The most concrete and long-term step in Armenia’s radical opening towards the West, which began in the period preceding the Second Karabakh War, has been Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s subsequent plans to lease the transport route in the Trump Route project. Pashinyan announced that extraordinarily long-term leasing scenarios to the United States, such as for 49 or 99 years, were being actively negotiated for this route, which aims to establish a connection between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan, in order to ensure the return on heavy investment and the financial guarantees of the investors (the US side).[i] While the physical construction of the project is planned to commence in the second half of 2026, such a long-term US engagement poses a serious strategic challenge to Russia’s traditional security and sphere of influence by altering the geopolitical status quo in the region.
This strategic axis shift has been reflected in Russia’s diplomatic discourse. Russia’s Ambassador to Armenia, Sergey Kopyrkin, described the relations between the two countries with the “tango” metaphor on October 24, 2025, stating that progress requires bilateral effort due to existing disagreements and misunderstandings.[ii] The Ambassador confirmed that the “Trump Route” was addressed in the high-level Russia-Armenia dialogue, and while conveying the message that Moscow supports every step that will bring peace, he added that they are awaiting the details of the route. In the same context, Armenia’s emphasis on the benefits of its Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) membership and its current characterization of the prospect of EU membership as “more hypothetical” can be read as an effort by Moscow to underscore its economic leverage over Yerevan.
However, Yerevan’s turn towards both regionalism and the US-centered West is being balanced by pragmatic regional cooperation established with Russia and Azerbaijan. Prime Minister Pashinyan gave a significant signal regarding the normalization of relations with Azerbaijan on November 7, 2025, announcing that they are actively considering the possibility of importing various goods from Russia via railway through Azerbaijan.[iii] Following the thousand-ton wheat shipment (November 6), which marked the first railway transit since the 1990s, applications for the import of different products are currently being processed, and practical ways for the route for the export of Armenian goods to Russia or Kazakhstan are being explored. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk also confirmed that “positive progress” has been achieved for transit with Azerbaijan’s approval.[iv] This situation indicates that Armenia’s pursuit of strategic autonomy is converging with a policy of regionalism within the framework of opening regional communication lines and economic necessities.
This multifaceted political atmosphere has deepened the erosion of trust and the information warfare between the two allies. Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, on November 10, 2025, drew attention to allegations that a “hybrid war,” similar to those in Georgia and Moldova, is being waged in Armenia by the West to interfere in internal processes and exert political blackmail.[v] Although Zakharova stated that Russia has always remained a reliable ally, this rhetoric reflects Moscow’s growing concern over Western influence in Yerevan. In response, the Pashinyan government, on November 12, 2025, dismissed the claims by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service that Armenia would prefer more expensive Ukrainian grain in exchange for EU funds as an “absolute misunderstanding,”[vi] and signaled its determination to maintain pragmatism in the economic sphere by conveying the message that it would continue its Russian grain policy.
The tension in relations reached a peak on November 14, 2025, with Armenia’s clearest demonstration of its claim to national sovereignty against Moscow. The Armenian Prosecutor General’s Office refused to extradite businessman Ruben Tatulyan, who is wanted by Russian law enforcement for serious charges including fraud, forming an organized criminal group, and murder, on the grounds that he is an Armenian citizen.[vii] This refusal, coinciding with the announcement of the Trump Route negotiations, partially demonstrates that the Pashinyan government is presenting an institutional challenge to Moscow by utilizing judicial independence, and that Yerevan is taking irreversible steps toward shaping its new geopolitical identity.
Within the context of these events, the situation for the post-2025 period is that the multifaceted strategy implemented by Armenia in its foreign policy is transforming into an unsustainable tension between Russia’s hardening reaction and the West’s attractive offers. Actions such as the Pashinyan government’s open announcement of negotiations to lease the Trump Route project to the US and the refusal to extradite the businessman sought by Russia, Tatulyan, indicate that Yerevan has begun to use its claim of national sovereignty against Moscow’s traditional hegemony in an irreversible manner. Russia’s characterization of Western influence in Armenia as a “hybrid war” will increase Moscow’s tendency to view Yerevan not as a reliable ally, but as a Western proxy tool in the Caucasus. This situation may lead Russia to question its security and economic support for Armenia, and even to punish Yerevan by activating indirect pressure mechanisms through the EAEU and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Consequently, the financial and strategic support Armenia expects from the West may prove insufficient to balance the economic and security costs resulting from the deterioration of relations with Russia, potentially leading to new instabilities and crises in domestic politics and social life.
Nevertheless, Armenia’s efforts to revitalize trade routes via railway through Russia and Azerbaijan, and Pashinyan’s policy favoring Russian grain over Ukrainian grain, are a critical balancing element demonstrating that Yerevan will not abandon economic pragmatism. In the coming period, these economic integration efforts focused on regionalism will serve to mitigate the geopolitical risk created by the Yerevan government’s strategic moves towards the West. It is likely that Azerbaijan and Russia will maintain political and economic pressure on Armenia by keeping this economic route (the part outside the Trump Route) operational, yet prevent a sudden rupture that would entirely push the country into the Western axis. This scenario is the strongest realistic possibility indicating that the South Caucasus will continue to be a complex geopolitical area marked by strategic competition but continued economic cooperation, rather than transforming into a sharp fault line. However, this balance is susceptible to disruption at any moment, or even sliding into a proxy crisis, due to the possibility of Russia deploying severe security responses should the Trump Route be implemented and the US’s permanent presence in the region be definitively established.
As a result of this chain of events, Armenia has concretized its pursuit of strategic autonomy by taking steps toward establishing a long-term institutional bond with the US (the Trump Route) and by its firm defense of national sovereignty against Russia’s judicial request at the end of 2025. This pro-Western stance has been met with Russia’s “hybrid war” rhetoric, but economic and logistical necessities have simultaneously compelled Armenia to revitalize trade with Russia via Azerbaijan and maintain pragmatism within the scope of its EAEU membership. Consequently, the Pashinyan government’s policies have pushed the erosion of trust in Russia-Armenia relations to an irreversible point, placing Yerevan on a high-geopolitical-risk, multi-stage balancing ground; this has turned the South Caucasus into a complex and fragile geography where economic cooperation and strategic competition between traditional hegemony and new Western engagement are intertwined.
[i] “Armeniya obsuzhdayet s SSHA dva stsenariya arendy ‘marshruta Trampa’”, Novosti, https://news.mail.ru/politics/68708661, (Access Date: 14.11.2025).
[ii] “Envoy: Russia, Armenia discuss “Trump Route” at highest levels”, Caliber https://caliber.az/en/post/envoy-russia-armenia-discuss-trump-route-at-highest-levels, (Access Date: 14.11.2025).
[iii] “Armenia Considering Importing Russian Goods Via Azerbaijan”, Russia’s Pivot to Asia, https://russiaspivottoasia.com/armenia-considering-importing-russian-goods-via-azerbaijan/, (Access Date: 14.11.2025).
[iv] “Aktobe ramps up efforts to prevent spring flooding”, Kazinform, https://qazinform.com/news/aktobe-ramps-up-efforts-to-prevent-spring-flooding-494b42, (Access Date: 14.11.2025).
[v] “Zakharova prokommentirovala zayavleniya o ‘gibridnoy voyne’protiv Armenii”, TASS, https://tass.ru/politika/25584021, (Access Date: 14.11.2025).
[vi] “Pashinyan: Armeniya ne namerena otkazyvatsya ot rossiyskogo zerna”, TASS, https://tass.ru/ekonomika/25600377, (Access Date: 14.11.2025).
[vii] “Armeniya ne vydast Rossii sochinskogo biznesmena Tatulyana”, TASS, https://tass.ru/proisshestviya/25627687, (Access Date: 14.11.2025).
