Japan is increasing its defense-security moves simultaneously with the rise of regional tensions. As part of this, Japan signed an agreement with the United States (US) on January 18, 2024, to purchase 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles. The Tokyo Government has committed to raising its annual defense spending to approximately 10 trillion yen (68 billion dollars) by 2027. This will make Japan the world’s third-largest military spender, following the US and China.[1]
Japan states that it is facing the “most serious” security environment since World War II due to tensions with China and threats from North Korea. This has led Japan to increase military cooperation with the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and other friendly nations.
Japan’s steps to strengthen military cooperation with the United States can be considered as a response to regional security concerns and increasing threats. In this context, Japan’s commitment to increasing defense spending aims to enhance the country’s defense capabilities and ensure regional security.
In November 2023, the United States approved the sale of 200 Block IV missiles and 200 upgraded Block V versions for 2.35 billion dollars. According to officials, these missiles are capable of being launched from warships and can target objectives up to 1,600 kilometers (1,000 miles) away.[2]
Towards the end of 2023, the Tokyo Government eased restrictions on the export of lethal weapons, allowing the sale of Japanese-made Patriot missiles to the United States.[3] Additionally, Japan accelerated the distribution of long-range cruise missiles capable of reaching targets in North Korea, while Japanese forces increasingly collaborated with the United States and other allied countries.
Japan’s military cooperation with the United States stands out as a crucial element in ensuring regional security and enhancing the country’s defense capabilities. This collaboration can contribute to efforts to maintain regional balance and support the interests of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region.
Particularly, agreements with the United States represent tangible steps taken by Japan to enhance its defense capabilities. The acquisition of high-tech weapon systems like Tomahawk cruise missiles reflects Japan’s efforts to modernize its defense capacity. This situation, along with Japan deepening military cooperation with the United States and other friendly nations, can contribute to maintaining regional balance.
Japan’s commitment to increasing defense spending reflects the seriousness of regional security concerns. However, this increase may also have economic and political implications. This situation may highlight the government’s need to strike a balance among its strategic priorities.
These expenditures could also lead to the Japanese government facing opposition and various protests in domestic politics. Therefore, it can be said that Tokyo’s foreign policy formulation process may be disrupted. After all, the Asia-Pacific region is a zone where fault lines in the global security system intersect. It can be inferred that an unstable foreign policy formulation process might result in significantly negative and unbalanced outcomes for the actors in this region.
Japan easing restrictions on the export of lethal weapons could facilitate the growth of the defense industry and enhance the country’s capabilities in this field. However, it should not be forgotten that this step has the potential to increase regional tensions. The policies of Japan in this regard need to be managed in a balanced and thoughtful manner to contribute to regional stability.
In this context, the claims about Japan joining the AUKUS alliance and subsequently changing the name of the alliance to JAUKUS can be recalled. Given Japan’s close relations with the United States and the United Kingdom in the regional context, as well as its geopolitical competition with China, these mentioned claims may come to the forefront again.
On the other hand, Tokyo ranks among the states most directly affected by the threat emanating from North Korea due to its geopolitical position.
In conjunction with Pyongyang’s moves that have closed off diplomatic and negotiation channels, it can be argued that Tokyo has no choice but to maximize its hard power in the context of this threat. Indeed, during the latest People’s Assembly meeting in Pyongyang, Kim characterized South Korea as the “unchanging main enemy” of North Korea and stated that the unification monument in Pyongyang should be demolished.[4] At the same time, during this meeting, it was stated that North Korea has no intention of avoiding war and that it would use nuclear weapons if provoked.[5]
Indeed, with both the nuclear threats from North Korea and its recent moves in domestic politics, the Asia-Pacific region is closer to a hot conflict than it has ever been.
At the same time, it can be argued that threats from North Korea provide a pretext for the Western Alliance’s “anti-China” actions in the region and create a legitimacy environment. Japan is among the countries attempting to increase its influence in the region by highlighting the North Korean threat in the context of anti-China sentiment. Indeed, Tokyo’s moves in its struggle against Beijing may be deemed provocative by the international community. However, the actions of Pyongyang provide a legitimacy ground for such actions.
In conclusion, Japan’s easing of restrictions on the export of lethal weapons can contribute to the growth of the defense industry. This is a noteworthy development from both internal and external policy perspectives, and how Japan manages its defense industry is crucial.
[1] “Japan Signs Agreement to Purchase 400 Tomahawk Missiles as US Envoy Lauds its Defense Buildup”, Associated Press News, https://apnews.com/article/japan-us-tomahawk-missile-defense-0bcabfc4a87bf1a16beceec1b0c426fb, (Date Accessed: 19.01.2024).
[2] Ibıd.
[3] Ibıd.
[4] “Russia’s Putin to Visit North Korea Soon, State Media Says”, Cable News Network World, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/22/asia/putin-to-visit-north-korea-intl-hnk/index.html, (Date Accessed: 01.02.2024).
[5] Ibıd.
