3In July 2025, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Minister of Industry and Advanced Technology and COP28 President Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber paid an official visit to Azerbaijan to attend the 17th Summit of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), held in the city of Khankendi.[1] At Fuzuli International Airport, Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber was received by Eldar Seyidov, Deputy Special Representative of the President of Azerbaijan for the districts of Aghdam, Fuzuli, and Khojavend. His visit goes beyond mere attendance at the summit; it signals the emergence of a new diplomatic corridor that could reshape the balance of power in the South Caucasus.
The United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) growing interest in Azerbaijan can be interpreted as a strategic and multilayered outreach that extends beyond traditional Gulf diplomacy. Through the COP28 process, the UAE has become increasingly visible in global energy and climate diplomacy, a visibility has begun to leverage not only in environmental forums but also in areas such as development, infrastructure, industry, and energy integration. In particular, the UAE’s involvement in green energy projects with Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus, its support for post-Karabakh reconstruction efforts, and its interest in initiatives like the Zangezur Corridor reflect an attempt to reposition the region not only politically, but also economically and technologically. Al Jaber’s direct participation in the summit held in Khankendi also carries symbolic significance regarding the status of Karabakh. While reinforcing Azerbaijan’s efforts to legitimize its sovereignty over the region, the visit simultaneously reveals the UAE’s increasingly diversified foreign policy orientations.
Although initially established to enhance economic cooperation between Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) has gradually evolved into a broader regional platform, including countries from Central Asia, the Caucasus, and South Asia. In recent years, the organization has offered alternative diplomatic maneuvering spaces for countries caught between China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the West’s Middle Corridor strategies.
The UAE’s active engagement with the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) can signal its strategic outreach toward Central Asia and the South Caucasus. In particular, its normalized relations with Iran, deepening economic integration with Turkey, and strategic energy partnership with Azerbaijan further strengthen the UAE’s potential role within the ECO. This reflects a broader trend in which the Gulf states extend beyond their traditional spheres of influence, forming new axes of engagement toward the heart of Eurasia.
In recent years, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as a powerhouse in energy and finance and a key factor in infrastructure, advanced technology, digital transformation, and green energy. The prestige gained through its COP28 presidency has allowed the UAE to transform these areas of technical expertise into instruments of soft power. In the context of Karabakh’s reconstruction, the UAE’s potential involvement in infrastructure and sustainable development projects—areas in which Azerbaijan has urgent needs—may pave the way for a transition toward a “strategic partnership” model in bilateral relations between the two countries.
The UAE’s interest in large-scale projects such as the Zangezur Corridor reflects its ambitions in transportation and logistics connectivity and its desire to gain influence along trade routes stretching from the South Caucasus to Central Asia. These projects hold strategic value for the UAE as they contribute to diversifying its connections with China, India, Turkey, and Europe.
The UAE’s diplomatic and economic engagement in the South Caucasus will intensify in the coming period. In particular, more concrete cooperation initiatives are likely to emerge with Azerbaijan in areas such as green energy, digital transformation, and infrastructure. These symbolic and technical engagements in the Karabakh region will further solidify the UAE’s strategic involvement in the Middle Corridor axis.
The multilateral diplomatic platform built around the ECO Summit may also strengthen relations between Gulf countries and the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Regional projects developed through the Turkey–Azerbaijan–UAE triangle can potentially create alternative economic and logistical models in Central Asia, offering an alternative to Chinese and Russian influence. However, the ongoing rapprochement between Iran and the UAE, alongside the tense equilibrium between Azerbaijan and Iran, necessitates careful diplomatic management. By maintaining balanced relations with both sides, the UAE could assume the role of mediator or stabilizing actor, positioning itself as an investor and a strategic interlocutor in regional diplomacy.
The post-Karabakh period represents a moment of realignment not only for Azerbaijan but also for international actors. By accurately interpreting this transition, the UAE is moving toward incorporating the South Caucasus into its broader economic diplomacy strategy across Eurasia.
The UAE’s participation in the ECO Summit held in Khankendi in July 2025 underscores the growing recognition among Gulf countries of the South Caucasus’s geopolitical significance. It also reflects the region’s increasing prominence in regional dynamics and the strategic calculations of global actors. The UAE’s active presence on international platforms such as its presidency of COP28 has transformed the country from a mere energy-rich financial power into a multifaceted actor capable of exerting diplomatic influence in technology, infrastructure, and green development. This multidimensional role also creates a complementary space for cooperation in the reconstruction of Karabakh and in supporting Azerbaijan’s broader development objectives.
In this context, competition in the South Caucasus is no longer confined to military and security; it is increasingly expanding into spheres such as the economy, green energy, infrastructure connectivity, and digital transformation. The direct involvement of extra-regional actors like the United Arab Emirates enhances the region’s potential for global economic integration while simultaneously generating a multilayered diplomatic arena. This dynamic also underscores the breadth and multi-centric nature of Azerbaijan’s multidimensional foreign policy strategy.
In the coming period, the UAE is expected to invest in Trans-Caucasian transportation routes, particularly the Zangezur Corridor, pursue more institutionalized cooperation with the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), and contribute technically to the reconstruction efforts in Karabakh. These developments may signal a new phase in which Gulf countries increasingly utilize their energy revenues as instruments of diplomatic influence across Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
At the same time, this deepening of diplomatic engagement may trigger a delicate balance between Iran and Azerbaijan; however, the UAE’s ability to maintain strong and calibrated relations with both actors positions it as a potential stabilizing force in the region. Such a role holds the potential to redefine Abu Dhabi not merely as an investor but as a diplomatic architect within the regional order.
In conclusion, the diplomatic engagement initiated by the visit to Khankendi represents far more than traditional energy diplomacy: it symbolizes the Gulf’s aspiration to integrate with the Middle Corridor and the South Caucasus’s drive to connect with an increasingly multipolar economic order.
[1] “UAE Minister of Industry and Advanced Technology Visits Azerbaijan”, AZERTAC, https://azertag.az/en/xeber/uae_minister_of_industry_and_advanced_technology_visits_azerbaijan-3641135, (Date Accessed: July 4, 2025).
