The relationship between political power, strength, and legitimacy is one of the most ancient and controversial issues in the history of thought. The narrative conveyed by Saint Augustine in his work The City of God, which has been referenced in discussions on international politics for centuries, reveals the timeless nature of this relationship.[i] According to legend, when Alexander the Great captured a pirate who had been plundering the seas, he questioned the pirate about the reasons for his crimes. The pirate’s response contained a profound challenge to the scale of power: it raised the question of whether justice is redefined by might, as an attack carried out with a small force is defined as a crime, whereas the same act performed by a great power is hailed as sovereignty and conquest. When evaluated within the context of modern international relations, this narrative demonstrates that whether the actions of states are deemed legal or legitimate is often determined by the balance of power rather than established norms.
The developments in Venezuela over the past year and the debates surrounding the Nicolás Maduro administration can be interpreted as a contemporary manifestation of this ancient question. The recent diplomatic activity between the United States and Venezuela, along with the shifting nature of international pressure on the Maduro government, should not be evaluated merely as a development unique to Latin America within global politics. This process also offers significant clues for understanding how the European Union (EU) and major European states approach global crises and how they balance normative values with strategic interests. Europe’s approach to the Venezuela issue is, on one hand, a concrete reflection of the structural transformation of European foreign policy and, on the other, its search for a role within the global system.
Since the early stages of the deepening Venezuelan crisis, the EU has clearly positioned itself as a normative actor.[ii] The discourse of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law has constituted the fundamental pillar of the EU’s policies toward the Maduro administration. The sanctions and diplomatic isolation policies implemented within this framework aimed to reinforce Europe’s claim to be a power that defends the moral and legal principles of the international order. However, developments over the past year have raised serious questions within Europe regarding both the effectiveness and the sustainability of this approach. In particular, Europe’s internal energy crisis and economic vulnerabilities have made the practical consequences of its normative foreign policy more visible.
Following the Russia-Ukraine War, the issue of Europe’s energy supply security has become a fundamental factor directly influencing foreign policy decisions. At this point, the prolonged exclusion of a country like Venezuela, which possesses the world’s largest oil reserves, from the global system has increasingly begun to be perceived by Europe as a costly policy preference. What is noteworthy here is that Europe’s stance toward Venezuela is undergoing a strategic reappraisal rather than a moral inquiry. In other words, while Europe has not abandoned its criticisms regarding the democratic nature of the Maduro administration, it has begun to discuss more openly to what extent these criticisms align with its own interests. This situation indicates that normative discourse in European foreign policy is ceasing to be an absolute reference and is instead becoming a circumstantial tool.
The recent legal and political processes surrounding the Maduro administration have brought about a distinct divergence within the EU.[iii] While the European Parliament and some member states evaluate this process as a positive development in terms of enforcing international law and ensuring accountability, some European capitals argue that this approach could further exacerbate the political crisis in Venezuela. This divergence once again reveals the limitations of the EU’s capacity to produce a common foreign policy. Europe’s inability to maintain a monolithic stance on the Venezuela issue is, in fact, a reflection of a structural problem that the EU frequently faces in the presence of global crises. To comment at this point, the Venezuela file serves as an internal cohesion test for Europe rather than merely a foreign policy matter.
This fragmented structure of Europe’s Venezuela policy also yields noteworthy consequences within the context of transatlantic relations. The fact that the US has recently pursued a strategy open to limited contact with the Maduro administration has created both an opportunity and an area of uncertainty for Europe. On one hand, Europe views Washington’s partial shift away from the policy of ‘maximum pressure’ as a development that expands its own diplomatic room for maneuver. On the other hand, the reality that Europe’s capacity to develop a strategy independent of the US remains limited necessitates a cautious approach to this process. The key point here is the tension between Europe’s desire to emerge from the shadow of the US on the Venezuela issue and its inability to fully break away from that shadow.
Another significant dimension of the Venezuelan crisis for Europe is the great power competition in Latin America. The increasing economic and political influence of China and Russia in the region is leading to a contraction of Europe’s traditional spheres of influence. According to a view increasingly expressed in European capitals, the total exclusion of Venezuela causes the country to lean further toward alternative centers of power, thereby damaging Europe’s long-term interests in the region. In this context, it is not surprising that the idea of conditional engagement is gaining more support. To comment here, this approach by Europe is the product of a necessity imposed by geopolitical realities rather than ideals.
The humanitarian dimension of the Venezuelan crisis also holds a significant place in Europe’s policy calculations. The long-standing economic collapse and political instability have led to major migration movements across Latin America. Even these migration waves, which are not directly oriented toward Europe, indicate the existence of a dynamic that generates instability on a global scale. Therefore, the EU evaluates the crisis in Venezuela not merely as a regime problem, but as a structural issue affecting global humanitarian security. At this point, it can be said that Europe’s humanitarian discourse serves as a bridge between its normative foreign policy approach and its strategic interests.
Germany and France argue that resolving the political crisis in Venezuela through military or coercive means would deepen regional instability, emphasizing the necessity of a dialogue-based and inclusive transition process. On the other hand, countries with strong historical and cultural ties to Latin America, such as Spain and Italy, express the view that the indefinite continuation of sanctions both exacerbates the humanitarian crisis and weakens Europe’s diplomatic influence in the region.[iv]
In contrast, some Central and Eastern European states, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic countries,advocate for increasing international pressure on the Maduro administration by maintaining a tougher stance on the discourse of democracy and the rule of law.[v]
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, evaluates the developments in Venezuela as a reflection of the challenges facing the West-centric order, interpreting the crisis as part of a broader global systemic transformation. These differing national approaches demonstrate that Europe struggles to produce a common and coherent strategy regarding the Venezuelan crisis, and that the issue also serves as a test of Europe’s foreign policy capacity.[vi]
The attempts of the Maduro administration to restore its international legitimacy are being handled by Europe with a cautious but not entirely exclusionary approach. The EU neither supports this process unconditionally nor rejects it absolutely. Instead, it adopts a model of conditional engagement based on criteria such as the transparency of electoral processes, political pluralism, and the integration of the opposition into the political system. However, to offer a critical commentary, the extent to which Europe’s conditional approach will be effective in practice remains uncertain. Indeed, the political structure in Venezuela possesses a character that exhibits high resistance to external pressure and is shaped by internal dynamics.
The developments over the past year point to a more general transformation process in European foreign policy. The case of Venezuela clearly reveals the tension between the EU’s discourse as a normative power and the necessities of realpolitik. While Europe seeks to maintain its claim to be a value-based actor on a global level, it simultaneously feels the need to take more pragmatic steps in areas such as energy security, strategic autonomy, and great power competition. This dual structure occasionally causes Europe’s Venezuela policy to appear inconsistent and contradictory. However, this inconsistency can also be interpreted as a natural part of Europe’s process of redefining its position within the global system.[vii]
Consequently, the recent developments surrounding the Nicolás Maduro administration and the diplomatic activity on the US-Venezuela axis do not constitute a file unique to Latin America for the European Union. This process reveals how Europe defines the relationship between power, law, and legitimacy in global politics and what kind of role it seeks to assume within the international order. The inquiry posed by Saint Augustine centuries ago gains renewed significance today within the context of Venezuela. The question of whether justice in international politics is truly based on universal principles or is redefined according to the scale of power is embodied in Europe’s stance toward Venezuela. The outcome of this test for Europe will be decisive not only for the future of Venezuela but also for the future of European foreign policy itself.
[i] Tolga Şahin, “İmparator ABD, korsan Maduro ve işlemeyen uluslararası hukuk”, T24, https://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/tolga-sirin/imparator-abd-korsan-maduro-ve-islemeyen-uluslararasi-hukuk,53185, (Date Accessed: 06.01.2026).
[ii] The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, Venezuela: Statement by the High Representative on the aftermath of the U.S. intervention in Venezuela, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/venezuela-statement-high-representative-aftermath-us-intervention-venezuela_en, (Date Accessed: 06.01.2026).
[iii] “Hungary’s Orban says US intervention in Venezuela good for energy markets”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/hungarys-orban-says-us-intervention-venezuela-good-energy-markets-2026-01-05/, (Date Accessed: 06.01.2026).
[iv] Jesús Maturana & Maria Tadeo, “Spain and five Latin American countries reject US attack on Venezuela in joint communiqué”, Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/2026/01/04/spain-and-5-latin-american-countries-reject-us-attack-on-venezuela-in-joint-communique, (Date Accessed: 06.01.2026).
[v] Beyza Binnur Donmez, “European countries urge restraint, respect for international law after US strikes on Venezuela, capture of Maduro”, Anadolu Ajansı, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/european-countries-urge-restraint-respect-for-international-law-after-us-strikes-on-venezuela-capture-of-maduro/3789101, (Date Accessed: 06.01.2026).
[vi] Jessica Elgot, “Wes Streeting warns of ‘disintegration’ of rules-based world order after Venezuela attack”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/06/wes-streeting-venezuela-disintegration-rules-based-world-order, (Date Accessed: 06.01.2026).
[vii] Patrick Wintour, “European leaders appear torn in face of new world order after Venezuela attack”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/04/venezuela-european-leaders-divided-and-torn-in-response-to-us-ousting-of-maduro, (Date Accessed: 06.01.2026).
