Analysis

Kremlin Proposes a “Putin-Trump-Xi Summit”

Even if the parties fail to reach an agreement on Ukraine, they may still agree to discuss global stability and the reduction of nuclear risks.
An understanding reached between Washington and Moscow could be expanded into a broader international framework with China’s participation.
Through direct negotiations, the great powers could establish the fundamental parameters for ending the war in Ukraine.

Paylaş

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In a statement on October 19, 2026, the Kremlin announced that a trilateral summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin, United States (US) President Donald Trump, and Chinese President Xi Jinping could take place.[i] Proposed to be held on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit scheduled for November in Shenzhen, China, the initiative could rapidly reshape the global balance of power. Putin’s move can be interpreted as a strategy to determine the fate of the conflict in Ukraine and the future security architecture through negotiations among the great powers—the US, Russia, and China—while completely sidelining Kyiv and Europe, both of which are directly affected by the crisis.

The proposed format, which does not include Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, evokes the 1945 Yalta Conference and the process of constructing a new world order. European powers, in particular, are concerned about a summit of this kind that could shape the future of the world through an arrangement in which they have no seat at the table.

The Zelensky administration argues that the US, and Trump in particular,[ii] is pressuring Kyiv to make concessions—or effectively pushing it toward capitulation—in order to reach a peace agreement. Consequently, proposals for such closed-door summits also weaken Kyiv’s negotiating position. As Trump exerts pressure for changes in Ukraine’s leadership, he is pursuing an increasingly hard-line policy toward Ukraine. This is pushing Kyiv into a corner, both militarily and diplomatically.

Putin’s proposal for a trilateral summit may represent not merely a negotiating initiative aimed at ending the war in Ukraine, but also a concrete manifestation of efforts to transform the global system from unipolarity into a multipolar order dominated by the great powers. Through direct talks, these powers could establish the fundamental parameters for ending the war. Those parameters, in turn, could shape the emerging global security architecture. An agreement reached between Washington and Moscow could be expanded into a broader international framework with China’s participation. In a format that excludes European powers, decisions could be made more quickly, while a limited number of participants could facilitate negotiations.

The exclusion of Ukraine, a party to the conflict, from discussions concerning its own territory, sovereignty, and security arrangements could create an extremely dangerous situation for Europe. Indeed, the problem is not simply who is present at the negotiating table, but also whose interests would be affected by the decisions made there and to whom those decisions would have binding consequences. These outcomes would be of direct concern to the security of Ukraine and Europe in particular. From this perspective, shaping Europe’s future at a meeting attended by Russia and China would represent an extremely dangerous scenario for Brussels.

Another major question surrounding the proposed summit is how the US and Russia would establish a negotiating framework on nuclear weapons and strategic security. China’s potential role in the diplomatic balance among the great powers is also a matter of considerable interest. Nevertheless, holding the summit would depend on the parties reaching an agreement on a common agenda. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that the possibility of such a meeting had been raised, but emphasized that no concrete proposal or agreement regarding its agenda had yet been put forward.[iii]

Even the proposal to hold such a meeting offers important clues about the parties’ diplomatic priorities and their positions within the international system. Moscow’s primary strategy is to capitalize on the developing dialogue with Washington—including certain understandings concerning energy trade—and Trump’s political pressure to end the war quickly, in order to impose a peace agreement in Ukraine that best serves Russia’s terms, particularly regarding Donbas and territorial control.

Although senior US officials have stated that Trump has not yet formally approved the proposed trilateral summit, it has been suggested that his campaign promises to end the war and his diplomatic pragmatism could leave the door open to the idea.[iv] Meanwhile, Trump has indicated a different priority for the potential summit, expressing openness to talks focused primarily on nuclear weapons and disarmament.

Beijing, for its part, has not categorically rejected the idea, seeking to position itself as a balancing force between the US and Russia and as a global mediator. However, China is making its participation conditional on clear approval from Washington and is carefully weighing the potential implications of assuming such a diplomatic leadership role for its relations with the West and Europe. China’s participation could move the negotiations beyond the bilateral US–Russia framework and into a broader diplomatic arena.

If the US, Russia, and China agree on a common agenda, the meeting could expand diplomatic engagement on the war in Ukraine or nuclear security. However, holding the summit would not necessarily mean that the parties would reach an agreement on a ceasefire or a peace settlement. Another possibility is that the summit’s agenda could be restricted to nuclear security. Even if the parties fail to reach an understanding on Ukraine, they might still agree to discuss global stability and ways to reduce nuclear risks. Conversely, if their priorities remain divergent and they cannot establish a common agenda, the summit may not take place at all or could be limited to bilateral meetings. Even where the parties share certain interests, the absence of a common strategic vision makes it more difficult to determine the summit’s agenda and reduces the likelihood that it will be held.


[i] “Kremlin says Putin, Trump and Xi could hold a three-way meeting in China next month”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/kremlin-says-putin-trump-xi-could-hold-three-way-meeting-china-next-month-2026-10-19/, (Date Accessed: 21.10.2026).

[ii] “Trump says he’d meet with Putin and Xi, criticizes Zelenskyy”, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2026/10/19/trump-putin-xi-zelenskyy.html, (Date Accessed: 21.10.2026).

[iii] “Russia proposes a Trump-Xi-Putin meeting in China next month”, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/10/19/russia-proposes-trump-xi-putin-meeting-china-next-month/, (Date Accessed: 21.10.2026).

[iv] Ibid.

Dr. Cenk TAMER
Dr. Cenk TAMER
Dr. Cenk Tamer graduated from Sakarya University, Department of International Relations in 2014. In the same year, he started his master's degree at Gazi University, Department of Middle Eastern and African Studies. In 2016, Tamer completed his master's degree with his thesis titled "Iran's Iraq Policy after 1990", started working as a Research Assistant at ANKASAM in 2017 and was accepted to Gazi University International Relations PhD Program in the same year. Tamer, whose areas of specialization are Iran, Sects, Sufism, Mahdism, Identity Politics and Asia-Pacific and who speaks English fluently, completed his PhD education at Gazi University in 2022 with his thesis titled "Identity Construction Process and Mahdism in the Islamic Republic of Iran within the Framework of Social Constructionism Theory and Securitization Approach". He is currently working as an Asia-Pacific Specialist at ANKASAM.

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