Colombia’s recognition of Israel’s presence in the Golan Heights on August 10, 2026, has been one of the first notable steps in foreign policy under the new President Abelardo de la Espriella’s administration. With the decision, Colombia has become the second country to recognize Israel’s presence in the region, following the United States (US), which took similar action in 2019. The Bogota administration justified its decision based on the ongoing instability in the Middle East and the strategic importance of the Golan Heights for Israel’s security.[i] However, the significance of the development is not limited to Israel-Colombia relations. The fact that another state is following the position that the United States has largely maintained as exceptional within the international community for seven years means that the principle of non-recognition of territory acquired by force is increasingly being eroded.
The current legal status of the Golan Heights forms the starting point of this discussion. Israel captured most of the Golan Heights, which belong to Syria, during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and applied Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration to the region in 1981. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in the same year, reaffirmed that the acquisition of territory by the use of force is unacceptable with its unanimously adopted Resolution 497 and declared Israel’s decision “null and void and lacking international legal effect.”[ii] Therefore, the recognition of Israel’s presence in the Golan by third states does not automatically change the region’s status under international law. In contrast, the preferences of states to recognize or not recognize this status are important in terms of showing how this status is received in international politics and to what extent established norms are maintained thru state practice.
In this regard, the first significant break occurred in 2019. The then U.S. President Donald Trump recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel with a presidential proclamation; in the justification of the decision, he highlighted the region’s strategic importance for Israel’s security and the threats originating from Syria.[iii] Thus, Washington, while deviating from the international consensus on the legal status of the Golan Heights, used security needs as a political justification supporting the recognition of sovereignty. However, the fact that the U.S. position has not been followed by other states for a long time has ensured that this decision remains an exceptional application rather than a pattern that transforms international state practice. Colombia’s decision in 2026 to take a similar stance for security reasons extends this exception beyond the foreign policy preferences of a single state for the first time.
The timing of Colombia’s decision is also significant. De la Espriella announced that diplomatic relations with Israel, which were severed during Gustavo Petro’s term, would be reestablished before he takes office on August 7, 2026; an agreement has been reached between the two countries regarding the reappointment of ambassadors and the relocation of the Colombian Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.[iv] The Petro administration severed diplomatic relations with Israel in 2024 due to the war in Gaza, while the new administration’s steps in its early days indicate a broader repositioning of Colombia’s policy toward Israel and the Middle East, alongside the normalization of bilateral relations. The Golan decision can therefore be considered not as a singular recognition decision but as part of a broader transformation in which the new administration is redefining Colombia’s international partnerships and its position on certain foreign policy issues.
This transformation also makes the relationship between foreign policy identity and state practice toward international norms visible. De la Espriella’s approach of reestablishing relations with Israel and strengthening security and political cooperation with the United States indicates that the new administration is defining Colombia in a different international position compared to the Petro era.[v] It is also evident that this repositioning is not limited to Israel policy alone. On the same day, the Colombian administration abandoned its policy of recognizing the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and adopted a position supporting Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over Western Sahara.[vi] The new administration’s departure from previous state practice on two different contentious sovereignty issues just three days after taking office makes it possible to consider the Golan decision not as a singular diplomatic choice but as part of a broader transformation in Colombia’s recognition policy and foreign policy orientation.
At this point, it is necessary to distinguish between the legal validity and political resilience of the norm of recognition. Colombia’s decision does not change the existing legal framework. The advisory opinion given by the International Court of Justice in 2024 regarding the occupied Palestinian territories, although in a different legal and geographical context, has reiterated the prohibition of acquiring territory by force and the obligation not to recognize unlawful situations by third states.[vii] Therefore, the recognition of Israel’s presence in the region by two states does not mean that a new international legal norm regarding the Golan has emerged.
The debates on objections to norms in the literature of international relations are important for understanding this distinction. As Nicole Deitelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann have pointed out, the emergence of an objection to a norm does not automatically mean that the norm has weakened or disappeared; the nature of the objection and whether it targets the fundamental validity of the norm or its application to a specific case is important.[viii]
The Colombian decision can be interpreted, in this regard, not as a direct rejection of the norm of non-recognition, but rather as an expansion of the exception area in the application of the norm to a specific case. Indeed, neither the United States nor Colombia explicitly rejects the principle of the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force; both states justify the Golan Heights as a special case based on Israel’s security and regional instability. This distinction is important. Because the political resilience of international norms can become contentious not thru their outright rejection but thru the increasing interpretation of certain cases as “exceptions.” The fact that the approach adopted unilaterally by the United States in 2019 was followed by Colombia in 2026 with a similar security rationale does not yet indicate that the boundaries of the norm of non-recognition have changed. However, if the same justification is adopted by other states, the discussion could transform into a broader political reinterpretation process regarding in which situations the norm should be applied, moving beyond singular exceptions.
In contrast, the initial international reactions to Colombia’s decision also indicate that the political consensus around the norm of non-recognition has not yet been undermined. In addition to the Arab League, Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have rejected the decision; statements emphasized that the status of the Golan would not change with unilateral recognition decisions and that Colombia’s stance was inconsistent with international law and United Nations resolutions.[ix] These reactions indicate that the exceptional interpretation developed by the United States and Colombia has not yet transformed into an alternative state practice accepted by other actors.
In conclusion, Colombia’s decision on the Golan Heights serves as an example of the political resilience of established international norms in the face of changing foreign policy identities and security priorities, rather than a change in the legal validity of the norm of non-recognition. The fact that the United States’ long-standing exceptional position has been followed by a second state, while not sufficient to say that the boundaries of the norm have changed, and the framing of Golan as a special case for security reasons, shows that established norms can be opened to debate at the practical level without being directly rejected. Therefore, the long-term significance of the Colombian decision will be seen not so much in the decision itself, but in whether the exceptional state practice it presents remains limited at the international level.
[i] “La Colombie reconnaît l’annexion du plateau du Golan par Israël”, Le Figaro, https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/la-colombie-reconnait-l-annexion-du-plateau-du-golan-par-israel-20260811 (Date Accessed: 11.08.2026).
[ii] “Resolution 497”, United Nations Security Council, 17 Aralık 1981, https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-180751/, (Date Accessed: 11.08.2026).
[iii] “Proclamation on Recognizing the Golan Heights as Part of the State of Israel”, The White House, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-recognizing-golan-heights-part-state-israel/, (Date Accessed: 11.08.2026).
[iv] “De la Espriella pledges to restore Colombia’s relations with Israel”, Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/24/de-la-espriella-pledges-to-restore-colombias-relations-with-israel (Date Accessed: 11.08.2026).
[v] “Colombia president-elect to open Israel embassy in Jerusalem”, France24, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260716-colombia-president-elect-to-open-israel-embassy-in-jerusalem, (Date Accessed: 11.08.2026).
[vi] “Colombia retira su reconocimiento a la República Árabe Saharaui y se acerca a Marruecos”, Cadena SER, https://cadenaser.com/nacional/2026/08/10/colombia-retira-su-reconocimiento-a-la-republica-arabe-saharaui-y-se-acerca-a-marruecos-cadena-ser/, (Date Accessed: 12.08.2026).
[vii] “Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem – Summary of the Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024”, International Court of Justice, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20240719-sum-01-00-en.pdf, (Date Accessed: 11.08.2026).
[viii] Nicole Deitelhoff & Lisbeth Zimmermann, “Things We Lost in the Fire: How Different Types of Contestation Affect the Robustness of International Norms”, International Studies Review, 22(1): 51–76, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viy080, ss. 70-71.
[ix] Diego Stacey, “Colombia abre una crisis diplomática con los países árabes al reconocer la soberanía de Israel sobre los Altos del Golán”, El Pais, https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2026-08-11/colombia-abre-una-crisis-diplomatica-con-los-paises-arabes-al-reconocer-la-soberania-de-israel-sobre-los-altos-del-golan.html, (Erişim Tarihi: 12.08.2026).
