The prolongation of the Russia-Ukraine War has led to a reassessment of many approaches that have long been debated within the European security architecture. In particular, security concerns have become increasingly influential in the European Union’s (EU) policies toward its eastern border. For many years, EU enlargement policy proceeded primarily along the axes of democratization, economic integration, and normative transformation. More recently, however, it has begun to acquire a more geopolitical and security-oriented character.[i] This transformation has also reinforced debates over whether the EU is moving beyond being merely an economic and political union toward acting increasingly as a strategic actor.
However, the EU’s capacity in the field of security remains limited. The incomplete integration of the Union’s common defense mechanisms, its continued dependence on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and differences in strategic priorities among member states make the EU’s vulnerabilities in the security domain increasingly visible. Accordingly, the EU’s eastward enlargement process can be viewed not only as a normative integration policy but also as an attempt to manage its security deficit through its external environment. In other words, the EU is seeking to compensate for deficiencies in its own security capacity by creating new strategic spaces along its eastern border. Yet this situation also brings new challenges. As the EU expands eastward, it not only extends the geographical boundaries of its security environment but also brings more vulnerable, economically weaker, and security-threatened regions into closer integration with the European system. Consequently, a more pragmatic and realist approach appears to have gained strength in recent EU policies. In particular, the case of Moldova, security policies along the Poland-Baltic axis, and the approach of containing Russia reveal the transformation taking place between the EU’s traditional normative identity and its emerging geopolitical reflexes.
Against this backdrop, examining the EU’s evolving security approach on its eastern border through the cases of Moldova, Poland, and Latvia is useful for discussing how the prolongation of the war and the integration process along the eastern frontier are transforming Europe’s role within the international system. In this context, granting candidate status to Moldova and Ukraine cannot be explained solely from the perspective of democratic transformation. These steps can also be interpreted as geopolitical decisions aimed at limiting Russia’s sphere of influence in Europe’s neighborhood. At the same time, the EU’s transformation into a security actor contains significant internal contradictions. While the Union seeks to gain strategic depth by expanding eastward, it is simultaneously incorporating more vulnerable regions into the European security system. In particular, the integration of states with high levels of economic vulnerability, energy dependence, and exposure to hybrid threats increases the security burden that the EU must manage. A paradoxical situation therefore emerges: while the EU is expanding in order to enhance its security, it is simultaneously exposing itself to a greater number of security risks.
Moldova is one of the most notable examples of the transformation in the EU’s eastern policy. Following the Russia-Ukraine War, Moldova has assumed a more critical position in terms of European security. In particular, the Transnistrian issue, Russia’s influence in the region, energy dependence, and the country’s geopolitical vulnerability are turning Moldova into a strategically significant security area for Europe. In this process, the EU’s political and military support for Moldova has also increased significantly. Radar systems, security assistance, financial support packages, and the acceleration of the candidate process indicate that Moldova is being integrated into the European system not only politically but also from a security perspective.[ii]
For the EU, Moldova serves as an important buffer zone capable of preventing security vacuums from emerging in Eastern Europe. In the short term, Moldova’s closer alignment with the EU may provide the country with security guarantees and international support. However, given Moldova’s economic capacity, energy dependence, and domestic political vulnerabilities, European integration may also generate significant costs. In particular, the process of moving away from the Russian energy system and the pressures associated with economic transformation may intensify social and economic tensions within Moldova. At the same time, Moldova’s emerging role as a “buffer zone” could transform the country into a permanent geopolitical pressure point in the long term. If strategic competition between the EU and Russia intensifies, Moldova could become not merely a candidate country but also a security space caught between two spheres of power. This could challenge Moldova’s internal stability while creating a permanent security burden along the EU’s eastern border. Thus, the case of Moldova demonstrates that the EU’s security-oriented enlargement strategy may produce not only short-term gains but also long-term vulnerabilities.
Poland and Latvia are among the countries where security threats are most strongly felt along the EU’s eastern border. For these countries, the “Russian threat” is not merely a military issue. Historical memory, the Soviet past, border security, identity politics, and regime security contribute to making threat perceptions much deeper and more structural. Particularly in Poland, hybrid attacks, cyber threats, border crises, and security debates related to Russia have become increasingly prominent in recent years. [iii] Similarly, along the Baltic frontier, airspace violations, unmanned aerial vehicles, and disinformation activities have heightened regional security concerns.[iv] These developments have encouraged Poland and the Baltic states to pursue closer security cooperation with NATO, while contributing to the emergence of a harder defense line along Europe’s eastern border.
However, this process is not limited to the current war. Even if the war with Russia comes to an end, security perceptions in countries such as Poland and Latvia are unlikely to change easily. The historical experiences of these states have contributed to their perception of Russia as a structural rather than temporary threat. Consequently, the defense decisions and increasing militarization undertaken today may make the normalization of relations with Russia more difficult even after the war. Moreover, the hardening of security reflexes along the EU’s eastern frontier could contribute to the emergence of a long-term period of “Cold Peace” in European-Russian relations and potentially create a new “Iron Curtain” within the international system. While this could deepen lasting polarization within the European security architecture, the closer alignment of Poland and the Baltic states with Washington and their increasing dependence on the U.S. security umbrella also raise new questions concerning the EU’s objectives of strategic autonomy.
In conclusion, the security environment that has emerged along the EU’s eastern border in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine War is gradually transforming the Union’s traditional understanding of normative enlargement into a more geopolitical and security-oriented framework. The effort to rapidly integrate Moldova into the European system, increasing defense reflexes along the Poland-Latvia axis, and growing perceptions of hybrid threats point to the EU’s search for a new security belt on its eastern flank. However, while this process provides the EU with strategic depth, it also incorporates economically vulnerable, high-risk, and difficult-to-manage areas into the European system. At the same time, deepening security concerns in Poland and the Baltic states indicate that a persistent environment of distrust may continue even in the post-war period. Therefore, the new security architecture being constructed along the EU’s eastern flank may make Europe more secure in the short term, but in the long term it could also transform the continent into a more rigid and enduring arena of geopolitical competition.
[i] L’EXPRESS, “Au lieu d’attendre que la guerre nous rassemble, unissons-nous pour la prévenir: l’appel de 25”, L’Express, https://www.lexpress.fr/monde/europe/au-lieu-dattendre-que-la-guerre-nous-rassemble-unissons-nous-pour-la-prevenir-lappel-de-25-2RWQP5FBGRCPHKLUQF23MVVD5Y/, (Date Accessed: 10.05.2026).
[ii] EEAS, “Moldova: Press remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Kaja Kallas at the joint press conference with President Maia Sandu”, European Union External Action, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/moldova-press-remarks%C2%A0-high-representativevice-president-kaja-kallas-joint-press-conference-maia_en, (Date Accessed: 10.05.2026).
[iii] FRANCEINFO, “En Pologne, une montée sans précédent des attaques hybrides russes, selon la sécurité intérieure”, Franceinfo, https://www.franceinfo.fr/monde/europe/en-pologne-une-montee-sans-precedent-des-attaques-hybrides-russes-selon-la-securite-interieure_7989512.html, (Date Accessed: 10.05.2026).
[iv] CELSALAB, “Ukraine – Russie: Des drones russes s’écrasent en Lettonie, Moscou évoque une attaque massive ukrainienne”, CelsaLab, https://celsalab.fr/2026/05/07/ukraine-russie-des-drones-russes-secrasent-en-lettonie-moscou-evoque-une-attaque-massive-ukrainienne/, (Date Accessed: 10.05.2026).
