Analysis

Energy Crisis and Protests in Cuba

The energy crisis and the US oil blockade are deepening electricity shortages and economic contraction in Cuba.
The protest in the city of Morón constitutes an example of a rare social reaction in Cuba, directly targeting state institutions.
The crisis is also creating a new area of diplomatic bargaining in US-Cuba relations.

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The recent protests in Cuba indicate that the multi-layered crisis facing the island’s economy has reached a new stage. In March 2026, protesters in the central city of Morón targeted the Communist Party headquarters, marking a rare and significant form of social backlash in the country. Worsening issues such as prolonged blackouts, food shortages, and fuel scarcity are driving widespread public discontent. This incident reflects not only domestic economic hardships but also how international sanctions and regional energy dynamics are reshaping Cuban internal politics.

One of the primary triggers of the protests appears to be the serious energy crisis in the country. The Cuban economy is heavily dependent on imported fuel for electricity production. However, disruptions in oil supply in recent months are seriously limiting energy production capacity. The Cuban government has announced that there has been no fuel entry into the country for three months. This situation reduces electricity production and leads to long-term blackouts across the country. In some cities, power outages of up to 15 hours a day directly affect the daily life of the people. These blackouts cause serious disruptions in many areas, from hospitals to public transport, education to food storage.[1]

The energy crisis is not seen merely as a technical infrastructure problem. The Cuban administration points to the oil blockade imposed by the United States (US) as one of the primary causes of the current situation. Recently, the US administration has threatened sanctions against countries selling oil to Cuba, leading specifically to the interruption of oil flow from Venezuela. A significant portion of Cuba’s energy needs was met by oil provided by Venezuela. The severance of this supply chain directly weakens the energy system. Additionally, the long-standing US trade embargo limits the country’s access to energy equipment and financing sources. Therefore, the energy crisis carries not only an economic but also a geopolitical character.[2]

The protests in the city of Morón show how this economic pressure is reflected in the social sphere. The protest initially began as a peaceful demonstration against power outages and food prices. However, the events took on a violent dimension during the night hours when some protesters attacked the Communist Party building. It is stated that protesters threw stones at the building’s entrance and took furniture from inside to set it on fire in the street. Also, a pharmacy and a state-run market were damaged during the protests.[3]

Such attacks on state institutions are quite rare in Cuba. The country’s political system is based on a single-party structure, and public protests generally take place on a limited scale. However, an increase in the number of protests has been observed in recent years due to power outages and economic hardships. Particularly since 2024, protests have emerged in different cities due to food shortages and energy cuts. These protests are considered one of the most serious waves of social discontent seen in Cuba since the “Special Period” crisis that occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Cuban government is following a two-pronged strategy in the face of these protests. On one hand, statements are being made that acknowledge the legitimacy of the protesters’ demands. President Miguel Díaz-Canel admits that power outages have created significant stress on the population. On the other hand, it is emphasized that acts of vandalism and violence that threaten public order will not be permitted. This approach shows that rather than completely denying social discontent, the Cuban administration is attempting to manage it in a controlled manner.[4]

The energy crisis is also initiating a new diplomatic process in Cuba’s foreign policy. The Cuban government has announced that it has begun seeking a dialogue with the US regarding energy and sanctions. The objective of these talks is described as reducing tensions between the two countries and developing solutions for the energy crisis. However, the US administration’s rhetoric supporting political change in Cuba creates uncertainty about the success of this dialogue process. US President Donald Trump’s statements expressing that the Cuban administration must change are interpreted by the Havana government as direct political pressure.[5]

These developments are also producing remarkable results for Latin American geopolitics. The weakening of energy cooperation between Venezuela and Cuba is considered a development that could affect the political balance in the Caribbean region. For many years, Venezuela maintained a strategic alliance between the two countries by providing oil to Cuba. However, political developments in Venezuela and US interventions have interrupted this energy line. Thus, Cuba’s energy security is becoming largely dependent on foreign policy developments.

The energy crisis and economic contraction are also testing the social legitimacy of the political system in Cuba. For many years, the political structure established after the Revolution generated social support through the relative stability provided by social services, education, and the healthcare system. However, the economic contraction and infrastructure problems experienced in recent years are leading to a weakening of this social contract. The fact that power outages directly affect daily life, along with the difficulties in procuring basic consumer goods, is eroding the perception of welfare and security provided by the state to its citizens. This situation shows that the protests consist of more than just economic demands; they are also linked to perceptions regarding management capacity and state authority. Nevertheless, the Cuban administration is trying to maintain its political control capacity through security institutions, party organization, and central management mechanisms. Therefore, the current crisis demonstrates that the delicate balance between the resilience of the Cuban regime and social discontent is being reshaped.

In conclusion, the protests in Morón show that the energy crisis in Cuba is not merely an economic issue. While power outages and shortages of basic goods increase social discontent, US sanctions and regional energy policies shape the international dimension of the crisis. During this process, the Cuban administration is attempting both to maintain internal stability and to struggle against external pressures. If the energy crisis continues in the coming period, it seems likely that protests will increase and US-Cuba relations will turn into a new area of diplomatic tension. Therefore, the Morón protest is not just a local event; it also carries the quality of being a reflection of the complex relationship between Cuba’s economic vulnerability and the international balance of power.

[1] Rawnsley, Jessica. “Cuban Protesters Ransack Communist Office as Energy Crisis Deepens”, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c875zd7de5xo, (Date Accessed: 15.03.2026).

[2] Ferguson, Donna. “Five Arrested in Cuba after Protest at Local Communist Party Office”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/14/arrests-cuba-protest-local-communist-party-office, (Date Accessed: 15.03.2026).

[3] Associated Press. “Protest in Central Cuba at Local Communist Headquarters Ends in 5 Arrests”, AP News, https://apnews.com/article/cuba-protest-arrests-communist-party-75e420ce4d6a1d52ceac5224839e2a6b, (Date Accessed: 15.03.2026).

[4] Ferguson, op. cit.

[5] Ibid.

Ali Caner İNCESU
Ali Caner İNCESU
Ali Caner İncesu graduated from Anadolu University Faculty of Business Administration in 2012. He continued his education with Cappadocia University Tourist Guidance associate degree program and graduated in 2017. In 2022, he successfully completed his master's degrees in International Relations at Hoca Ahmet Yesevi University and in Travel Management and Tourism Guidance at Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University. In 2024, he graduated from the United States University of Maryland Global Campus (UMGC) Political Science undergraduate program. As of 2023, he continues his doctoral studies at Cappadocia University, Department of Political Science and International Relations. In 2022, Mr. İncesu worked as a special advisor at the Embassy of the Republic of Paraguay in Ankara. He is fluent in Spanish and English and is a sworn translator in English and Spanish. His research interests include Latin America, International Law and Tourism.

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