The month of December 2022 witnessed developments that showed that the Beijing administration’s Middle East opening accelerated rapidly. In this context, the participation of Chinese President Xi Jinping in the China-Arab Countries Summit and the China-Gulf Cooperation Organization Summit held on 7-9 December 2022 made a lot of noise.[1]
At the same time, the development in question was also interpreted as rapprochement between Beijing-Riyadh. Considering that Saudi Arabia has not taken steps to confront Russia on oil prices despite the pressure of the United States of America (USA) and that it has joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with the status of “Dialogue Partner” at the SCO Dushanbe Summit held in August 2021, it can be said that Riyadh is willing to improve its relations with Beijing and Moscow.
Of course, there are also claims that this rapprochement has elicited Iran’s response. Therefore, in order to understand the current state of relations between Beijing and Tehran, it is necessary to examine the visit of Chinese Vice Premier Hu Chunhua to Tehran on December 13, 2022.
As it will be remembered, in the final declaration of the China-Arab Countries Summit, it was pointed out that Iran’s regional activities created instability and the situation in question led to Tehran’s reaction. In fact, Iranian President Ibrahim Reisi opened this issue to discussion during his meeting with Hu and said, “Some of the issues that have come up during the Chinese President’s recent visit to the region have caused dissatisfaction and complaints in the Iranian people and government.”[2] Hu’s visit also garnered attention because it took place in the shadow of the statement in question.
At this stage, it is possible to interpret Hu’s visit to Tehran in two ways because, during the same time period, Xi was visiting Riyadh. The first of these is that China maintains its contacts with Saudi Arabia at the presidential level, that is, at the highest level, while choosing to establish relations with Iran at a lower level. This can be interpreted as there being some problems between Beijing and Tehran. Still, considering that Xi’s visit to Riyadh took place within the scope of the summit, it can be stated that this would be an exaggerated assessment. For this reason, it is useful to put forward the second perspective. This means that Hu’s visit was developed within the framework of the “China-Iran 25-Year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement” signed in March 2021, and therefore things are on track. The indications that strengthen this interpretation are found in the statements made at the summit and in the memorandums of understanding signed.
The most important consideration in the meeting between Reisi and Hu is that Hu stated that China has always respected Iran’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity and supports Tehran’s efforts to secure its core interests.[3] On the occasion of these words, Hu implied that the Beijing administration is in solidarity with Tehran in the face of the protests in Iran. This can be described as a support that Iran expects in such a period. Also, in the context of regional developments, Hu made a statement by saying, “China’s determination to strengthen and deepen its relations with Iran will continue regardless of regional and international developments.”[4]
During Hu’s visit, a meeting of the “Iran-China Comprehensive Cooperation Program” was also arranged. Speaking at the meeting, Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber said, “Tehran is ready to develop cooperation with Beijing in various sectors such as energy, transit and co-production.”[5] and he emphasized the potential for cooperation between the two countries. This means that there is no serious problem between the parties. As a matter of fact, in the context of the “China-Iran 25-Year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement”, 16 different memorandums of understanding were signed for the implementation of projects related to energy, oil, natural gas, joint investments, banking, trade, foreign exchange, strategic transit and ports.[6] It was also stated that the cooperation between the parties will be discussed in detail at a meeting to be held later between Xi and Reisi and a road map will be drawn up for the relations.[7]
All these developments mean that China cares about relations with Iran and sees the Tehran administration as an important partner in the Belt and Road Project. Because the memorandums of understanding signed are a harbinger that the relations between the parties will continue to develop. Consequently, it can be argued that Beijing’s Gulf Opening, especially through energy-based needs, is not a step taken against Iran. On the contrary, when the visit schedule is considered, China is almost like saying, “End the disagreements between you. Because I don’t want instability in the region within the framework of the Belt and Road Project.”
At this point, it is necessary to remind the Iran-Gulf normalization, which came to the agenda in March 2021 and was discussed through various meetings until August 2022. Because the process indicates that while the Beijing administration increases its influence in the Middle East, it may want to mediate the normalization processes between Tehran and Riyadh. Therefore, it is possible to talk about a Chinese reality that wants to fill the power vacuum created by the USA’s withdrawal from the Middle East and tries to achieve the image of a “peace-building actor” while doing so. In fact, the approval of Iran’s “full membership” status at the Dushanbe Summit, where Saudi Arabia joined the SCO with the status of “dialogue partner”, shows that a certain balance is being observed.
As a result, China is opening to the Middle East for various reasons, especially its energy needs and the security of the Belt and Road Project. This expansion has two basic sheet metal pillars. One of them is the Gulf countries, the other is Iran. Although the convergence on the Beijing-Riyadh line is among the possibilities that the rapprochement in Tehran is among the possibilities, Hu’s visit has revealed that there is no serious problem in China-Iran relations.
[1] Neslihan Topcu, “Background of China and Saudi Arabia Meeting”, ANKASAM, https://www.ankasam.org/background-of-china-and-saudi-arabia-meeting/?lang=en, (Date of Accession: 14.12.2022).
[2] “İran, Cinping’in Riyad Ziyaretindeki Tutumundan Rahatsızlığını İletti”, TRT Haber, https://www.trthaber.com/haber/dunya/iran-cinpingin-riyad-ziyaretindeki-tutumundan-rahatsizligini-iletti-730545.html, (Date of Accession: 14.12.2022).
[3] “Reisi, Çin Başbakan Yardımcısı’nı Kabul Etti”, Mehr News, https://tr.mehrnews.com/news/1906432/Reisi-%C3%87in-Ba%C5%9Fbakan-Yard%C4%B1mc%C4%B1s%C4%B1-n%C4%B1-kabul-etti, (Date of Accession: 14.12.2022).
[4] “Ayatollah Raisi Stresses Implementation of Key Pacts Made in Previous Meetings between Iranian, Chinese Presidents / Dr Raisi: Some Positions Raised During Recent Visit of Chinese President to the Region Caused Iranian Nation, Gov’t to Complain”, President.ir, president.ir/en/, (Date of Accession: 14.12.2022).
[5] “Tahran’da “İran-Çin Kapsamlı İşbirliği” Toplantısı Gerçekleşti”, Mehr News, https://tr.mehrnews.com/news/1906427/Tahran-da-%C4%B0ran-%C3%87in-Kapsaml%C4%B1-%C4%B0%C5%9Fbirli%C4%9Fi-toplant%C4%B1s%C4%B1-ger%C3%A7ekle%C5%9Fti, (Date of Accession: 14.12.2022).
[6] “Minister: Iran, China Finalize MoUs to Implement 25-Year Deal”, Pars Today, https://parstoday.com/en/news/iran-i190776-minister_iran_china_finalize_mous_to_implement_25_year_deal, (Date of Accession: 14.12.2022).
[7] “Iran, China finalize 16 MOUs under 25-Year Agreement Framework”, Tehran Times, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/479673/Iran-China-finalize-16-MOUs-under-25-year-agreement-framework, (Date of Accession: 14.12.2022).
