As 18 years have passed since the outbreak of the Russia-Georgia War, the European Union’s (EU) statement dated August 7, 2026, has once again rendered visible a remarkable shift regarding the security issue in Georgia. Alongside its long-standing criticism of Russia’s military presence, demarcation activities, and restrictions on freedom of movement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EU also draws attention to the attempts to de facto integrate these regions into Russia’s regulatory and security sphere. However, the developments in 2026 indicate that this process has acquired a new institutional dimension.[i]
Understanding these developments is crucial. Although the situation in Georgia has been explained for many years in the international relations literature through the concept of a “frozen conflict,” current developments indicate a continuous transformation proceeding below the threshold of open warfare, rather than a static conflict environment. Therefore, the fundamental issue in the Georgian case is no longer merely whether the unresolved consequences of the 2008 war persist. The more significant question is to what extent a country’s sovereignty can be eroded through political, legal, economic, and security instruments before formal annexation occurs, and with what means Europe can respond to this more gradual form of coercion.
Following the war in 2008, Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, whereas the EU maintained its support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. Subsequent to the EU-mediated Six-Point Agreement of August 12, 2008, the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) was established, aiming to stabilize the security situation in the region. Today, the EUMM continues to operate with approximately 200 monitors, performing functions such as preventing the resumption of hostilities, supporting the security of communities living adjacent to the administrative boundary lines, and building confidence between the parties. Conversely, although the mission’s mandate covers the entirety of Georgia’s internationally recognized territory, the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia deny the EUMM access to the territories under their control.[ii]
Over the intervening 18 years, this situation has demonstrated that the cessation of military hostilities did not terminate the struggle for political control over the territory. Particularly within the scope of the process defined as “borderisation,” the establishment of physical barriers, fences, and control mechanisms along the administrative boundary lines, coupled with restrictions on freedom of movement and detention practices, have progressively rendered the division between the breakaway regions and the rest of Georgia more tangible in daily life. A recent academic study published in March 2026 also addresses the borderisation process in Georgia through the lens of “gray zone” strategies, highlighting the capacity of these practices to generate legal and spatial control without overt warfare or formal annexation.[iii]
This framework reveals why the concept of a frozen conflict is becoming increasingly inadequate to explain the situation in Georgia. The term frozen conflict evokes a situation where the fundamental political dispute remains unresolved, yet the status quo on the ground remains largely static. However, in the case of Georgia, even if the status does not formally change, the substance of the status quo is altering. The fortification of physical borders, the deepening of institutional relations between Russia and the breakaway regions, and the increasing integration in the fields of security, economy, and legislation demonstrate that the post-war order is not stagnant. Therefore, interpreting the process in Georgia as the erosion of sovereignty through gradual integration, rather than the continuation of a frozen conflict, appears to possess greater explanatory value.
The “Agreement on the Deepening of Allied Cooperation,” signed between Russia and the de facto administration of South Ossetia on May 9, 2026, constitutes one of the most recent manifestations of this transformation. The agreement envisions the expansion of coordination in foreign policy, defense, and security, as well as the harmonization of legal norms and the development of a common space to facilitate the movement of capital, goods, services, and labor. In the ensuing weeks, the de facto leader Alan Gagloyev’s announcement that he would step down from his position to become an advisor to Vladimir Putin, stating that he would assume a role in implementing the agreements regarding Russia-South Ossetia integration, formed another indicator of the deepening political ties. Concurrently, the appointment of Marat Kambolov, who had long served in the Russian state system, as the de facto prime minister of South Ossetia has rendered the administrative dimension of institutional integration more visible. The EU has also evaluated the agreement and Kambolov’s appointment among the current indicators of attempts to de facto integrate the region into Russia’s regulatory and security space. Nonetheless, Moscow and the de facto administration of South Ossetia have not yet taken a referendum or a similar step toward formal annexation.[iv]
What is noteworthy here is that integration can practically deepen prior to the legal completion of annexation. Furthermore, this process is not entirely novel. The study by Thomas Ambrosio and William Lange, which examines 78 agreements signed by Russia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia post-2008, demonstrates that bilateral treaties regulating military, economic, and political relations have over the years constructed a comprehensive legal architecture.[v] In this regard, the new agreement in 2026 is not an abrupt rupture but can be assessed as a new and more comprehensive stage of an institutional structure that has been developing for an extended period.
Precisely at this juncture, the European Union’s position in Georgia becomes more complex. On the one hand, the EU is not a completely ineffective actor in the region. The continuous field presence of the EUMM, its co-chairmanship role in the Geneva International Discussions, and the diplomatic activities conducted through the Special Representative for the South Caucasus illustrate that the security architecture forged by Europe post-2008 is still functional. The presence of the EUMM offers a tangible capacity in terms of generating information, monitoring incidents, de-escalating tensions, and supporting local security around the conflict zones. However, the limits of this capacity are equally pronounced.[vi] The mission’s lack of access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia exposes the divergence between Europe being present on the ground and its ability to establish a direct influence over developments within the disputed territories. In other words, while the EUMM can contribute to preventing the conflict from escalating back into military confrontation and managing current security risks, the same instruments cannot be expected to reverse the regions’ gradual integration with Russia. Therefore, it is imperative to distinguish between Europe’s capacity to produce stability and its capacity to transform the political status quo within its security policy in Georgia.
The significance of this distinction heightens further when considering the transformation in Georgia’s own political relations with the EU. Although Georgia obtained EU candidate status in December 2023, the accession process effectively stalled in 2024. The European Commission’s 2025 enlargement assessment characterized developments such as the regression in the rule of law and fundamental rights, the suppression of the opposition and protesters, the politicization of the judiciary, and the shrinking of civil society space as severe democratic backsliding, evaluating Georgia merely as a “candidate country in name only” under current conditions.[vii] In June 2026, the European Parliament also asserted that any further EU engagement with the Georgian government should be contingent upon concrete and verifiable steps directed at reversing the democratic backsliding.
The Georgian government, for its part, rejects the accusations of authoritarianism and rapprochement with Russia leveled against it, characterizing certain actions of the opposition as attempts to overthrow the constitutional order. In contrast, the sentencing of ten individuals to lengthy prison terms in May 2026 in connection with the protests held during the 2025 local elections, and the imprisonment of Levan Khabeishvili, one of the opposition leaders, in the same month, demonstrate the persistence of the country’s internal political tension.[viii]
Thus, an unusual dichotomy emerges for Europe regarding the Georgia dossier. While the EU’s security presence continues, its political influence is waning. Through the EUMM, Europe sustains the only international monitoring mission on the ground and diplomatically supports Georgia’s territorial integrity. Conversely, the membership perspective, which was once one of the EU’s most paramount instruments of political influence, no longer yields the same transformative capacity due to democratic backsliding. This situation is pivotal as it demonstrates that security presence does not automatically translate into political leverage. Moreover, there is no straightforward choice for the EU. The relaxation of democratic criteria on geopolitical grounds could undermine the conditionality mechanism that underpins the enlargement policy and the Union’s normative assertions. In contrast, the gradual erosion of the membership process’s political impact could constrain Europe’s long-term room for maneuver in Georgia during a period when Russia is deepening its integration over the breakaway regions. Consequently, Georgia is mutating into an arena where the EU’s capacity to concurrently manage normative conditionality and geopolitical competition is being tested.
In conclusion, the case of Georgia illustrates that the absence of a military resumption of a conflict does not signify the cessation of the struggle over sovereignty. While the War in Ukraine brings to the forefront the capacity for deterrence and defense against overt military aggression in European security, Georgia demonstrates that gradual methods proceeding below the threshold of war can also transform political and institutional reality over time. This situation renders the distinction between producing stability and being able to preserve the status quo more visible for Europe. Therefore, Georgia should not solely be regarded as an unresolved conflict lingering from 2008, but rather as a contemporary test of the EU’s capacity to translate its security presence into political influence and to devise a long-term strategy against sovereignty erosion that manifests in various forms.
[i] “Georgia: Statement by the Spokesperson marking 18 years since the outbreak of the war between Russia and Georgia”, European External Action Service (EEAS), https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/georgia-statement-spokesperson-marking-18-years-outbreak-war-between-russia-and-georgia_en, (Access Date: 09.08.2026).
[ii] “Our Mandate”, European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, 2026, https://www.eumm.eu/en/about_eumm/mandate, (Access Date: 10.08.2026).
[iii] Olga Dorokhina, “’Borderization’ as a Tool of Gray Zone Warfare: The Case of Georgia”, AUC Studia Territorialia, 25(2): 43–70, çevrimiçi yayın tarihi: 24 Mart 2026, https://doi.org/10.14712/23363231.2026.3, ss. 67-69.
[iv] Mamie Powers, “South Ossetia and Russia Make Further Steps Toward Annexation”, The Jamestown Foundation, 6 Haziran 2026, https://jamestown.org/south-ossetia-and-russia-make-further-steps-toward-annexation/, (Access Date: 10.08.2026).
[v] Thomas Ambrosio & William A. Lange, “The Architecture of Annexation? Russia’s Bilateral Agreements with South Ossetia and Abkhazia”, Nationalities Papers, 44(5): 673–93, 2016, https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1203300, ss. 676.
[vi] “EU Statement on the 67th round of the Geneva International Discussions, OSCE Permanent Council No. 1572”, EEAS, 10 Temmuz 2026, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna-international-organisations/eu-statement-67th-round-geneva-international-discussions-osce-permanent-council-no-1572_en, (Access Date: 10.08.2026).
[vii] “2025 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy (extract about Georgia)”, EEAS, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/2025-communication-eu-enlargement-policy-extract-about-georgia_en, (Access Date: 10.08.2026).
[viii] Lucy Papachristou, “Georgia hands down long sentences to election-day protest organisers”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/georgia-hands-down-long-sentences-election-day-protest-organisers-2026-05-07/, (Access Date: 10.08.2026); “Georgia jails opposition figure who urged ‘peaceful revolution’ for 2-1/2 years”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/georgia-jails-opposition-figure-who-urged-peaceful-revolution-2-12-years-2026-05-21/, (Access Date: 10.08.2026).
