The United States’ decision, announced on July 28, 2026, marks a new phase in the Washington-Beijing technology competition, extending from screens to factories and the power grid.[i] The Federal Communications Commission added power converters connected to advanced robotic devices manufactured abroad to its list of prohibited items for safety reasons. The regulation largely prevents the importation, marketing, and sale of new, unapproved models in the US. The use and sale of previously approved devices, however, continues.
While the political target of the decision is Chinese manufacturers, the legal scope is broader than the manufacturer’s nationality. The text classifies relevant devices manufactured in foreign countries according to their place of manufacture and leaves room for conditional authorization for products officially determined to be safe. Defense or homeland security authorities may grant exceptions for power converters, and the defense authority for robots. This structure gives Washington selective access based on country, company, and product class.[ii]
The importance of this step stems from the fact that robots serve as the application layer of artificial intelligence in the physical world. While large language models produce information, advanced robots perceive the environment, translate decisions into action, and work with people in shared spaces. A platform carrying a camera, microphone, location data, lidar, motion sensor and cloud connection is a mobile computer that constantly collects data. A security vulnerability in the software in such a device may cause consequences such as stopping the production line, opening doors or harming people.
The prominence of humanoid and quadruped robots in the security debate stems from their mobility. While humanoid systems can be used in warehouses, factories, and service areas designed for human labor, quadruped models can navigate irregular terrain such as stairs, tunnels, power plants, and disaster zones. These same characteristics make them valuable for monitoring critical facilities, military reconnaissance, border surveillance, and missions in hazardous areas. A remotely controlled machine, or one connected to external servers, combines data security with physical security in a single device.
China’s advantage in this field does not appear to be limited to a single popular brand. The country’s extensive electronics manufacturing network, battery capacity, motor and actuator supply, rapid prototyping capabilities, and large domestic market provide scale for robot manufacturers. In 2024, of the 542,000 industrial robots installed worldwide, 295,000 were commissioned in China, accounting for 54% of global installations.[iii] The number of active industrial robots in Chinese factories has also exceeded 2 million. While these figures do not directly represent the size of the humanoid robot market, they demonstrate the industrial depth required for mass production.
For the U.S., the risk extends beyond Chinese companies entering the market with cheaper robots. A platform that becomes widespread early on may bring its own software ecosystem, maintenance network, training data, and parts standard. Once factories are configured according to a specific robot architecture, changing suppliers becomes very costly. Therefore, instead of intervening after market share is established, Washington is trying to influence today which technology will shape future systems.
The integration of power converters with robots highlights the energy dimension of the decision. These devices convert direct current (DC) generated by solar panels and batteries into alternating current (AC) usable by the grid and data center equipment. Next-generation models feature internet connectivity for remote monitoring, software updates, and grid management. Unauthorized access could allow an attacker to alter power flow, collect data, or shut down multiple devices simultaneously. A digital breach could thus translate into physical consequences such as outages, equipment damage, and fire.
This vulnerability becomes more critical with the rapidly growing electricity needs of artificial intelligence infrastructure. In the USA, data centers consumed approximately 4.4 percent of total electricity in 2023. It is estimated that this rate may increase between 6.7 percent and 12 percent in 2028.[iv] The security of converters operating between renewable generation, battery storage, and data centers therefore directly impacts the continuity of AI capabilities. It is not enough to protect chip access; the control layer of the electricity that powers the chip must also be secured.
Washington’s approach demonstrates the expansion of regulatory tools developed for telecommunications security to include robotics and energy technologies. The scope previously applied to communications equipment, surveillance systems, drones, and routers. Now, similar authority is being applied to mobile machinery and devices that manage the flow of electricity. Thus, the Federal Communications Commission is transforming from a classic communications regulator into a more powerful security actor overseeing the gateway to the market for critical digital hardware.
The decision could create a protected domestic market for American robotics companies. Limiting the price and production advantages of Chinese competitors could make it easier for domestic startups to find investment and increase order volume. Conversely, the cost of robot research, training, logistics, and use in small businesses may increase. Reduced competitive pressure could slow down product development. Furthermore, the inability of domestic production of power converters to quickly meet demand could create delivery time and cost pressures in solar energy, storage, and data center projects.
Excluding existing models from the scope of the program, while smoothing the transition, creates a different security issue. Devices in the field will remain dependent on the manufacturer for maintenance, spare parts, and software updates. Closing update channels could lead to the growth of vulnerabilities, while keeping them open could allow the disputed remote access to continue. Without inventorying devices, isolating them from networks, restricting data flow, and implementing independent security audits, halting new sales alone will not eliminate the established risks.
How the conditional authorization mechanism is implemented will determine the reliability of the decision. A broad restriction based on the country of manufacture, while providing quick protection, could place technically secure products in the same category as weak ones. Clearly published criteria such as source code review, software component list, location of update servers, data localization, remote shutdown authorization, and supplier ownership are required. If a transparent testing regime is established, exceptions can be prevented from appearing as a political bargaining tool.
The response of allies will also influence the direction of the global market. Europe, Japan, and South Korea may seek conditional permission to protect their manufacturers’ access to the US market. If safety requirements are harmonized, a network of reliable suppliers of robotics and energy equipment could emerge. If each country develops its own standards, manufacturers will have to comply with different software, communication module, and data management rules. This fragmentation, while increasing costs, could push China to establish an alternative market around its own technical standards.
Beijing’s response could be shaped by export permits, critical components, or the activities of American companies in China. Robots rely on a complex chain of motors, sensors, batteries, rare earth magnets, semiconductors, and precision machining equipment. Even if the US restricts the final product, China-based intermediate goods could remain in production in the short term. Effective restructuring requires component manufacturing alongside domestic assembly, a skilled workforce, secure software, and commitments to large-scale procurement.
In conclusion, the decision demonstrates that the AI competition has transcended the algorithm and chip race, reaching instead the machines that move and the hardware that manages electricity. Who sees the data collected by the robots, who can remotely control the machines, and which software powers the converters that supply energy to data centers are becoming strategic power factors. Washington’s success will depend not on closing the import channel, but on establishing a secure, competitive, and scalable manufacturing ecosystem. Otherwise, restrictions imposed for security reasons could increase costs and shift technological dependency to other links in the chain.
[i] Alexandra Alper ve David Shepardson, “Trump administration bans new Chinese humanoid robots, to protect US AI buildout”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-administration-ban-new-chinese-robots-inverters-protecting-us-ai-buildout-2026-07-28/, (Date Accessed: 29.07.2026).
[ii] “Addition of Foreign-Produced Power Inverters and Advanced Robotic Devices to FCC Covered List”, DA 26-786, Federal Communications Commission, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-786A1.pdf, (Date Accessed: 29.07.2026).
[iii] “Global Robot Demand in Factories Doubles Over 10 Years”, International Federation of Robotics, https://ifr.org/ifr-press-releases/news/global-robot-demand-in-factories-doubles-over-10-years, (Date Accessed: 29.07.2026).
[iv] “DOE Releases New Report Evaluating Increase in Electricity Demand from Data Centers”, U.S. Department of Energy, https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-releases-new-report-evaluating-increase-electricity-demand-data-centers, (Date Accessed: 29.07.2026).
