The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Heads of State Council Summit held in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, in October 2025 reflected Russia’s efforts to shift towards a “win-win” policy as a result of the weakening of its hegemonic power in the region, as well as the quest for strategic autonomy of the Turkic Republics in Central Asia. Russia is moving away from its former tough stance with the aim of making the CIS operate as a complementary organization alongside other regional structures such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The “CIS Plus” platform approved at the summit carries the goal of maintaining influence for Russia in this context, but as emphasized by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, it is seen by Central Asian countries as a multilateral tool that develops trade, centered on national interests.
The CIS Heads of State Council Summit held in Dushanbe in October 2025 and the strategic decisions taken in this regard, highlight the complex balance between Russia’s efforts to maintain its influence in the post-Soviet geography in the post-Cold War era and the multi-vector and national interest-centered regional integration strategies of the Central Asian Turkic Republics. The summit revealed the community’s efforts to adapt to the region’s realpolitik necessities by expanding the traditional Russia–centric integration model with a new and flexible platform called “CIS Plus.” This strategic step explains the CIS’s continued presence for over thirty years, not only through the preservation of a common market and humanitarian sphere, but also by repositioning itself as an “adaptability tool” in the face of changing global geopolitics.[i]
This enlargement of the CIS, namely the establishment of the CIS Plus platform, aims to transform Russia’s fundamental geopolitical objective into a more flexible and proactive coordination mechanism that promotes the secure and consistent development of the Eurasian community.[ii] As emphasized by Russian President Vladimir Putin, the primary function of the CIS Plus is to establish an exploratory and consultative mechanism that aims to expand the organization’s scope to include key transit and economic partners such as the Middle East, South Asia, and even Türkiye, while enabling the ‘‘flexible’’ involvement of external actors in addressing specific regional issues.[iii] This platform arises from the need to optimize the integration and coordination of critical geo-economic infrastructure projects such as the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Middle Corridor, repositioning the CIS as a multipolar geopolitical coordination tool by strengthening its ties with existing multilateral structures such as the EAEU and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In this respect, updating the Military Cooperation Concept by 2030 and new action plans in the field of security covering the period 2026-2030, as well as granting the SCO observer status within the CIS, demonstrate the CIS’s efforts to establish its security architecture on a long-term and institutional basis. Furthermore, CIS Plus can also be interpreted as a collective resistance mechanism against the West’s allegations of provoking fragmentation processes within the CIS.[iv]
However, the dynamics of this integration are shaped by the Central Asian Republics’ pursuit of national interests and strategic autonomy. The initiatives of Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the summit reveal that he views the CIS Plus as a multilateral tool centered on national interests and realpolitik circumstances, rather than as a means of falling under Russian influence. Despite President Tokayev’s statement of “conviction to eternal alliance” due to the $28 billion bilateral trade volume with Russia and a shared land border of over 7,500 km, which points to a deep connection based on geographical destiny and economic necessity, Kazakhstan’s strategy has focused on cultural diplomacy and strategic infrastructure construction.[v] In this context, the proposal to establish a “creative industries union” aimed at strengthening cultural and economic ties, along with projects for the modernization and digitization of Trans-Eurasian corridors, aims to position Kazakhstan as a central logistics hub between East and West. These projects can be seen as a strategic move to balance Russia’s traditional hegemonic dominance by increasing the country’s regional influence and setting a new generation of digital logistics standards across the CIS. From this perspective, Kazakhstan views the CIS as a platform for maximizing its own geo-economic interests.
On the other hand, Russia’s integration policy centers on its soft power strategy and cultural-linguistic hegemony. The conference in St. Petersburg and the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly meetings academically confirm that this cultural-linguistic substructure carries a geopolitical purpose aimed at strengthening political and economic ties on the Russian axis, with an emphasis on the Russian language as an “investment in a common future.”.[vi] Russia’s trade volume with CIS countries reaching $112 billion in 2024 and 96% of mutual transactions being conducted in national currencies are concrete outcomes of Moscow’s policy to enhance financial sovereignty against external influences and intensify trade. In this regard, disinformation analysis of conspiracy theories and fake quotes, such as the West’s plans to reduce the population of Russia and CIS countries to 15 million, has claimed that such narratives originate not in Western politics but in internal propaganda mechanisms, thereby justifying Russia’s regional integration efforts.[vii]
Indeed, the CIS Plus format approved at the Dushanbe Summit represents one of the CIS’s most important strategic transformations in the post-Cold War era. Although this expansion is an attempt by Russia to integrate its traditional sphere of influence into the broader geo-economic and geopolitical fault lines of Eurasia, particularly the Turkic Republics of Central Asia, led by Kazakhstan, tend to use this platform not as a “perpetuation of Russian influence” but as a multilateral and flexible realpolitik tool that maximizes their own national interests. The future of the CIS will be shaped at the intersection of Russia’s centralizing hegemonic desire and Central Asia’s quest for strategic autonomy. This has the potential to transform the community from a classic integration union into a “multilateral coordination council” that manages the balance of power in Eurasia. Vladimir Putin’s closed-door briefing on the positive outcome of the US talks in Alaska regarding the resolution process in Ukraine shows that regional integration efforts remain the main agenda item for CIS leaders, even in the shadow of global geopolitical tensions.
Looking ahead, the establishment of the CIS Plus provides critical clues as to how the geopolitical architecture of the Eurasian region will take shape in the upcoming 2026-2030 period. In light of Russia’s previously emphasized goal of acting in concert with the EAEU and transforming the CIS into an inclusive coordination tool, it is expected that CIS Plus will conduct ad hoc consultations with key geo-economic partners such as China, India, Iran, and Türkiye through a “flexible engagement” model. In this strategy, Russia will seek to preserve the EAEU as the core of deep economic integration within a win-win policy framework, while using the CIS Plus to ensure logistical coordination, particularly in projects such as the INSTC and the Middle Corridor, and to establish an expanded “security shield” against security threats (terrorism, border security). Yet, the Central Asian Republics will remain committed to utilizing the CIS Plus as a de facto balancing mechanism, centering their own “creative industries” and “digital logistics” projects (as exemplified in the case of Kazakhstan) against Russia’s soft power strategy. This situation will create a “strategic duality” in which, despite the CIS remaining institutionally aligned with Russia, the national interests of other member countries will become increasingly decisive in operational and economic practices. This process will enhance the effectiveness of the CIS while limiting Russia’s ability to exercise absolute hegemony.
A second prediction is that the CIS Plus format will serve as a vital “multilateral buffer zone” for the countries of the region in managing the impacts of global power competition (particularly between the West and Russia/China) in Eurasia. As mentioned earlier, Russia’s efforts to conduct 96% of its mutual transactions with CIS countries in national currencies push regional countries to deepen their economic ties with Moscow in pursuit of financial sovereignty, while CIS Plus will be a platform based on realpolitik necessities that allows for avoiding a definitive alignment in the political and military spheres. In this sense, the success of CIS Plus will depend on how sensitive Russia is to the sovereignty concerns of CIS countries in the long run and how much it supports national interest projects such as infrastructure modernization led by Kazakhstan. If Russia leaves the “win-win” approach reflected in the text as mere rhetoric and fails to continue supporting regional integration efforts, which are the main agenda of CIS leaders, in the shadow of developments in Ukraine, CIS Plus will face the risk of becoming a symbolic structure that cannot rein in Central Asia’s multi-vector foreign policy. Therefore, the future of CIS Plus will depend less on deepening integration and more on its ability to reconcile the interests of regional actors and ensure the sustainability of coordination.
The approval of the CIS Summit and the CIS Plus platform marks the community’s most significant strategic transformation since the end of the Cold War: an effort to transition to a win-win-oriented, multilateral integration model, which recognizes Russia’s declining hegemonic power. On the one hand, this model reflects Russia’s goal of positioning the CIS as an expanded security and trade coordination tool by acting in concert with the EAEU; while also showing the tendency of the Central Asian Turkic Republics, led by Kazakhstan, to use this platform as a tool to strengthen their strategic autonomy against Russian influence, increase trade volume, and support geo-economic infrastructure projects, based on their national interest-centered realpolitik approaches. Thus, the future of the CIS will be shaped by the dynamic balance between Russia’s traditional desire for clout and Central Asia’s growing demands for autonomy. The CIS Plus formation has the potential to evolve from a single-axis bloc into a multilateral and adaptable coordination council that manages the balance of power in the Eurasian geography.
[i] “Meeting of the CIS Council of Heads of State”, President of Russia, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78183, (Access Date: 17.10.2025).
[ii] “CIS + Trade & Development Platform To Be Created: Potential Partners and Analysis”, Russia’s Pivot to Asia, https://russiaspivottoasia.com/cis-trade-development-platform-to-be-created-potential-partners-and-analysis, (Access Date: 17.10.2025).
[iii] “CIS leaders establish CIS Plus platform”, TASS, https://tass.com/politics/2027885, (Access Date: 17.10.2025).
[iv] “Naryshkin: Zapad Pytayetsya Sprovotsirovat Dezintegratsionnyye Protsessy v SNG”, TASS, https://tass.ru/politika/25374631, (Access Date: 17.10.2025).
[v] “Initsiativy Prezidenta K.-ZH.Tokayeva Kak İnstrument Forsayt-Integratsii Stran SNG – Rossiyskaya Gazeta”, SNG, https://e-cis.info/news/566/131327/, (Access Date: 17.10.2025).
[vi] “V. Matviyenko Napravila Privetstviye Uchastnikam Mezhdunarodnoy Konferentsii ‘Russkiy Yazyk – Osnova Integratsionnogo Dialoga v Regione SNG’”, Sovet Federatsii Federalnogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy, http://council.gov.ru/events/news/169895, (Access Date: 17.10.2025).
[vii] “‘Naseleniye Rossii i Stran SNG Khoteli Sokratit do 15 Millionov Chelovek’: Razbor Mifov o ‘Planakh Zapada’ Protiv Rossii”, Delfi, https://www.delfi.lt/ru/detektor-lzhi/lozh/naselenie-rossii-i-stran-sng-hoteli-sokratit-do-15-millionov-chelovek-razbor-mifov-o-planah-zapada-protiv-rossii-120162085, (Access Date: 17.10.2025).
