As of 2025, when the global system is evolving towards multipolarity, China has become not merely an actor reacting to the great power rivalry in its foreign policy, but also a proactive strategic architect simultaneously shaping regional hubs. Amid the ongoing trade and technology tensions with the United States (US), the cautious cooperation maintained with Russia, and the quest for strategic autonomy developed with the European Union (EU), Beijing has been conducting a multi-layered foreign policy, particularly focusing on the regions of Southeast Asia and Central Asia.
In this context, China has been developing comprehensive economic partnerships with member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) based on digitalization, green transformation, and logistical integration; while in Central Asia, it aims to establish a new regional order founded on knowledge through energy, infrastructure, and technology transfer. These strategic orientations indicate that China is not only seeking economic leverage but also aiming to build sustainable power at the global level by enhancing its geopolitical, cultural, and normative influence.
As of 2025, China has been implementing a multi-layered strategy in its foreign policy, simultaneously focusing on Southeast Asia and Central Asia to enhance its capacity for global influence. Against the backdrop of ongoing economic and technological tensions with the US, a cautious and controlled cooperation framework with Russia, and debates over strategic autonomy with Europe, China seeks to balance geopolitical encirclement and strengthen its role in global supply chains through parallel initiatives in different regions. In this regard, digital and green-based integration with ASEAN countries is being deepened, while in Central Asia a new regional order is being shaped with an emphasis on energy, infrastructure, and expertise.
The most prominent development in the ASEAN leg of this strategy has been the completion of the 3.0 version of the Free Trade Agreement between China and ASEAN. The trade volume between China and ASEAN, amounting to $234 billion in the first quarter of 2025, has made ASEAN China’s largest trading partner. However, this agreement is not limited to trade figures alone. The new version of the agreement has established a framework for cooperation in strategic areas such as the digital economy, environmentally friendly production, and sustainable development; thus, ASEAN-China relations have transformed from classical trade boundaries into an integrated economic and technological partnership. President Xi Jinping’s ASEAN tour in April demonstrated that this transformation is being pursued not only from an economic but also from a geopolitical perspective. Emphasizing multilateralism, China has sought to revive the notion of “Asian solidarity” in an attempt to weave a regional line of resistance against the influence of the US.[1]
In this parallel, China’s relations with the EU also reflect similar multi-dimensional balancing strategies. During a meeting on May 19, 2025, between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and German politician Johann Wadephul, China’s reiteration of its “core interest” rhetoric regarding Taiwan demonstrated that Beijing follows a realist course in its foreign policy based on national interests rather than normative principles.[2] On the other hand, Germany’s message to China as a “predictable and reliable partner” indicates that the new Berlin Government is inclined to develop a more rational, pragmatic, and economically-centered roadmap for relations with Beijing. China’s criticism of the “risk avoidance” strategy and its encouragement of mutual interdependence in supply chains show that Beijing is attempting to assume a balancing role against economic polarization.
The meeting held on May 20, 2025, in Beijing between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and President of the Asia Society Kyung-wha Kang was a reflection of China’s soft power strategy aimed at managing perceptions in global public opinion. In the meeting, Wang Yi described the US restrictions on China’s semiconductor industry as “bullying” and reaffirmed China’s vision of cooperation based on “mutual respect” and “win-win” policy.[3] Kang’s promise, as President of the Asia Society, to continue an objective understanding of Chinese culture was another reflection of China’s efforts to control its image in Western public opinion.
On the same day, in a speech in Munich, Chinese Consul General Qiu Xuejun expressed that China views its economic relations with the EU not only at the trade level but also as one of the pillars of global stability. The 5.4% growth rate in the first quarter demonstrated the continuation of China’s economic dynamism, while the structural progress achieved in the areas of the digital economy and green development indicates that this growth is sustainable.[4] The foreign policy framework emphasized by Qiu through principles such as “true multilateralism” and a “shared future for humanity” reveals that China aims for long-term strategic partnerships not only with ASEAN but also with Central Asia and Europe.
This multidimensional foreign policy line was given an institutional framework at the meeting of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo at the end of April 2025. In the strategy shaped under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the concepts of “struggle” in foreign policy and “stability” in domestic policy were defined as fundamental principles. Artificial intelligence, domestic production capacity, and the software sector were declared as strategic priority areas in line with the goals of national security and economic autonomy.[5] At the same time, economic opening policies were adopted in markets outside of the US; free trade zones, customs reforms, and alternative global networks have become the structural pillars of this new phase.
One of the concrete reflections of this strategic opening in ASEAN was the new railway transport line initiated by the China State Post Bureau. The reduction of transportation time by 26 hours for the first freight train sent from Guangxi to Hanoi demonstrated that China has taken its logistical integration with ASEAN countries to a higher level. By 2025, the number of containers transported on this line had increased by 314% compared to the previous year, demonstrating the decisive impact of physical connections on economic relations.[6]
The green transformation vision emphasized by Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in the framework of ASEAN’s rotating chairmanship is also aligned with China’s partnership strategy with the region. Ibrahim’s announcement of direct engagement with the Gulf Cooperation Council reflects his intention to position ASEAN as an integrated economic area not only within Asia but also with the Middle East.[7] In this context, the economic growth model integrated with environmental responsibility is becoming a foreign policy tool that also supports China’s own internal transformation.
On the Central Asian front, China has developed a new partnership model based not only on energy supply but also on knowledge transfer and innovation. On May 10, 2025, the China-Central Asia Energy and Innovation Alliance was established; signed at the North China University of Energy in Beijing, this alliance has been supported by concrete projects such as smart energy grids, joint laboratories, and expert training programs.[8] This development reflects China’s desire to establish its influence in Central Asia on long-term and structural foundations.
Speaking at the “Central Asia-China” meeting held in Bishkek on May 23, 2025, former Kyrgyz Prime Minister Akylbek Japarov emphasized that China views the region not as a fragmented but as an integrated actor. Calling for partnership in areas such as transportation, green energy, digitalization, and expert training, Japarov argued that the “Central Asia-China” format should no longer remain symbolic but should instead be transformed into a mechanism for regional development.[9]
In the first scenario shaped in this context, the digital and green transformation-based integration that China has established with ASEAN is expected to transform into a regional “Asian Common Development Area” in the coming period. This partnership, institutionalized with the Free Trade Agreement 3.0, will expand to include logistics, production, and environmentally friendly infrastructure, while China aims to accelerate “de-dollarization” in regional trade through the “digital yuan” and cross-border payment systems. Green energy investments in countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia will strengthen Beijing’s environmental leadership, while regional countries are expected to directly benefit from low-cost infrastructure and expanding markets. However, the stable functioning of this structure is foreseen to depend on China’s adoption of a balanced partnership model that respects the strategic autonomy of ASEAN countries and is supported by elements of soft power.
In the second scenario regarding Central Asia, China’s growing presence in energy, technology, and infrastructure is expected to not only erode Russia’s traditional sphere of influence but also to pursue a new “smart power” strategy based on cooperation with the EU to limit the US’s influence in the region. In this context, China is expected to act not only as an actor building infrastructure in Central Asia, but also as a system builder working in coordination with Europe and introducing the region to a development model outside of the West in areas such as green transformation, digitalization, and expert training. This approach is projected to soften the US’s influence based on democracy and security, highlighting a more functional and mutually beneficial partnership platform. Should China be able to reflect the economic balance model it has developed with Europe in Central Asia, it will be possible to establish a multipolar, pragmatic, and sustainable order in the region that counters both Russia’s unilateral dominance and the US’s normative influence.
In conclusion, as of 2025, China’s simultaneous multi-layered foreign policy along the ASEAN and Central Asian axes is not limited to establishing regional economic partnerships; it also targets deeper structural transformations such as geopolitical balancing, normative influence, and the construction of strategic autonomy. The digital and green-based integration established with ASEAN is transforming China into the new system-building actor of the Asia-Pacific, while the new partnership model in Central Asia, based on energy, infrastructure, and knowledge transfer, reflects Beijing’s determination not only to compete with the West but also to produce a sustainable and multilateral balance against regional rivals such as Russia and the US. Should these strategies succeed, it appears inevitable that China will become not only an economic but also a diplomatic and cultural central power in the global arena.
[1] “China, ASEAN Complete Negotiations on Upgraded Free Trade Deal”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/markets/emerging/china-asean-complete-negotiations-free-trade-area-30-2025-05-21, (Access Date: 23.05.2025).
[2] “Chinese FM urges China, Germany to Deepen Win-Win Cooperation, Jointly Oppose Unilateralism, Protectionism”, Xinhua, https://english.news.cn/20250519/5089995be43a473fa7ba93d7001eefbd/c.html, (Access Date: 23.05.2025).
[3] “Wang Yi Meets with President of the U.S. Asia Society Kyung-wha Kang”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs the People’s Republic of China, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202505/t20250521_11629919.html, (Access Date: 23.05.2025).
[4] “Keynote Speech by Chinese Consul General in Munich Qiu Xuejun at the Breakfast Club of Chinaforum Bayern”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs the People’s Republic of China, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/zwbd/202505/t20250521_11629716.html, (Access Date: 23.05.2025).
[5] Matthew Johnson, “Stabilization and ‘Struggle’: Strategic Signals from April’s Politburo and Trade Meetings”, The Jamestown, https://jamestown.org/program/stabilization-and-struggle-strategic-signals-from-aprils-politburo-and-trade-meetings, (Access Date: 23.05.2025).
[6] “Kitay Zapustil Novyy Gruzovoy Zheleznodorozhnyy Marshrut v Strany ASEAN”, TV BRICS, https://tvbrics.com/news/kitay-zapustil-novyy-gruzovoy-zheleznodorozhnyy-marshrut-v-strany-asean, (Access Date: 23.05.2025).
[7] “Premyer-Ministr Malayzii Anvar Ibragim Rasskazal o Prioritetakh Predsedatelstva Strany v ASEAN”, TV BRICS, https://tvbrics.com/news/premer-ministr-malayzii-anvar-ibragim-rasskazal-o-prioritetakh-predsedatelstva-strany-v-asean, (Access Date: 23.05.2025).
[8] “Novyy Kitaysko-Tsentralnoaziatskiy Energeticheskiy Alyans Natselen na İnnovatsii i Sotrudnichestvo”, News Central Asia, https://www.newscentralasia.net/2025/05/23/novyy-kitaysko-tsentralnoaziatskiy-energeticheskiy-alyans-natselen-na-innovatsii-i-sotrudnichestvo, (Access Date: 23.05.2025).
[9] “Tsentralnaya Aziya Vazhna Dlya Kitaya Kak Yedinyy Region — Zhaparov”, EADaily, https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2025/05/23/centralnaya-aziya-vazhna-dlya-kitaya-kak-edinyy-region-zhaparov, (Access Date: 23.05.2025).
