The agreement signed in Tripoli on 30 August sets out a 24-month timetable for Libya’s long-awaited presidential and parliamentary elections. The UN-led 4+4 Committee reached a joint text covering election laws and the unification of the executive authority. After years of delays, elections are once again at the center of the political agenda. However, the value of the agreement will depend less on the timetable itself and more on whether it can be implemented.[i]
The text renews the leadership of the High National Elections Commission and addresses issues that have blocked the process, such as the candidacy of military personnel and dual citizens. Presidential candidates will need 20,000 signatures from across the country. If a person with dual citizenship is elected, they will be required to give up their other citizenship before taking the oath. Plans for institutions to hold rotating meetings in Tripoli, Benghazi, and Sabha reflect an effort to bring geographic balance into the political process.[ii]
Libya’s election problem is not simply a lack of technical preparation. The December 2021 vote collapsed because of disputes over candidate eligibility and legal authority. The temporary arrangements created afterward produced lasting areas of interest and strengthened the institutional division between the east and west. For this reason, it is important that talks which began in April and continued for seven rounds have produced an agreement. Still, distrust created by earlier failures continues to hang over the process.[iii]
The sharing of oil revenues especially feeds this distrust. Hydrocarbons provide most of the country’s exports and public revenues, while parallel budgets and weakly controlled spending have made economic management fragile. Therefore, elections are more than a change of officeholders. They are also a struggle over who will control the budget, appointments, and the distribution of resources.[iv]
At this point, the most difficult part of the agreement becomes clear. Elections can create new political legitimacy, but they cannot be expected to remove in one night the administrative networks, armed relationships, and economic interests built up over many years. Actors who may lose their positions after an election may choose methods other than openly opposing the process. They may slow down the timetable, create disputes over authority, or use security problems as a reason to extend the process.
The positive response of both the Tripoli administration and the military leadership in the east points to broad agreement. However, welcoming a document is less costly than accepting a transfer of power after an election. Libya’s political history shows that parties may support elections while also trying to protect their own candidates, institutions, and sources of revenue.
Restructuring the High National Elections Commission is a necessary first step, but the commission’s neutrality cannot be measured by a change of names. Updating voter registers, delivering ballot papers, deciding on objections, and providing security will determine public trust in the institution. If the commission appears to be under the influence of any region, a debate over legitimacy may begin even before the results are announced.
The rules on the candidacy of military personnel and dual citizens also aim to close old disputes. However, if people believe that the rules were designed to allow or prevent certain individuals from running, a legal solution may turn into a new political objection. Libya needs predictable election rules that bind winners and losers equally, rather than rules that change according to the identity of candidates.
The goal of holding elections under a single executive authority creates one of the most important dilemmas in the process. The country needs a common executive structure in order to hold elections, but that structure can gain real political legitimacy only through elections. For this reason, the powers of the government that will manage the pre-election transition are very important. If its authority over the budget, senior appointments, and security institutions is not clearly limited, the transitional government may quickly become the center of a new political competition.
At first sight, a 24-month period seems reasonable for technical and political preparations. For Libya, the main issue is not the length of the period but how it will be used. Many timetables announced in previous years later became reasons for further delays. To achieve a different result this time, the process needs to be divided into interim targets. Trust in the timetable could increase if clear dates are set for steps such as forming the election commission, passing the necessary laws, renewing voter registration, and preparing the security plan.
It seems difficult for elections alone to unite the country while the position of armed groups remains unresolved. Different chains of command continue to exist in the east and west, and in some cities local groups can act more effectively than public institutions. Temporary calm on voting day will not be enough. A security system in which candidates can campaign freely, voters are not pressured, and results cannot be changed by force will be essential.
At this point, guarantees for the post-election period are at least as important as the rules before the election. Fear that the losing side will be completely excluded from politics may increase the tendency to disrupt the process. At the same time, giving unlawful privileges in the name of compromise would weaken trust in the new institutions. A solution may be found in a justice system that works for everyone and in reasonable channels for political participation.
Oil revenues are at the economic center of this political equation. Production fields and ports have often been used as tools of political pressure in the past. Disputes around the Central Bank have also directly affected the country’s economy. Therefore, the rules for sharing oil revenues among regions after the elections should be clearly defined. Otherwise, elections may be seen not as a chance to build a common state system, but as a new struggle over who will control oil revenues.
The planned rotating meetings between Tripoli, Benghazi, and Sabha may strengthen the feeling that the capital represents the whole country. In particular, visible participation by the south may help reduce the sense of exclusion that has built up over many years. However, if symbolic meetings do not lead to public services, local investment, and fair representation, geographic balance will remain only on paper.
International support can make the agreement easier to implement because it can increase the diplomatic and economic cost for actors who disrupt the process. However, outside guarantees cannot replace the will of Libyan parties. The most useful role for the United Nations would be not to create another temporary formula, but to monitor the agreed stages transparently and clearly identify those responsible for delays.
For the Libyan people, the measure of success is more practical. Citizens want a government that keeps the electricity on, pays salaries on time, provides working health services, and allows safe travel between cities before they want a new institution name or a long roadmap. If the election process does not connect with these expectations, participation may weaken, while political fatigue may benefit existing centers of power.
In the coming period, three possible scenarios for Libya’s political and social future can be identified. If the parties follow the agreed stages, complete security arrangements, and create shared guarantees for accepting the election results, elections could become the beginning of institutional unification. However, the creation of another transitional administration and a further extension of the election timetable also remain strong possibilities. In another scenario, a new dispute over candidacy rules or the powers of the executive could block the process again before ballot boxes are even set up.
Libya’s 24-month timetable has reopened a political path that had been closed for years. However, the ability of elections to unite divided institutions will depend on the steps taken before voting day and protected afterward. Elections can become a real beginning if current power holders accept the possibility of losing, oil revenues are shared under clear rules, and armed forces cannot override the results. Otherwise, the timetable will remain only another date added to a long series of extended transition periods.
[i] “Libya rivals agree roadmap for elections within 24 months at UN-led talks”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/libya-rivals-agree-roadmap-elections-within-24-months-un-led-talks-2026-08-30/, (Accessed: 30 Ağustos 2026).
[ii] “Libya’s 4+4 Small Dialogue Committee signs draft final deal to restructure election commission”, Anadolu Ajansı, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/libyas-4-4-small-dialogue-committee-signs-draft-final-deal-to-restructure-election-commission/4041548, (Accessed: 30 Ağustos 2026).
[iii] “Political Roadmap”, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/en/political-roadmap, (Accessed: 30 Ağustos 2026).
[iv] “Libya Economic Monitor, Fall 2025”, World Bank, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/4f4aa403-99e4-44e5-8df2-6f955da2441d, (Accessed: 30 Ağustos 2026).
