The National Security Strategy document,[1] published with the signature of the President of the United States of America (US) Joe Biden on October 12, 2022, contains important clues about the future of American foreign policy. In this context, the document is also very important in terms of understanding how the relations and struggle of the US with China, its main rival in the global power struggle, will be shaped.
As it is known, China is an actor that wants a larger share in the international system due to its economic growth. For this reason, while the Beijing administration defends multipolarity by opposing the American-led unipolar world order through international structures such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS, it also seeks to deepen interstate interdependence by bringing its own commercial system and trade routes to the center of the global economy through initiatives such as the Belt-Road Project.
Of course, this means that the most serious challenge to American leadership comes from Beijing. As a result, since Barack Obama’s presidency, the Washington administration has turned its gaze to China and focused on Indo-Pacific geopolitics.
After being elected the US President for the second time, Obama made his first foreign visit to the countries surrounding the Malacca Strait. These visits can be seen as the start of the containment strategy that the Trump administration is currently implementing against China through alliances such as the Quad Security Dialogue (QUAD) and AUKUS.
In the Trump era, China has been described in the US National Security Strategy Document as “an actor challenging American leadership.”[2] In this framework, Trump had opened trade wars in an attempt to bring the Beijing administration to its knees by harming China economically. Also, the containment strategy has been expanded and sustained by the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” discourse.
At this point, it can be seen that the Biden administration has increased pressure on China. In this sense, the Washington administration appears to be testing Beijing’s limits with Nancy Pelosi’s, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, Taiwan visit.[3] In fact, the US National Security Strategy Document, which was released shortly after the Taiwan Crisis, contains an important idea about the future of the Washington administration’s China policy.
In the document, the Biden administration defined China as an actor that should be contained together with Russia and gave wide coverage to Beijing’s actions. The document, which includes China among the autocratic regimes, asserted that the Beijing administration’s actions posed a threat to the international system[4] and accused China of pursuing a revisionist foreign policy.[5]
In this context, it can be predicted that the US President, who stated that China has increased its sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific geography[6] and that the Washington administration owes its global power to the alliances it has developed its allies, will expand its containment strategy towards China and exploit AUKUS and QUAD. In fact, the expansion of the QUAD may be the agenda once more in the following period. Furthermore, the emphasis on strengthening deterrence against China reflects the US’ desire to increase its military presence in the Indo-Pacific region.[7] As a result, it is expected that Washington will prioritize strengthening ties with Tokyo and Seoul. It is also possible that the US will increase pressure on India in order to make New Delhi abandon its equilibrium policy.
On the other hand, the document highlights the fact that China’s economic and technological power is devastating, revealing that the economic relations developed by European states with China are being called into question by Washington. This indicates that the Washington administration wants to see Europe on its side in the fight against China. In this sense, the US is attempting to gain the support of European states by emphasizing values such as democracy and human rights. In other words, it emphasizes soft power through ideological elements.[8]
In addition, the Biden administration has indicated that it will implement a strategy aimed at weakening the Beijing administration from within, with a particular focus on separatist structures in China. As a result, it can be predicted that the issues referred to as China’s soft belly will be raised more frequently by the US in the future, and Beijing’s nerve endings will be tested. Washington will almost certainly demand that Western capitals align with it on this issue by emphasizing human rights. It can even be argued that Washington will force Europe to make a choice.
Finally, it should be noted that the document takes a critical stance toward China in terms of combating climate change. This highlights the importance of gaining Europe’s support on climate change and implementing an isolation policy that limits China in every way.[9]
As a result, according to the National Security Strategy document dated October 12, 2022, and signed by Biden, the main rival of the US in the global power struggle is China. The document’s emphasis also reveals that the Washington administration’s main goal is to limit China, which it sees as a potential hegemonic power. Accordingly, it can be suggested that the United States will try to increase its military presence in the Indo-Pacific geography, deepen allied relations, conduct a strategy aimed at expanding existing alliances, discuss Europe’s relations with Beijing and take steps to test China’s nerves.
[1] “National Security Strategy”, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf, (Date of Accession: 18.10.2022).
[2] “National Security Strategy of the United States”, The White House, December 2017, p. 3.
[3] Cenk Tamer, “What Could China’s Red Lines in Taiwan Be?”, ANKASAM, https://www.ankasam.org/what-could-chinas-red-lines-in-taiwan-be/?lang=en, (Date of Accession: 18.10.2022).
[4] “National Security Strategy”, op. cit., p. 3.
[5] “National Security Strategy”, op. cit., p. 8.
[6] “National Security Strategy”, op. cit., p. 23.
[7] “National Security Strategy”, op. cit., p. 20.
[8] “National Security Strategy”, op. cit., p. 24.
[9] Ibid.
