The attacks in the Black Sea in July have caused the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which transports Kazakh oil to world markets, to fall more than 20% below its planned loading levels. While daily shipments have fallen to the range of 1.2 to 1.3 million barrels, the amount that has not reached the international market has been approximately 400,000 barrels.[i] Thus, the Russia-Ukraine War has begun to directly impact Kazakhstan’s energy revenues, which are far from the front lines.
In the same days, ships carrying grain in Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and maritime corridor have once again become targets. In an attack on a ship flying the flag of Guinea-Bissau and carrying wheat, a crew member lost their life, and a fire broke out on the ship.[ii] The Kiev administration has announced that it will provide low-interest loans and financial support to farmers affected by the port attacks. Oil and grain are now under similar security pressure in the same sea.
These two developments indicate that the Black Sea has transformed from a military battleground into one of the centers of global economic security. On one side, there are Kazakhstan’s budget revenues and global oil supply, and on the other side, there is Ukraine’s agricultural production and the food access of import-dependent countries. As of June, approximately 266 million people in 13 hunger hotspots are experiencing severe food insecurity, exacerbating the humanitarian consequences of a new price shock.[iii]
The CPC pipeline transports oil from the Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak fields to a marine terminal near Novorossiysk via a 1,511-kilometer route. The pipeline carries more than two-thirds of Kazakhstan’s oil exports and about 2% of the world’s supply. The 14% production loss in July compared to June indicates that the terminal disruption quickly reflected in the wells and public revenues. Current alternatives can only meet a limited portion of this large volume.
In the case of Kazakhstan, the issue is related to the balance of foreign policy beyond economic dependence. Astana has long conducted its relations with Russia, China, the European Union, the United States, and Türkiye in a multifaceted manner. In contrast, the fact that the main export route passes thru Russian territory exposes the country to the operational risks of a war it is not a party to. The attack on the energy facility shows that political neutrality alone cannot protect physical infrastructure.
The partnership structure of CPC also removes the interruption from being a bilateral Russia-Kazakhstan issue. In fact, alongside Kazakh and Russian companies, American and European energy groups also hold significant stakes. The majority of the oil loaded at the terminal comes from Kazakh fields operated by international investors. Therefore, the disruption of security affects Astana’s revenues, as well as the sales of Western companies, the supply plans of refineries, and global price expectations.
Astana’s permanent response could be to accelerate route diversification. Increasing shipments via Aktau across the Caspian Sea to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route could reduce the pressure on the Russian route. However, due to the number of tankers, port capacity, sea transit, and pipeline connections, this option will not be able to reach the volume carried by CPC in the short term. Still, even limited capacity can provide strategic maneuvering space during times of crisis.
A similar route issue is also emerging in terms of Ukrainian grain. After the attacks on the ports of Odesa, efforts are being made to increase exports via the Danube River, road, and rail. These routes are not expected to reach the necessary level by the end of August; their total capacities are estimated to be able to handle approximately half of the amount processed at the Black Sea ports. The delay in the harvest period is reducing the farmer’s income while increasing storage pressure.
The impact of grain unable to leave the sea does not remain within Ukraine’s borders. The rise in shipping costs, insurance premiums, and delivery delays create a chain that extends to the price of bread in importing countries. In African countries experiencing severe food crises, such as Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and Nigeria, budgetary resources are limited. Even a small price increase can strain public subsidies, erode household purchasing power, and increase the need for humanitarian aid.
The simultaneous disruption of oil and grain flows is exacerbating this pressure. The increase in energy prices is raising the costs of fertilizer production, agricultural machinery use, storage, and maritime transportation. Thus, the loss of Kazakh oil could return to food prices thru another channel. Products that appear as two separate commercial loads in the Black Sea are moving within a common economic cycle in terms of global inflation and human security.
Another aspect of the issue is the protection of commercial ships. When civilian tankers and grain ships operate under the risk of attack, shipowners demand higher fees, insurance companies tighten their coverage, and finding crew members becomes increasingly difficult. Since the flag state, the shipowner, and the operator are located in different countries, a single attack can put a large number of actors in crisis. For safe navigation, there is a need for operational notification channels between the parties and effective risk reduction mechanisms around the port.
Türkiye holds a special position at this point. The Montreux Convention grants commercial vessels the freedom to pass thru the Straits while limiting warships in terms of tonnage, notification, and duration of stay. Ankara’s balanced implementation of the treaty creates a stabilizing factor that controls military buildup in the Black Sea and preserves the legal basis of commercial flow. The intensification of attacks necessitates supporting this balance with more careful maritime traffic management.
Türkiye’s mediation experience gained from the previous grain deal may be valued again. Ankara is one of the few actors that can communicate with both Moscow and Kiev and understand the connection between port security and the food market. A new comprehensive agreement may not be established in a short time. Nevertheless, developing technical agreements on the coordinates, cargo characteristics, inspection, and sailing times of commercial vessels could open narrow but functional areas that reduce the risk of attacks.
The Middle Corridor, on the other hand, forms the second leg of the strategic connection between Türkiye and Kazakhstan. The route from the ports of Aktau and Kuryk across the Caspian Sea to Baku, and then thru Georgia and Türkiye to Europe, combines land, rail, and sea transportation. It is not expected that the corridor will be a direct alternative to oil pipelines. However, the distribution of energy equipment, agricultural products, and high-value cargo along different routes can strengthen the economic resilience of the two countries.
Therefore, Black Sea security and Caspian connectivity should be addressed as a common policy area. While Kazakhstan expands its export terminals and tanker fleet, Türkiye can facilitate the transition between Ceyhan, Samsun, and railroad connections. African countries can also strengthen regional grain depots by diversifying supply contracts. The steps taken in three different geographies can limit the global impact of a disruption in a single port or corridor.
As a result, grain and Kazakh oil meet on the same economic front in the Black Sea. The war produces results not only thru the control of land but also thru the operation of ports, the safety of ships, and the timely arrival of goods to the market. Kazakhstan’s energy revenue, Africa’s bread prices, and Türkiye’s responsibility over the Straits have become interconnected. Permanent resilience requires increasing the capacity of alternative corridors extending from the Caspian to Türkiye, along with the protection of commercial vessels.
[i] “Drone attacks reduce July CPC oil loadings by a fifth, sources say”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/drone-attacks-reduce-july-cpc-oil-loadings-by-fifth-sources-say-2026-08-07/, (Date Accessed: 08.08.2026).
[ii] “Zelenskiy says Ukraine to help farmers hit by Russian attacks”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/zelenskiy-says-ukraine-help-farmers-hit-by-russian-attacks-2026-08-06/, (Date Accessed: 08.08.2026).
[iii] “New FAO-WFP report warns worsening hunger puts 13 hotspots at significant risk”, World Food Programme ve Food and Agriculture Organization, https://www.wfp.org/news/new-fao-wfp-report-warns-worsening-hunger-puts-13-hotspots-significant-risk, (Date Accessed: 08.08.2026).
