Analysis

Elections in Myanmar Under the Shadow of Civil War

The junta government may seek more support on the international stage from major powers such as Russia and China after the elections.
It is essential that the junta administration initiate a genuine democratic transition process by entering into dialogue with opposition groups and that a civilian administration be established in the country.
In a country where civil war is still ongoing, it seems unlikely that a government under the control of a military junta will gain supporters at the national and international levels.

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The holding of elections in Myanmar for the first time since the 2021 coup is seen as a ray of hope by many, despite the ongoing civil war in the country. The Myanmar Army, led by Min Aung Hlaing, overthrew the civilian government led by Aung San Suu Kyi on February 1, 2021, and seized power. Since then, the country has been sliding into a civil war involving ethnic groups. Aung San Suu Kyi and many other ruling party officials were arrested and imprisoned. The National League for Democracy, which won the 2015 and 2020 elections, has been dissolved by the election commission. Despite ASEAN’s calls for Suu Kyi’s release and the initiation of dialogue between the parties as part of peace plans, the junta government has not taken any steps in this regard.

The first phase of elections in Myanmar took place on December 28 in 102 districts. The second phase of elections is expected to take place on January 11, 2026, in 100 districts, and the third phase of elections is expected to take place on January 25, 2026, in 63 townships. As conflicts continue in many parts of the country, elections are only being held in certain districts and towns. To give a general overview, elections will be held in a total of 265 of Myanmar’s 330 districts. It is known that over 60 towns are closed to entry.[1] Many international observers from Russia, China, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Cambodia, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and India came to the country to monitor the elections, and some foreign political observers criticized the government for not holding fair and transparent elections.[2]

The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), backed by the military, is considered the favorite in the elections. In this context, it is predicted that the USDP will return to power with the support of other parties and maintain the junta’s rule. Indeed, such elections are generally seen as an attempt by coup regimes that have seized power to legitimize their seats through the ballot box. However, in a country where civil war is still ongoing, it seems unlikely that a government under the control of a military junta will gain supporters at the national and international levels.

The main reason for the country being dragged into civil war in 2021 can be attributed to the junta regime’s use of force against non-violent protests and its targeting of the people. The National Unity Government (NUG) coalition, consisting of deputies and parliamentarians who lost power and became opponents, aimed to establish a parallel or exile government and tried to resist the junta government by forming armed resistance forces throughout the country under the name “People’s Defense Forces” (PDF) throughout the country to resist the junta government, while also seeking to collaborate with ethnic separatist groups.

From 2021 to the present, the situation and parties involved in the country’s civil war can be summarized as follows: The junta government, and in this sense the Myanmar Army, is in conflict with both ethnic separatist groups and the NUG, which consists of overthrown opposition forces, and the PDF established by them, throughout the country. Despite losing power, the NUG coalition and its affiliated PDF continue their resistance, fighting against the Myanmar Army in many regions by forming alliances with separatist groups. Independently of the war waged against the Myanmar Army over the past 4-5 years, some separatist organizations have also been fighting each other for decades due to conflicts among themselves. Myanmar, already fragile due to its multi-ethnic structure and the armed struggle waged by separatist organizations for many years, saw the collapse of central authority following the military coup in 2021, making civil war inevitable.

Indeed, the significant weakening of the central authority responsible for suppressing separatist groups has led to escalating chaos in the country and the strengthening and expansion of separatist groups. For this reason, the junta government is only able to control urban areas in many towns and hold elections there. In this context, it is known that conflicts continue in many other towns where elections are planned.[3] For example Kaçin,[4] It is stated that control in the administrative centers or rural areas of states such as Rakhine, Shan, Karenni, Chin, and Sagaing is mostly in the hands of ethnic resistance forces or partially in the hands of the PDF.[5] Under current conditions, it appears nearly impossible for the junta to seize complete control of Myanmar through the use of force. For the civil war in the country to end, political stability and a legitimate government must first be established in Myanmar.

ASEAN countries, which are leading diplomatic efforts to end the crisis in Myanmar, proposed a five-point plan at the summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in 2022, calling for an immediate cessation of violence, the provision of humanitarian aid, the initiation of dialogue between the parties, the appointment of an ASEAN special envoy to act as a mediator, and the special envoy’s visit to the country to meet with all parties. However, the junta failed to fulfill its promises of dialogue and de-escalation in the country and did not allow the ASEAN special envoy to meet with ousted leader Suu Kyi and other detained figures. Although the junta had promised to begin negotiations with ousted leader Suu Kyi, it later failed to comply with this agreement. ASEAN subsequently barred the military leader from attending summit meetings.

There is widespread concern that Myanmar, which has been excluded from ASEAN meetings, will use the elections as a tool to regain legitimacy at the national, regional, and global levels. It is expected that the USDP, composed of civilian-looking junta officials, will win the elections, consolidate its position in power, and strengthen its authority. The military-led regime in Myanmar, which is expected to claim legitimacy through the elections, aims to deepen its war against opponents and ethnic separatist organizations throughout the country and strengthen its hand in diplomatic contacts with ASEAN. Furthermore, the junta may seek greater support on the international stage from major powers such as Russia and China after the elections. However, it seems unlikely that a nationally and internationally recognized, sovereign Myanmar will emerge without the establishment of a fully civilian government through elections. Above all, it is essential for the junta to initiate a genuine democratic transition process by entering into dialogue with opposition groups and establishing civilian rule in the country. Otherwise, it will not be easy to end the civil war in the country in the short to medium term.

[1] “Myanmar Election’s Third Phase to Cover Fewer Areas Than Thought”, Irrawaddy, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/politics/myanmar-elections-third-phase-to-cover-fewer-areas-than-thought.html, (Access Date: 31.12.2025).

[2] “Sunday Polls Bring Hopes To Myanmar, Govt Says On Election Eve”, Bernama, https://www.bernama.com/en/news.php/?id=2506514, (Access Date: 31.12.2025).

[3] “Myanmar Election’s Third Phase to Cover Fewer Areas Than Thought”, a.g.e., (Access Date: 31.12.2025).

[4] Same palce.

[5] Same place.

Dr. Cenk TAMER
Dr. Cenk TAMER
Dr. Cenk Tamer graduated from Sakarya University, Department of International Relations in 2014. In the same year, he started his master's degree at Gazi University, Department of Middle Eastern and African Studies. In 2016, Tamer completed his master's degree with his thesis titled "Iran's Iraq Policy after 1990", started working as a Research Assistant at ANKASAM in 2017 and was accepted to Gazi University International Relations PhD Program in the same year. Tamer, whose areas of specialization are Iran, Sects, Sufism, Mahdism, Identity Politics and Asia-Pacific and who speaks English fluently, completed his PhD education at Gazi University in 2022 with his thesis titled "Identity Construction Process and Mahdism in the Islamic Republic of Iran within the Framework of Social Constructionism Theory and Securitization Approach". He is currently working as an Asia-Pacific Specialist at ANKASAM.

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