The executive order dated January 14, 2026, states that the United States (U.S.) is entirely dependent on imports for 12 critical minerals and relies on imports for more than 50% of its supply of 29 critical minerals.[i] The risks posed by dependence on foreign sources for processed critical minerals and products manufactured from them—in terms of national security, the defense industry, and critical infrastructure sectors—are accelerating Washington’s efforts to diversify its sources of supply. The U.S. Geological Survey’s 2026 report also highlights the American economy’s dependence on other countries for strategically important minerals. Against this backdrop, the United States is seeking to strengthen its economic relations not only with traditional partners such as Australia and Canada but also with countries in Latin America, Africa, and Central Asia.[ii] This pursuit reflects not only the need to access alternative sources of raw materials but also the goal of establishing reliable partnerships throughout the value chain, from the extraction and processing of critical minerals to their use in industrial production.
Within this broader search, Central Asia stands out because of its natural resources and geographical position between Asia and Europe. However, China’s economic presence in the region is underpinned by a long history of infrastructure investments, energy agreements, trade links, and financial instruments, while Russia continues to exert influence through historical, institutional, and societal ties. Consequently, the most significant challenge facing the United States in regional competition is the mutual interdependence that China and Russia have developed with Central Asian states. Although this interdependence is unlikely to disappear in the short term, Washington can offer the countries of the region an alternative. Indeed, the multidirectional foreign policy approach adopted by Central Asian states in recent years provides the United States with considerable room for maneuver. Countries in the region, particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are seeking to expand their economic and diplomatic cooperation with Western actors while maintaining their relations with Russia and China. Accordingly, the U.S. outreach to Central Asia is evolving at the intersection of Washington’s regional objectives and Central Asian states’ efforts to diversify foreign investment, secure technology transfers, and gain access to external markets.
The C5+1 mechanism constitutes the institutional pillar of this engagement.[iii] In a region where Russia and China maintain strong economic and political ties, C5+1 provides Washington with an opportunity to develop economic and diplomatic cooperation at the regional level. The platform, established in 2015,[iv] began convening at the presidential level after 2023. The establishment of the Critical Minerals Dialogue in 2024[v] and the emphasis on economic cooperation at the summit held in Washington in 2025 demonstrate that diplomatic relations are increasingly acquiring a more comprehensive economic dimension.[vi] During this process, Washington has been institutionalizing its political engagement with regional states while promoting an investment environment in which American companies can operate in mining, the energy industry, and transportation. C5+1 is thus evolving beyond a platform for diplomatic consultations into a mechanism that supports the United States’ economic objectives in the region.
In this context, Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s plans to attend the C5+1 meeting in Samarkand with a business delegation expected to include representatives of more than 100 American companies are particularly noteworthy.[vii]This initiative is a significant indication of Washington’s efforts to support its regional partnerships through private-sector investment. Indeed, the expansion of American companies’ activities in the region could foster new economic linkages involving the extraction of natural resources, their processing, their integration into production processes, and their transportation to international markets.
At this point, Türkiye stands out as an important actor in the geoeconomic deepening of U.S. strategy toward Central Asia, owing to its political and economic relations with regional states, the cooperation mechanisms institutionalized within the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), and the transportation links it seeks to strengthen through the Middle Corridor. The potential complementarity between the United States’ capital, technology, and access to global markets, on the one hand, and Türkiye’s regional connectivity and industrial infrastructure, on the other, could add a new dimension to Washington’s economic outreach to Central Asia. In particular, the processing of critical minerals, the development of industrial investments, and the facilitation of regional countries’ access to international markets are among the areas in which the economic interests of the two countries could converge.
In this context, the Middle Corridor is one of the principal economic connections reinforcing Türkiye’s regional position. Linking Central Asia to Europe via the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye, the route offers an alternative trade connection to transportation corridors running through Russia. For the United States, this alternative is important because it can diversify transportation options for investments in the region, improve the predictability of delivery times, and facilitate access to international markets. However, realizing the corridor’s economic potential depends on the development of railway and port connections, the expansion of logistics capacity, and the reduction of border-crossing difficulties. In this regard, U.S.–Türkiye cooperation could extend beyond the use of the existing route to include investment partnerships aimed at enhancing transportation capacity.
Of course, the relationship between the Middle Corridor and China’s Belt and Road Initiative must not be overlooked. Through the memorandum of understanding on harmonization signed by Türkiye and China in 2015,[viii] the Middle Corridor became part of the trade network facilitating China’s access to the European market. Accordingly, it is clear that the Chinese dependence the United States seeks to reduce in Central Asia is not limited to natural resources but also encompasses production, financing, and transportation processes. For Washington to increase its economic influence in the region, it must also develop alternative investments to China’s existing trade links. This is precisely where the importance of cooperation with Türkiye becomes apparent. Ankara’s position along the Middle Corridor, its transportation infrastructure, and its strong relations with regional states could help expand the United States’ economic presence along the route and integrate its activities in Central Asia more closely into international trade networks.
From Ankara’s perspective, growing U.S. economic interest in the Middle Corridor offers new opportunities to develop transportation infrastructure and expand regional investment relations. Türkiye’s priority in this process could be to pursue its own economic and strategic objectives through its relations with the relevant actors without becoming drawn into U.S. competition with China. Indeed, Türkiye’s policy toward Central Asia extends well beyond Washington’s objective of enhancing the security of critical mineral supplies. For Ankara, the region holds long-term strategic importance, encompassing not only economic relations but also the development of political, institutional, and societal ties. These differences in U.S. and Turkish priorities in the region make it possible to develop selective, mutually beneficial cooperation in areas where their interests overlap.
Against this backdrop, the United States’ engagement with Central Asia through a large business delegation should not be viewed merely as an initiative to bring American capital into the region. Investments by American companies in mining, energy, industry, and transportation could lay the groundwork for new economic linkages in the region’s production and trade relations. In this process, the partnerships Washington develops directly with Central Asian states could lead to the emergence of economic networks in which Türkiye plays only a limited role. Therefore, for Türkiye, the key is not simply to monitor the transformation of regional economic relations but to strengthen existing institutional and economic connections through concrete investment projects. In particular, supporting cooperation developed within the OTS with joint projects in transportation, energy, industry, and technology would reinforce Türkiye’s role in regional economic development while enabling it to secure a more active position in shaping new investment relationships.
In conclusion, the geoeconomic deepening of U.S. policy toward Central Asia demonstrates that Washington views the region not merely as an arena of strategic competition among major powers but also as a region capable of strengthening the supply security of the American economy and diversifying global production networks. Indeed, the institutionalization of the C5+1 mechanism, initiatives in the field of critical minerals, and growing interest from the American private sector point to an expanding network of relations that is moving beyond diplomatic rapprochement toward economic partnership. Developing economic relations with Türkiye could provide opportunities to strengthen Washington’s strategy toward Central Asia. Such cooperation could create a new avenue through which Ankara can advance its objectives of developing the Middle Corridor and promoting economic integration with the Turkic world.
[i] “Adjustıng Imports Of Processed Crıtıcal Mınerals And Theır Derıvatıve Products Into The Unıted States”, TheWhite House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/01/adjusting-imports-of-processed-critical-minerals-and-their-derivative-products-into-the-united-states/, (Date Accessed: 10.10.2026).
[ii] “Mineral Commoidty summaries 2026”, USGS, https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026.pdf, (Date Accessed: 10.10.2026).
[iii] “C5+1”, U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Kazakhstan, https://kz.usembassy.gov/c51/, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.10.2026).
[iv] “Ten Years of C5+1: U.S.–Central Asia Minerals Cooperation”, CSIS, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ten-years-c51-us-central-asia-minerals-cooperation, (Date Accessed: 10.10.2026).
[v] Wilder Alejandro Sánchez, “The Upcoming C5+1 Dialogue on Critical Minerals”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2026/06/the-upcoming-c51-dialogue-on-critical-minerals/, (Date Accessed: 10.10.2026).
[vi] Paulo Aguiar, “Trump’s C5+1 Gamble: Can America Reclaim Central Asia?”, Geopolitical Monitor, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/trumps-c51-gamble-can-america-reclaim-central-asia/, (Date Accessed: 10.10.2026).
[vii] “Rubio to Lead Major U.S. Business Delegation to Uzbekistan for C5+1 Talks”, The Times of Central Asia, https://timesca.com/rubio-to-lead-major-u-s-business-delegation-to-uzbekistan-for-c51-talks/, (Date Accessed: 10.10.2026).
[viii] “A. Eda Ünlü Özen, Türkiye ile Çin 7 anlaşma imzaladı”, Anadolu Ajansı, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/turkiye-ile-cin-7-anlasma-imzaladi/473607, (Date Accessed: 10.10.2026).
