As of June 2025, the African continent is witnessing not only an increase in the number of conflicts but also a significant transformation in their nature. Recent data published by the “Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)” shows that violence is spreading not just in traditional hotspots, but also in border areas and regions where new actors are gaining influence.[1] Especially the Sahel region, West Africa’s coastal states, and northern regions of Mozambique stand out in this month’s report as three critical crisis zones. Developments in these regions threaten not only local security but also signal the beginning of a new era in which fragile state structures across the continent are being redefined.
At the core of these evolving conflict dynamics lie complex processes such as the weakening of state authority, the rise of alternative order-providing actors gaining legitimacy, and shifting positions of international powers. In the Sahel, for instance, the emergence of proto-state structures by Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) represents not only a security threat but also an alternative model of governance. Similarly, the rise in attacks in countries like Benin, Togo, and Ghana, previously regarded as relatively stable, reveals a new axis of jihadist expansion and compels a reassessment of the continent’s security architecture. In Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado region, the resurgence of ISIS-linked groups is once again drawing international attention to this zone.
The geographical spread and intensity of attacks throughout June in the Sahel illustrate not only the failure of central governments but also the ineffectiveness of regional security cooperation. The harsh security measures implemented by military transition regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are not only failing to stop groups like JNIM but are also weakening public support and strengthening the legitimacy of armed actors. ACLED’s data does not only record actions carried out by non-state groups but also documents human rights violations by state forces, indicating that the prevailing security strategy relies solely on armed repression. This ultimately leads to the collapse of the state’s capacity to regulate civilian space in the long run.
Targeted attacks on Fulani communities, in particular, are laying the groundwork for the resurgence of ethnic-based violence. Jihadist groups exploit the perception of marginalization of these communities by state forces to gain sympathy, after which they establish armed control in these areas, impose taxation, and reinforce their legitimacy. This dynamic blur the lines between battlefield and governance, intertwining violence with administration. In areas where JNIM’s presence is concentrated, the group’s legal mechanisms, conflict resolution bodies, and networks of influence through local leaders constitute an alternative process of norm production. Therefore, violence is not only a destructive act, but also as a strategy to build a new political order.
Developments in countries like Benin, Togo, and Ghana clearly show that the jihadist threat is not confined to the Sahel. According to ACLED data, the number of jihadist attacks in Benin in just the first five months of 2025 has already surpassed the total recorded for all of 2024.[2] This surge highlights that there are security gaps in the border areas of coastal states and armed groups exploit these vulnerabilities. In this context, there is a pressing need to reassess regional cooperation mechanisms. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) lacks the military capacity and intelligence coordination required not only for crisis response but also for proactive security building.
The Cabo Delgado region in northern Mozambique represents another critical turning point. Following the relative success of the Mozambican army, backed by the Wagner Group in 2021, conflict in the region had subsided. However, as of June 2025, fighting has reignited. The “Islamic State-affiliated Ahlu Sunna Walijama’a (ASWJ)” group has reasserted control in rural areas and launched attacks on strategic military bases. According to ACLED, dozens of soldiers have been killed and hundreds of civilians displaced as a result of attacks in April and May. These developments underscore that security is not lasting and military victories backed by foreign support are temporary unless converted into structural solutions.
This landscape once again highlights that Africa’s security challenges cannot be addressed solely through military interventions. Armed groups are not only expanding in weakly governed areas but also in socioeconomically marginalized regions, capitalizing on the absence of the state. Their sources of financing are becoming increasingly diverse—gold smuggling, livestock trade, illegal migration networks, and local taxation mechanisms all contribute to a sustainable revenue model. This indicates that traditional counter-terrorism strategies are no longer sufficient, and a multidimensional approach is required.
Within this context, the solution must go beyond military force. There is a need to build social justice mechanisms and ensure that the state’s presence is felt not only through coercion but also through service delivery. Investments in health, education, infrastructure, and local economic development can strengthen public trust and loyalty to the state. Furthermore, reforms to eliminate ethnic and sectarian discrimination can help rebuild the relationship with the targeted communities like the Fulani.
In light of current data, three key developments are expected in the upcoming period. First, the areas of control held by JNIM and other armed groups in the Sahel region will continue to expand. This spread will be felt not only in rural areas but also in strategic towns, and the governance capacity of these groups will increase. Second, security violations in the coastal states of West Africa will become more systematic, and these countries will be compelled to adopt foreign policies focused on internal security. Third, the conflict in Mozambique may initiate a discussion on a new regional security architecture in East Africa. This could bring the restructuring of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) onto the agenda.
In conclusion, ACLED’s most recent data reveals that in Africa, conflict is not only increasing in quantity but also evolving in character. Non-state actors are no longer merely terrorizing forces—they are building alternative systems of governance. This situation indicates debates on state reconstruction in Africa must be approached not only from a security standpoint but also through socio-political and economic lenses. Otherwise, the spiral of violence will continue to spread and lack of resolution will become entrenched. Preventive diplomacy, integrated development planning, and multilateral cooperation mechanisms will be critical in shaping the future of the continent.
[1] “Regional Overview Africa”, ACLED, June 2025, https://acleddata.com/2025/06/06/africa-overview-june-2025/, (Accessed: 23.06.2025).
[2] Ibid.
