Analysis

India’s South China Sea Initiative

India’s opening to the South China Sea can largely be interpreted as a response to China’s recent actions in the Indian Ocean.
Jaishankar’s visit to Manila comes at a time when tensions between the Philippines and Chinese navies have reached new levels.
There is a mistrust between India and China regarding respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.

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Indian Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar embarked on a six-day working visit to Singapore, the Philippines and Malaysia from 23-28 March 2024. [1]  On Tuesday 26 March 2024, Jaishankar met with Philippine President Bongbong Marcos and Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo and expressed India’s support for the sovereignty of the Philippines.

Jaishankar’s visit to Manila came at a time when tensions between the Philippines and Chinese navies had reached new levels. Following this step by India, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that maritime disputes are issues between the countries concerned and that third parties have no right to intervene. In this context, the Ministry called on India and the Philippines to “respect China’s territorial sovereignty”.[2]

During the Indian Foreign Secretary’s visit to the Philippines, an Indian Coast Guard vessel also visited the Port of Manila. Both countries praised maritime co-operation. Speaking on board the Indian vessel as it docked at Manila’s South Harbour, Jaishankar said that the visit of the vessel was “significant” because it highlighted the “common challenges” faced by India and the Philippines in the areas of ocean pollution, illegal fishing and conservation of natural resources. The Minister also underlined the need for “like-minded countries” to enhance cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.[3]

India’s rapprochement with the Philippines is not limited to maritime cooperation. The Philippines became the first foreign customer of Indian-made BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles under a $415.7 million deal signed in 2022. [4]  The first batch of these missiles is expected to be delivered soon.

During his stay in the Philippines, Jaishankar discussed other areas of growing cooperation between the two countries, including trade, capacity building in digital infrastructure, Indo-Pacific, Myanmar, regional issues such as the Ukraine war, and cooperation in joint forums. Mr Jaishankar also briefed on the deployment of Indian navy in the Red Sea to ensure safety of maritime navigation. He also highlighted the rescue operations in which Indian naval personnel assisted Philippine nationals on board vessels in distress.

India’s enhanced co-operation with the Philippines can often be read as an “anti-China” action. This is because there is a mistrust between India and China regarding respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty. This mistrust is also visible in bilateral trade. India is imposing stricter controls on Chinese investments in sensitive sectors in order to establish its national economic security.

The economic rivalry soon extended to the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. After the recent clashes in the Galvan Valley, India sent a warship to the South China Sea, signalling a serious warning that China might intervene in its “backyard”. In response, China sent space exploration ships to Sri Lankan ports, creating the impression that it could easily reach India’s “backyard”. In this context, India’s opening to the South China Sea can be interpreted largely as a response to China’s recent actions in the Indian Ocean. Indeed, after the visit of the Chinese military research vessel “Yuan Wang 5” to Sri Lanka in September 2022, India-China relations started to deteriorate irreparably. India, which already has border tensions with China and therefore does not interfere much in South China Sea issues, is signalling that it will abandon this policy in the near future. This may be an indication that India-China rivalry has started to spread from land to seas.

The failure of the parties to agree on disputed territories such as Kashmir, Ladakh and Aranuchal Pradesh paves the way for this crisis to move to the seas. Here, what is expected from both countries is to provide some mutual assurances, to ensure an atmosphere of peace and to continue the dialogue. There are many reasons for both countries to work together. Since the last border conflicts that broke out in 2020, it is seen that India and China have maintained their restrained policies.

Consequently, in military-security exercises in the Indo-Pacific and in missions for the security of navigation, India has refrained from approaching China’s near seas and has generally refused to take part in exercises with the United States and its allies in the South and East China Sea. In general, India has been careful to take part only in exercises in the near seas, i.e. in the Indian Ocean, and in manoeuvres in the far seas, i.e. in the Pacific or Oceania. From this point onwards, if India becomes more involved in China’s near seas, for example in the Taiwan Strait and its neighbourhood, there is a high probability that the border conflict between the two countries will move to the seas. 


[1] “India supports Philippines’ sovereignty, says Jaishankar, sparking response from China”, The Hindu, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-supports-philippines-in-upholding-its-national-sovereignty-eam-jaishankar/article67993485.ece, (Date of Access: 19.04.2024).                

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] “India eyes key role in the Philippines’ military modernisation plan”, Asia News, https://asianews.network/india-eyes-key-role-in-the-philippines-military-modernisation-plan/, (Date of Access: 19.04.2024).               

Dr. Cenk TAMER
Dr. Cenk TAMER
Dr. Cenk Tamer graduated from Sakarya University, Department of International Relations in 2014. In the same year, he started his master's degree at Gazi University, Department of Middle Eastern and African Studies. In 2016, Tamer completed his master's degree with his thesis titled "Iran's Iraq Policy after 1990", started working as a Research Assistant at ANKASAM in 2017 and was accepted to Gazi University International Relations PhD Program in the same year. Tamer, whose areas of specialization are Iran, Sects, Sufism, Mahdism, Identity Politics and Asia-Pacific and who speaks English fluently, completed his PhD education at Gazi University in 2022 with his thesis titled "Identity Construction Process and Mahdism in the Islamic Republic of Iran within the Framework of Social Constructionism Theory and Securitization Approach". He is currently working as an Asia-Pacific Specialist at ANKASAM.

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