The BRICS group has been regarded as a leading platform in shaping a multipolar world since its establishment process in 2009–2010. As of 2023, a large number of “Global South” countries have expressed interest in joining BRICS, and by 2024, with the accession of Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Ethiopia, the number of member states has increased to ten. Acting upon a set of objectives such as “challenging the dollar hegemony of the United States (US),” “conducting trade in local currencies,” and “establishing global financial institutions that could serve as alternatives to Western financial systems,” BRICS has also sought to achieve a degree of geopolitical alignment. However, with the inclusion of countries such as Iran, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia—each possessing distinct geopolitical perspectives and positions across different regions—the prospect of political cohesion within BRICS has become equally more difficult. In light of recent developments in the Middle East, the question of whether BRICS can function in a coherent and coordinated manner has become increasingly contentious. Before addressing this issue, it is useful to analyze the geopolitical stances of Russia, China, and India, particularly in relation to the countries that joined BRICS in 2024.
The expansion of BRICS has been largely driven by the willingness and determination of Russia and China, while India’s position has significantly complicated the process of determining new member states. For instance, Iran’s accession can be explained through the support provided by Russia and China. On the other hand, the UAE’s membership can largely be associated with India’s backing. Moreover, it has also been reflected in the media that some countries which expressed interest in or formally applied for BRICS membership encountered opposition—particularly in the form of India’s veto—during this process.[i] For instance, reports have appeared in the media indicating that Pakistan sought China’s support in order to gain membership in the BRICS New Development Bank, but that this effort was rejected by India.[ii] Similarly, taking into account the existing geopolitical balances among actors such as Armenia, the UAE, Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Pakistan, India has played a decisive role in the BRICS expansion process. Comparable geopolitical calculations have become even more complex following the outbreak of war initiated by the United States and Israel against Iran on 28 February 2026.
First of all, India’s reporting of an Iranian naval vessel to Israel at the very outset of the war, followed by Israel’s subsequent strike on this vessel,[iii] is of a nature that could potentially damage the friendly relations between Tehran and New Delhi. India has explained this situation as a “requirement of its strategic partnership with Israel.”[iv] In the subsequent period, while the ceasefire was ongoing, Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and targeted Indian oil tankers, after which India delivered a formal protest note to the Iranian Ambassador in New Delhi regarding the incident.[v] These developments have signaled an implicit disagreement and a conflict of interests between Iran and India. With the onset of this war, the Iranian administration has begun to adopt a more assertive stance toward actors such as India, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, which are perceived as aligning more closely with the United States and Israel. This situation has also reflected the underlying geopolitical dissonance among BRICS member states, namely Iran, India, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia.
This lack of cohesion has also been reflected in BRICS’s decision-making processes. For instance, during the BRICS consultative meeting held in New Delhi on 23–24 April 2026, the group was unable to issue a joint statement on the Iran crisis.[vi] Moreover, it has been reported that during this meeting, delegates from Iran and the UAE engaged in discussions regarding the latest developments in the Middle East, but were unable to reach any consensus.[vii] For this reason, BRICS’s efforts to unite Global South countries under a single platform may, in the long term, prove unsuccessful. In an increasingly globalized world, the establishment of a system entirely free from Western influence appears highly difficult. India, while maintaining cooperation with the United States and Israel, is simultaneously a founding member of BRICS and assumed its rotating presidency in 2026. The UAE and Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, are actors that continue their normalization process with Israel under the Abraham Accords, while also facing retaliatory attacks from Iran due to the presence of American military bases on their territory. Within such a geopolitical fragmentation, it becomes increasingly challenging for the platform to reach unified decisions. In this regard, the Iran crisis functions as a “stress test” for BRICS, exposing internal divisions and highlighting the divergent security priorities and alliance preferences of its member states.
Ultimately, the establishment of a comprehensive and sustainable geopolitical alignment among BRICS members such as Iran, the UAE, India, and Saudi Arabia appears unlikely as long as the ongoing crisis in the Middle East persists. The primary reason for this is the marked divergence in these actors’ security perceptions, threat definitions, and foreign policy priorities. In particular, Iran’s anti–United States and anti–Israel positioning, contrasted with the UAE’s and Saudi Arabia’s close security ties with the United States and their normalization processes with Israel, significantly complicates the formation of a common strategic framework. Similarly, India’s multi-vector foreign policy approach and its expanding relations with Western powers further deepen this multilayered fragmentation.
In conclusion, the pattern of relations within BRICS points to an interest-based and flexible cooperation model rather than a classical alliance structure. In this context, rather than full policy convergence among the actors, what emerges is a framework in which differences are managed and limited cooperation is developed through overlapping interests in specific areas. This situation both constrains BRICS’s institutional capacity and transforms it into a flexible coordination platform within the multipolar international system, rather than a rigid bloc.
[i] “BILD: India did not approve Türkiye’s membership in BRICS.”, T24, https://t24.com.tr/ekonomi/bild-hindistan-turkiye-nin-brics-uyeligini-kabul-etmedi,1191922?_t=1777634562975, (Date Accessed: 02.05.2026).
[ii] “Pakistan seeks China support to join BRICS bank amid likely India objection”, Asia Nikkie, https://asia.nikkei.com/politics/international-relations/pakistan-seeks-china-support-to-join-brics-bank-amid-likely-india-objection, (Date Accessed: 02.05.2026).
[iii] “India stated that it was the party that provided Israel with the location of the Iranian vessel.”, Son Dakika, https://www.sondakika.com/dunya/haber-hindistan-iran-gemisinin-konumunu-israil-e-biz-19638635/, (Date Accessed: 10.03.2026).
[iv] Ibid.
[v] “Following the ship attacks in the Strait of Hormuz, India summoned the Iranian ambassador to the Ministry of External Affairs.”, Haberler, https://www.haberler.com/politika/hindistan-bandrali-tankerlere-hurmuz-bogazi-nda-saldiri-19762542-haberi/, (Date Accessed: 02.05.2026).
[vi] “BRICS meet ends without joint statement after differences over Iran War, India’s stance on Israel and Palestine”, Mronline, https://mronline.org/2026/04/28/brics-meet-ends-without-joint-statement-after-differences-over-iran-war-indias-stance-on-israel-and-palestine/, (Date Accessed: 02.05.2026).
[vii] Ibid.
