. States that anticipate these expectations early and adjust their policies accordingly can rapidly build social trust. If there is a delay, rhythmic waves of protest and intermittent periods of tension are likely to emerge.
The significance of the Gen Z movement in terms of political theory lies in its ability to change forms of participation. Channels of representation are no longer limited to the ballot box. Everyday micro-political actions, rapid feedback calls, and data-driven campaigns are transforming decision-making processes. Political legitimacy is strengthened through a new layer of performance when governments respond to these calls. When rigid command-and-control reflexes dominate, the flexibility of the online space expands, creating a broader universe of reactions. Policymakers can use a manageable method to read, prioritize, and report on demands early with measurable outcomes. This approach can effectively limit the growth of the incoming wave, meaning that actions may end before they even fully begin.
There is a potential Gen Z wave in Africa that could shape the direction of social transformation. Considering the continent’s large youth population, governments need to take young people seriously and listen to their voices. At this point, young people’s demands for public space and services could prompt governments to rethink service quality, transparency, and employment policies. As a result, health and education spending could be balanced, programs supporting young entrepreneurs could expand, and, if institutional dialogue is established, protests could transform into structured conversations with authorities. Digital networks can serve as ongoing consultation and feedback mechanisms. Such developments could strengthen social stability and channel the energy of the younger generation into productive outcomes. However, if this opportunity is missed, social expectations may continue to rise, and cycles of unrest could become a new norm in politics. The Gen Z generation appears determined to shape its future, and this determination could become one of the most important factors influencing governance quality across the continent.
[i] Mohamed El Amrani, “Manifestations GenZ 212”, Medias24, October 7th 2025, https://medias24.com/2025/10/07/le-mouvement-genz-publie-un-communique-autour-de-lenseignement-de-la-sante-et-de-lemploi/, (Accessed: 21.10.2025).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Nimi Princewill, “Gen Z protesters toppled Madagascar’s president. Should other African leaders worry?”, CNN, October 18th, 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/10/18/africa/gen-z-topples-madagascars-president-intl, (Accessed: 21.10.2025).
[iv] Ibid.
