As of 2025, Venezuela has adopted a more transparent and strategic foreign policy line to reduce the effects of long-standing economic sanctions and international isolation. One of the pillars of this policy is its multifaceted partnerships with China and Qatar. The high-level visits held in April 2025 herald a new phase in energy, transportation, investment, and multilateral relations, beyond diplomatic courtesy.
The visit of Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez to China is a concrete reflection of Venezuela’s efforts to put into practice the “Strategic Partnership Valid at All Times and in All Circumstances” doctrine declared in 2023. During the meeting with Chinese Vice President Han Zheng, it was announced that more than 600 bilateral agreements would be reviewed, and it was emphasized that these agreements would be updated according to global transformations. [1]The fact that concrete cooperation proposals are being developed in a wide range of areas such as energy, health, technology, infrastructure, and education shows that this visit has a meaning far beyond being a protocol visit.
The fact that Rodríguez is also the minister responsible for hydrocarbons shows that these contacts include an energy security dimension in particular. Although sanctions have severely damaged Venezuela’s oil production capacity, its energy partnership with China is of vital importance in terms of both political support and technical rehabilitation. The talks with the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) are noteworthy.
China’s interest in Venezuela is not limited to energy supply security. China is trying to establish long-term infrastructure investments and political influence in Latin America, while Venezuela seeks to diversify its economic dependency. In this context, both sides seek a long-term partnership by placing the “win-win” discourse in a strategic framework.
Rodríguez’s contacts with Qatar following his visit to China reflect Venezuela’s multidimensional relations with the Gulf countries. Qatar offers Venezuela a two-way value through its influence in energy markets and regional mediation capacity.
The meeting with the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, carries an important message not only on an economic level but also on a diplomatic level.[2] At a time when direct contacts between the United States (US) and Venezuela are limited, Qatar can act as a mediator, just as it did on the issues of Iran and Afghanistan. This function could contribute to Venezuela creating a negotiating space in the context of sanctions.
In addition, the new direct air route to be established between Doha and Caracas is symbolic and has economic functionality. This development coincides with Venezuela’s efforts to expand its international transportation networks and increase tourism and business connections.
Both visits show that Venezuela continues its search for multipolar diplomacy by moving away from the “unipolar world” model. This new foreign policy vision aims to establish permanent and structural ties with rising actors such as China and a strategy of resistance against Western sanctions. For the Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro’s administration, these collaborations are economically essential for gaining political legitimacy.
However, there is also a risk of unilateral dependency like these relations. China’s economic influence on Venezuela may eventually turn into political pressure. Similarly, relations established with Gulf countries may be sensitive regarding geopolitical balances in the region.
Venezuela may not limit its cooperation with China and Qatar to these two countries only. Still, it may also try to develop a similar model with countries such as India, Russia, South Africa, and Iran. Platforms such as BRICS+ offer political legitimacy and economic maneuvering space for Caracas, which is seeking a “parallel order” against sanctions. Venezuela will likely turn to new investment and trade agreements as of 2025 to deepen its BRICS+ membership.
Venezuela’s external expansions are not limited to distant geographies. At the same time, the revival of regional alliances (such as CELAC, ALBA, and UNASUR) and the diplomatic reproduction of the Bolivarian ideology are also among Caracas’ goals. Efforts to rebalance, especially with large neighbors such as Colombia and Brazil, are integral to Venezuela’s strategy to emerge from isolation.
Venezuela may want to expand the use of local currencies or digital currencies (such as petro or yuan) in its trade with China and Russia. This effort is part of a strategy to mitigate the impact of US sanctions and increase financial sovereignty. The sale of oil in yuan with China or crypto finance projects with Qatar can be evaluated in this context.
Sharing military technology with China and Russia and cooperation in cybersecurity and intelligence, may be on the agenda of Venezuela’s security strategy. Such military cooperation, especially against the US’s containment policies, can consolidate nationalist sentiments in domestic politics and serve as a deterrent in foreign policy.
Since sanctions restrict oil production, Venezuela may resort to new energy diplomacy methods such as alternative energy lines, refinery partnerships, and offshore transportation solutions (e.g., offshore tanker transfers, shipping via third countries). It will likely produce creative solutions to these issues with countries like China and India.
This new orientation is not only a defensive reflex developed by Venezuela against foreign policy pressures shaped by sanctions but also a conscious evaluation of the opportunities presented by the shifts in global power balances. Multidimensional relations established with countries with independent diplomatic lines vis-à-vis the US, such as China and Qatar, provide Venezuela with economic breathing space and expand its political maneuverability. In this process, Venezuela is building a complex and strategic foreign policy doctrine not limited to energy or trade partnerships; it extends from technology transfer to transportation networks, from diplomatic mediation to finding support in multilateral forums.
By deviating from Latin America’s traditional diplomatic axis and establishing new alliances centered on Asia and the Middle East, Venezuela also has the potential to revive its claim to regional leadership. The year 2025 is a turning point of historical importance regarding a change in foreign policy, integration into multipolarity, and an orientation toward alternative development models that go far beyond the country’s search for economic recovery. This strategic repositioning of Venezuela will affect not only its destiny but also the future geopolitical architecture of Latin America.
[1] Fernández, Sleither. “Venezuela and China Strengthen Alliance as Two Vice Presidents Meet in Beijing.” Guacamaya, https://guacamayave.com/en/venezuela-and-china-strengthen-their-alliance-in-key-meeting-between-vice-presidents/, (Date Accession: 03.05.2025).
[2] Ferrer, Elias. “Delcy Rodríguez Visits Qatar on Her Return from China Visit.” Guacamaya, https://guacamayave.com/en/delcy-rodriguez-visits-qatar-on-her-return-from-china-visit/, (Date Accession: 03.05.2025).
