Armenia’s Western Move and the Change of Balance of Power in the South Caucasus

Armenia’s EU orientation questions Moscow’s power in the South Caucasus.
Moscow can use diplomatic and economic tools to pressure Yerevan.
The West’s support for Armenia will be the critical factor defining the success of this process.

Paylaş

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Armenia’s initiation of the European Union (EU) membership process could lead to severe changes in the geopolitical structure in the South Caucasus. The law on the subject, which the Armenian Parliament adopted with 64 votes in favour on March 26, 2025, was approved by President Vahagn Khachaturian on April 4, 2025 and joined the force.[1] Although this law does not directly express a membership application, it has great symbolic significance in terms of the political orientation of the process.

This result is a foreign policy choice and an effort to restructure regional security policy and economic relations. Moscow believes this move is a strategic variation in its sphere of impact. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk stated that economic ties between the two countries should be reassessed if Yerevan enters the EU integration process.[2] This explanation actually signals economic pressure and sanctions dangers. It reveals the potential costs for Armenia’s foreign policy independence.

Similarly, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that they are in favour of preserving the “traditional friendly” format of relations. However, she suggested that the actions taken by Yerevan could put this structure at risk.[3]It is observed that the Kremlin is using soft power elements instead of direct conflict. Energy policies, media campaigns, and diplomatic pressure stand out among these methods.

Russia’s main crisis is weakening Armenia’s ties with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). The deep integration approach with the EU questions institutional duty to these institutions and emphasises Moscow’s closed approach to the multi-alliance model.

Moscow’s lack of military support for Armenia after the 2020 Karabakh War has led to a profound questioning of Russia’s reliability as a country within the country. This crisis of trust in society and political elites has triggered a Western-oriented exposure in Armenia’s foreign policy. The basis of this orientation is the search for security and economic independence.

By May 2025, Armenia’s EU orientation has made structural changes in diplomacy and military and defence policies. Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan declared that the country’s dependence on a single source for defence imports had been reduced by 95%.[4] This announcement means that dependency on the Russian defence industry has ended. It shows that Armenia has entered a process of opening up to the West in its defence architecture.

This transformation is not only a supply diversification but also part of a long-term strategic repositioning. Armenia is likely to participate in joint practices with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), move towards defence reforms in line with European standards, and set defence partnerships with nations such as France and Germany. At the same time, this growth could pave the way for incorporating the domestic defence industry into the West.

A radical change in Armenia’s defence ideology could accelerate the country’s preference to move its security architecture away from Russia-centred structures. In particular, the institutionalisation of technical collaboration with the European Defence Agency and NATO will contribute to the organisation of Western military standards. In this process, tools such as grants, military training programs and technology transfer from the West to modernise defence power may be on the agenda.

Nevertheless, this new perspective also has risks. Russia’s military presence in Armenia may weaken. This could lead to Moscow forming new tensions on the border. In addition, the Tehran regime may be uncomfortable with Armenia’s integration into Western security systems. In this context, it seems likely that Russia will improve pressure on Armenia with soft power approaches via energy dependency, trade regulations, media tools and the diaspora in order to reestablish its influence in the South Caucasus. The Kremlin might try to challenge the approchement process with the EU by creating influenced instability in the border regions.

The European Parliament includes Armenia’s reform initiative but states that the procedure will be long term as the official application has not yet been made. The Speaker of the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, Annita Demetriou, highlighted that peace with Azerbaijan is key to the EU process.[5] Armenia’s EU integration process strengthens pro-Western actors in the country’s domestic approaches. Needs for democratic reform are becoming important to politics; areas of social resistance are improving against authoritarian tendencies. Concepts such as transparency, accountability and the rule of law are becoming part of political speech.

These results are anticipated to accelerate institutional shift in Armenia in the long term and allow the country to align more powerfully with European values. Policies aimed at fighting corruption in public organisations, establishing judicial autonomy and supporting civil society will play a crucial part in understanding the pace of the EU integration process. Yet, new border tensions with Azerbaijan or regional safety dangers could increase the risks of the process. In this context, the continuity of the economic and political support packages that Brussels will show to Armenia will strengthen reformist actors.

Moscow may use indirect techniques such as energy dependency, soft power systems through the diaspora, and trade regulations to stop this process. Kremlin may increase economic force by using energy prices and resort to information strategies that will guide public opinion-building campaigns through the Armenian diaspora abroad. In addition, disinformation activities targeting Armenia’s domestic politics through Russia’s ruling media platforms may provoke social polarisation. These plans aim to prevent Yerevan from the EU path, and they are trying to be useful through geoeconomic pressures.

As a result, although symbolic in the short term, Armenia’s EU orientation means a strategic axis change that will affect the balance of power in the South Caucasus in long term. This process’s future depends on Armenia’s determination for reform and the continuity of technical and political support that the EU will provide. At the same time, this integration can’t gain political legitimacy without establishing a permanent peace with Azerbaijan.


[1] “Armenia Adopts Law to Launch EU Accession Process”, Politico, https://www.politico.eu/article/armenia-adopts-law-launch-european-union-accession-process/, (Access Date: 20.05.2025).

[2] “Russia to Build Power Plant in Armenia with Investment of $1.2 bln”, TASS, https://tass.com/economy/1934845, (Access Date: 20.05.2025).

[3] “Russia Says Armenia Risking ‘Irreparable’ Damage to Ties”, Azatutyun, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32860300.html, (Access Date: 20.05.2025).

[4]“FM Mirzoyan Says Armenia will Pursue EU Membership Step by Step”, Armenpress, https://armenpress.am/en/article/1220159, (Access Date: 20.05.2025).

[5] “President of Armenia Signs Law on Launching EU Accession Process”, Armenpress, https://armenpress.am/en/article/1220006, (Access Date: 20.05.2025).

Aybike VRESKALA
Aybike VRESKALA
Hacettepe University, Department of English-French Translation and Interpretation (Double Major) and Middle East Technical University, Department of International Relations (Special Student)

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