While discussions largely revolve around rising oil and natural gas prices, the United States blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s closure of the Gulf, and numerous vessels becoming stranded in the Gulf as consequences of the war launched by the United States (US) and Israel against Iran on 28 February 2026, the hardships endured by personnel aboard vessels have not found their way into the public agenda as frequently as other issues, particularly economic ones. Yet the Strait of Hormuz, which plays a critical role in global energy supply, has in recent months transformed into a crisis zone where not only oil tankers but thousands of seafarers have become trapped. This situation in Hormuz remains in the shadow of the grand military and geopolitical strategies upon which world public opinion is focused; it deprives thousands of people of even their basic needs beyond strategic calculations and energy wars, and this process constitutes one of the most severely neglected humanitarian crisis areas of the war.
While the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) agency, affiliated with the Royal Navy, declared the security situation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf as “critical” ,the highest risk level, International Maritime Organization (IMO) Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez called upon all member states to support efforts and, once necessary security guarantees are provided, to open a humanitarian evacuation corridor to address the problem in the Strait of Hormuz, where approximately 20,000 seafarers aboard 2,000 vessels are stranded and unable to depart.[i]
In the last week of April, UKMTO reported that numerous container and tanker vessels sailing off Oman and Iran were being targeted with heavy weapons, with seizure attempts directed particularly at vessels such as the MSC Francesca and Epaminondas.[ii] This demonstrates that seafarers are not only stranded but have also become direct targets in an active war zone. Tanker and container vessels transiting and/or stranded in the region are exposed to threats from missiles, armed unmanned maritime and aerial vehicles (UAVs, USVs), while according to UKMTO data dated 2 May 2026, a total of 41 incidents affecting vessels in and around the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman have been reported 23 attacks on vessels, 15 suspicious activities,[iii] and two vessel hijackings (Advisory UKMTO #2026).[iv] While the reports do not specify who carried out the attacks, suspicious activities, or vessel hijackings, some incidents are commonly associated with Iran-linked actors in international media and security assessments.[v]
Regardless of who carries out the attacks, seafarers who bear the heaviest burden of the crisis by dying, being wounded, or remaining stranded aboard vessels since the outbreak of conflict on 28 February 2026 are struggling not only with security threats but also with shortages of water, food, medicine, and communications. Crew changes cannot be made on vessels that have been unable to berth for weeks, while personnel injured in drone attacks cannot receive necessary medical treatment either.
While the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) stated that commercial vessels have “become part of the war” and that seafarers are being directly targeted, according to the union many seafarers are now refusing to board vessels transiting Hormuz, and some companies are having difficulty finding crew for crew changes. While the ITF stated that they have received thousands of distress calls from stranded seafarers, the blockage of diplomatic channels for resolving the crisis is heightening concerns.[vi]
Compared to the global crisis experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic a modern maritime history event in which personnel were forced to work far beyond their contract periods causing psychological problems the crisis experienced by personnel of vessels stranded in Hormuz or transiting the region exposes seafarers to direct physical risk. While in the past personnel only feared returning home late, today they live under the severe psychological toll of constant threat of attack or explosion, alongside the fear of not being able to survive.
The tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and the accompanying maritime security vulnerabilities have also directly shaken the security architecture of the Gulf of Aden and the waters off Somalia. According to recent analyses by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and UKMTO, the shift of coalition warship patrol areas to focus on interstate tensions in Hormuz and attacks in the Red Sea has created a security vacuum off Somalia. This situation has provided fertile ground for Somali pirates largely suppressed since the early 2010s to reorganize and resume successful vessel hijacking operations against commercial ships from the beginning of 2026.[vii] This domino effect created by regional instability proves that piracy is not merely economic opportunism but a direct consequence of the division of global security resources, and that the crisis in Hormuz has in fact transformed into a multi-layered spiral of instability encompassing the entire Indian Ocean.
In conclusion, while the security and living conditions problem faced by seafarers stranded in Hormuz may not be as visible as the energy prices, military operations, and geopolitical consequences of the war, it constitutes a serious humanitarian crisis that directly affects the lives of thousands of seafarers who ensure the continuity of global trade, and its impact extends to the eastern borders of the Indian Ocean.
[i] IMO, (2026). “No safe transit through Strait of Hormuz: IMO Secretary-General”, https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/pressbriefings/pages/no-safe-transit-through-hormuz-imo-secretary-general.aspx?utm_source (Accessed: 03.05.2026).
[ii] “Iran releases video of forces seizing ship in the Strait of Hormuz”, Youtube, https://youtu.be/KMZScyykYdw?si=iN4vDJ2RBnMMXAmL (Accessed: 03.05.2026).
[iii] Even if an attack or armed intervention against a commercial vessel has not yet occurred; this refers to abnormal activities that may pose a threat to maritime security, such as surveillance of the vessel, unusual approaches by high-speed boats, tracking behavior by unidentified aerial or maritime vehicles, unauthorized radio calls, GPS/GNSS jamming/spoofing, course interception maneuvers, or potential boarding preparations.
[iv] UKMTO, https://www.ukmto.org/recent-incidents#ff64365a-a734-437e-ba67-4c5fa2f767db (Accessed: 03.05.2026).
[v] Saul, J. (2026). “Iran fast-boat swarms add to Hormuz threats for shipping”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/iran-fast-boat-swarms-add-hormuz-threats-shipping-2026-04-23/ (Accessed: 03.05.2026).
[vi] ITF. (2026). “ITF condemns fresh wave of attacks and seizures on civilian vessels in the Strait of Hormuz”, https://www.itfseafarers.org/en/news/itf-condemns-fresh-wave-attacks-and-seizures-civilian-vessels-strait-hormuz?utm_source (Accessed: 03.05.2026).
[vii] Oral. F. (2025). Environmental impacts of the Houthis’ attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Front. Polit. Sci, 7(1711643), doi: 10.3389/fpos.2025.1711643.
