The history of European integration has been shaped by the dynamics of deepening and restructuring through crises. The integration process, which began in the 1950s on the basis of economic cooperation, expanded both geographically and institutionally with the waves of enlargement after the Cold War. However, this expansion has also increased heterogeneity and political differentiation in decision-making processes. By the mid-2020s, the European Union (EU) faced multiple structural pressures simultaneously: The transformation of the security architecture following the Russia-Ukraine War, the United States’ (US) tendency to redefine its role within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), economic competition with China, the search for strategic independence in energy and industrial policies, and internal political fragmentation. This multi-layered crisis environment has brought the “multi-speed Europe” debate back to the forefront.[1]
In particular, the reintroduction of the idea of “multi-speed integration” in contacts and policy documents at the European leadership level at the beginning of 2026 indicates that the EU’s current institutional architecture is inadequate in the face of geopolitical realities. Ursula von der Leyen’s proposal for integration at different speeds, voiced prior to the economic summit, is noteworthy in this context. Von der Leyen’s approach stated that not all member states are required to advance at the same depth in the same policy area, and that countries that are more willing and ready in certain areas can establish advanced integration mechanisms.[2]
This idea is not entirely new in EU history: the Schengen Area and the Eurozone are already examples of integration at different speeds. However, the current debate marks a new phase in that it brings systematic differentiation in areas of high geopolitical importance, such as economic competitiveness and defense capabilities, to the forefront. This regulation, seen by many as a potential “game changer,” has been dubbed the “28th Regime” and is expected to be announced before the end of March. Von der Leyen pointed to the benefits of the regulation in her statement on the subject, saying, “Wherever you are, you will be able to set up a company with EU status within 48 hours.”[3]
The emphasis on “Made in EU” at the leaders’ meetings in Brussels has made the relationship between industrial policy and institutional differentiation more visible. The fragility of global supply chains and the US’s protectionist industrial incentives (such as the Inflation Reduction Act) have made it imperative for Europe to develop a common industrial strategy and increase the speed of decision-making.[4] However, there are significant differences among the 27 member states in terms of financial capacity, political will, and foreign policy priorities. For this reason, some leaders argue that the “coalition of the willing” model may be more functional than expecting all member states to act unanimously.
Roberta Metsola’s assessment that “this is not an obstacle or a shortcut to unity; on the contrary, it is a path to unity” implies that this model should be interpreted as flexible integration rather than fragmentation.[5] According to Metsola, the issue is not to create a permanent hierarchy between the center and the periphery; rather, it is to ultimately link integration processes at different speeds to common goals. However, the normative and political consequences of this approach are debatable. Institutionalizing different speeds could also carry the risk of a permanent split between “core Europe” and “peripheral Europe.”
The security dimension of these discussions has become more pronounced in the context of NATO. Recent statements by some strategists and politicians in the US emphasizing the need for Europe to increase its defense spending and shoulder more of the security burden indicate that a process of “rebalancing” has begun in transatlantic relations. Discussions within NATO are increasingly raising the question of whether the US will continue to provide unconditional security guarantees to Europe. Calls for rebalancing within NATO directly affect the multi-speed Europe debates within the EU. The increasingly widespread conceptualization of “NATO 3.0” in the literature takes this debate beyond merely an issue of institutional reform and links it to the transformation of the transatlantic security architecture.[6] The transition from a post-Cold War era focused on crisis management to a structure that has shifted back toward deterrence and great power competition following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine requires Europe to increase its security responsibilities.
In this context, Elbridge Colby, one of the prominent names among US policymakers, represents a line of thinking that argues Europe must significantly increase its defense capabilities. Colby’s approach is based on the argument that Europe must assume its own defense responsibilities at a time when the US is shifting its strategic focus to China. The US strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific also reinforces this trend. In this context, NATO 3.0 signifies a period in which burden-sharing is being redefined, while the search for a multi-speed model by countries within the EU demanding faster integration in the areas of defense and industry is emerging as a strategic alignment effort.
A common European defense capability requires not only budget increases but also coordinated industrial policies and more flexible decision-making mechanisms. However, the differing stances of some countries, such as Hungary, on Russia policy or their cautious approach to defense integration call into question the effectiveness of the current system based on the principle of unanimity. For this reason, the multi-speed model is advocated, particularly in the areas of defense and foreign policy, as a means of “clearing the way for those who want to move forward.”
There is also the issue of the democratic legitimacy of the multi-speed Europe concept. The EU’s decision-making processes are already subject to criticism for their “democratic deficit.” Integration mechanisms progressing at different speeds could further complicate the role of the European Parliament and national parliaments. If a core group of countries deepens in defense or industry while others remain outside, this could create unequal rights and obligations among EU citizens. Therefore, the principle of “flexibility within unity” emphasized by Metsola will only be sustainable to the extent that it is supported by strong institutional balancing mechanisms.[7]
In economic terms, these approaches can be interpreted not merely as a protective reflex, but as part of a quest for strategic autonomy. The concept of strategic autonomy aims to reduce Europe’s dependence on external sources in the fields of energy, technology, and defense. However, achieving this goal requires deepening financial integration. Tools such as joint borrowing mechanisms, investment funds, and industrial incentives necessitate financial solidarity among member states.[8] At this point, the ongoing debates on fiscal discipline between northern and southern countries could also create cracks in the economic pillar of the multi-speed model.
In a geopolitical context, the idea of a multi-speed Europe has emerged as a defensive reflex. Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine has heightened security concerns in the EU’s eastern flank; NATO’s role has been vital for the Baltic and Central European countries. However, at a time when the US is redefining its global priorities, the need for Europe to increase its own military capacity has become more apparent. While discussions on “burden sharing” continue within NATO, the argument for accelerating defense integration within the EU is gaining traction. This naturally brings flexible models to the fore, enabling more willing countries to move forward more quickly.
Viewed historically, European integration has never been a homogeneous process. Even during the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union in the 1990s, not all countries switched to the euro at the same time. Therefore, a multi-speed Europe can be interpreted not as a radical break, but as the systematization of existing differences. However, in the context of 2026, the distinctiveness of this model lies in its simultaneous coverage of economic and security areas and its direct connection to changes in the global balance of power.
As a result, the debate over a multi-speed Europe can be interpreted as a necessity rather than a choice. In a period of intensifying global competition, the redefinition of transatlantic relations, and deepening internal political differences, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the EU to move forward at a single pace. However, institutionalizing different speeds also carries the risk of inequality and fragmentation. Therefore, the fundamental question in the coming period will be not “Is a multi-speed Europe possible?” but rather “How can a multi-speed Europe be made democratic, inclusive, and sustainable?” Europe’s future appears to depend on its capacity to strike this balance.
[1] Nicholas Vinocur, “Presenting Europe’s two-speed era”, Politico, https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/brussels-playbook/presenting-europes-two-speed-era/, (Access Date: 13.02.2026).
[2] Vincenzo Genovese, “Two-speed Europe could be ‘pathway to unity’, European Parliament prsident Metsola tells”, Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/02/13/two-speed-europe-could-be-pathway-to-unity-european-parliament-president-metsola-tells-eur, (Access Date: 13.02.2026).
[3] Elena Sanchez & Wester van Gaal, “‘Two-speed Europe’ and ‘Made in EU’ form core conclusions of leaders’ retreat”, Euobserver, https://euobserver.com/202873/two-speed-europe-and-made-in-eu-form-core-conclusions-of-leaders-retreat/, (Access Date: 13.02.2026).
[4] Nikolaus J. Kurmayer, “Von der Leyen floats two-speed Europe ahead of economy summit”, Euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/news/von-der-leyen-floats-two-speed-europe-ahead-of-economy-summit/, (Access Date: 13.02.2026).
[5] Ibid.
[6] Alice Tidey, “‘NATO 3.02: US and Europe appear to agree rebalancing of power is needed’”, Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/02/12/nato-30-us-and-europe-appear-to-agree-rebalancing-of-power-is-needed, (Access Date: 13.02.2026).
[7] Ibid.
[8] Jorge Liboreiro, “As challeges mount, a two-speed Europe emerges as a way out”, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/02/11/as-challenges-mount-a-two-speed-europe-emerges-as-a-way-out, (Access Date: 13.02.2026).
