The United States (US), Israel, and Iran are experiencing a period of uncertainty. While a ceasefire continues between the United States, Israel, and Iran, Israel’s attacks on Hezbollah targets in Lebanon are ongoing. Alongside the uncertainty, the parties’ statements—preconditions, terms, and maximalist demands—are escalating tensions day by day. On May 2, 2026, Tehran is putting a list in front of the Trump administration, calling the U.S. back to the diplomatic table. It has been reported in the press that the U.S. directed its own response to Iran thru Pakistan. US President Donald Trump has claimed that the Tehran administration has not paid a sufficient price for Iran’s offer. Meanwhile, Trump’s announcement that they would safely remove the ships remaining in the Strait of Hormuz was interpreted by Tehran as a violation of the ceasefire. Therefore, despite the recent prominence of diplomacy, there is a possibility that the fragile ceasefire process could result in a new war at any moment.
As mentioned above, the attempts to expand the diplomatic front are important. While Iran is trying to draw Russia into the diplomatic equation, the Kremlin continues its traditional “wait-and-see” approach to crises. While the Gulf Countries are increasing their anti-Iran rhetoric, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has responded to the regional tension by withdrawing from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and taking a step that could be interpreted as favorable to Israel.
A war between the US, Iran, and Israel has “not yet” resumed. It is not possible to say that peace has been achieved. It is observed that the parties are increasing the tension with their statements during this attrition process between war and peace. For example, both Trump and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards are sharing with the world public that the resumption of war is a matter of moments. In any case, the blockade of ports and the Strait of Hormuz by the United States is unacceptable to Iran and is interpreted as an indication that the war will continue. Maximalist demands, conditions, and preconditions are being articulated, included in the proposals package conveyed to the other side, and are mostly rejected by the US.
In this environment where “stability” is achieved thru uncertainty, another “stable” stance is being exhibited by Israel: It continues to carry out attacks on Lebanon and Gaza, thereby violating the ceasefire on a delicate line and making the process even more fragile. Additionally, Israel threatens Iran by stating that it could resume its attacks at any moment. Therefore, distrust continues to grow among all three parties. A ceasefire has been in effect since April 8.
As of May 2, 2026, Iran has conveyed its new proposal to the United States. Trump, on the other hand, claims that Iran is on the verge of collapse. He continues to make threats that the war will start again. He is trying to put pressure on Iran on the ground and bring it to the negotiation table. In order to meet at the negotiation table, it is understood that Iran and the USA expect the other side to make concessions. With its final proposal consisting of 14 points, Iran aims to end the war. It has been prepared in response to the US plan, which envisions a two-month ceasefire and consists of 9 points.
When looking at its past regulations or demands, preconditions, and conditions, it can be seen that Iran has partially softened its demands with this latest list. For example, the lifting of the U.S. blockade is not included as a precondition. However, the issue of the nuclear program has again been left for the next stage. Tehran, in its previous “proposals,” also held the view that the nuclear issue should be addressed in the future and indicated that the Strait of Hormuz could be opened in return; it had also requested security guaranties from the US to take any steps regarding the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran had put forward the condition that Israeli attacks in Lebanon should also cease for the war to end. Iran had put the lifting of the blockade on the table as a precondition for the resumption of negotiations. According to Tehran, the blockade in question constitutes a violation of the ceasefire established between the two countries. The Washington administration, led by Trump, had also taken a maximalist stance by stating that Iran’s nuclear program was unacceptable in response to these demands. It had put forward the condition that Iran should open the Strait of Hormuz to traffic. He had also emphasized that Iran’s nuclear program would continue to be a red line for Washington.
As reported in the media, Iran is demanding that the issues listed in its current 14-point list be resolved within a month. As seen in past proposals and the Tehran administration’s distrust of the US, Iran continues to seek assurances that future attacks will cease. It also reserves the right to enrich uranium. It demands the withdrawal of American forces from Iran’s immediate vicinity, the release of Iran’s frozen assets, the lifting of sanctions imposed on Iran, the cessation of war preparations, the end of all conflicts including in Lebanon, and the establishment of a new arrangement over the Strait of Hormuz. It also demands the guaranty of uranium enrichment.
In this environment where uncertainty prevails, the war diplomacy steps taken by both sides are used to wear down, keep under pressure, and extract concessions in return. Additionally, Trump’s inconsistent statements have contributed to the dominance of uncertainty in the process. Indeed, Iran’s diplomatic initiatives centered on Russia have not been reciprocated by the Washington administration, nor have they prevented Trump from threatening Iran. According to Trump, Iran has no intention of signing an agreement with the USA.
In the diplomatic offensive led by Iran, Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi’s contacts in Russia have come to the fore. The meeting with Russian leader Vladimir Putin was interpreted by Tehran as the expected reaction from Moscow. Especially, Putin’s praise of the Iranian people’s resistance and his declaration of support for Iran raised the question of whether full support would be given to Iran against the US. However, shortly thereafter, Putin’s phone call with Trump and the U.S. President’s request for the Russian leader to “especially focus on the process of ending the war in Ukraine” have been interpreted as indicating that Putin’s current “wait and see” stance will continue. Putin is focusing on the war in the vicinity of the Russian Federation and ensuring that Middle Eastern politics do not harm relations with the West. In other words, he aims to maintain the current gains in Ukraine, which Trump also acknowledged.
On the other hand, it is frequently mentioned that the relationship between Russia and Iran has a dimension of strategic partnership or alliance. The Kremlin has stated from the beginning of the process that the United States and Israel initiated the war and that the effects of the war are not limited to the Middle East. Additionally, cooperation between Iran and Russia on drones and their joint stance against sanctions can be cited as examples. Russia has opposed the sanctions against Iran outside the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Moscow has not supported economic sanctions against Iran. The elements listed in the agreement signed between the two countries in 2025 have been implemented. However, the said agreement does not include cooperation in the field of defense and does not establish a military alliance. Therefore, it appears that a political and diplomatic solution to the Iran War is being sought by the Kremlin.
Another aspect of the campaign of attrition waged by Washington is the assertion that the Iranian regime is not monolithic and that its leadership is fragmented. By suggesting that there is rivalry between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Parliament, and the Revolutionary Guards, the aim is to call into question the regime’s legitimacy and the legitimacy of the demands and conditions it has put forward to the U.S. While Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi represents Iran in negotiations with the U.S., Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Ghalibaf chairs Iran’s negotiating delegation. On the other hand, control over the closure of the Strait of Hormuz falls within the authority of the Revolutionary Guards. The statements of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, are also being used by the U.S. administration and parts of the media to suggest that there is pluralism in Iran.
The tense nature of the process also keeps the possibility of strong and varied reactions from different segments of Iranian society on the agenda. Pressure continues to mount on the Tehran administration from within the religious establishment, from certain members of Parliament, and from conservative groups regarding the termination of negotiations. There are calls to end negotiations with the United States and Israel, which are characterized as enemies. There are even voices calling for Iran to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is the strongest evidence of Iran’s claim that its uranium enrichment is for peaceful purposes. The foundations of the nuclear program were laid during the Shah Pahlavi era. The clerical regime also decided to continue the nuclear program after a certain period. Consequently, the political regime in Iran views the nuclear program as a red line and a crucial pillar of its policy of “solitary resistance” against the West.
Iran’s nuclear program was developed not only for national security but also to gain respect and recognition on the international stage. On the other hand, the fact that both former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and current Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei have approved nuclear negotiations while simultaneously allowing the nuclear program to continue demonstrates that the program has been adopted as state policy and is regarded as one of the primary indicators of Iran’s sovereignty. Furthermore, both the conservative and reformist factions in Iran are aware that blocking the nuclear program constitutes a key pillar of the containment policy pursued by the United States and other Western nations against Iran. Iran’s nuclear program, a key factor in its deterrence, also constitutes one of the reasons for the maximum pressure being exerted on Iran, as evidenced by the rhetoric of President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as well as Israel’s periodic attacks on nuclear facilities.
The Gulf States must also be included in the equation involving the U.S., Iran, and Israel. As part of the contacts mentioned above, Arakchi also held talks in Oman. It is believed that discussions regarding the Strait of Hormuz took place, with the aim of reaching a solution that Oman would also accept. The UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC, however, can be interpreted as a development that increases regional tension, particularly one that benefits Israel.
The Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) “anti-Iran” statements are also noteworthy. Iran’s goal of spreading the war to the Gulf remains unchanged. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard has threatened that if Gulf territories are used to attack Iran, oil production centers will be targeted. Such rhetoric, threats, and Iran’s attacks on American targets and infrastructure systems in Gulf countries have deepened the Gulf states’ existing distrust of Iran. GCC members have characterized Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz as a violation of international law. The GCC, which convened in Saudi Arabia in recent days, has called for increased military cooperation and the restoration of pre-war freedom of navigation and security. Bahrain has stated that Iran is interfering in the internal affairs of Gulf countries, asserting that such policies are unacceptable. It is also worth noting that the Gulf States have interpreted the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement as a “strategic defeat inflicted by Iran” and as “confirmation of Iran’s regional power.” The agreement in question was viewed as a “blank check” in the face of Iran’s encirclement; in return, the Gulf States demanded the signing of defense agreements with Washington.
As a result, the standoff between the parties continues. Uncertainty and tension are mutually reinforcing. It remains the primary factor influencing developments both within the Middle East and beyond the region. It is unlikely that Russia will enter the equation on Iran’s side, as it is believed that Putin’s priority will be to protect his current gains on the Ukrainian front and bring the war to an end. The stance of the Gulf States will continue to influence tensions in the Middle East. U.S.-Gulf cooperation is drawing Iran’s ire. Trump is attempting to bring Tehran back to the negotiating table by reminding it, through his rhetoric and pressure, that the development of nuclear weapons is a red line. Iran has given diplomacy a chance despite Trump’s refusal to abandon particularly harsh rhetoric and maximalist demands. Given the Iranian religious leadership’s distrust of Washington administrations—and, of course, of Trump—the significance of the 14-point list in the diplomatic arena becomes clearer. On the other hand, Iran is aware that the U.S. could reignite the war at any moment and has declared to the global public that it is prepared to fight.
