Analysis

Nicolas Maduro’s Meetings in Moscow

Maduro embodies his vision of a multipolar world in Moscow.
Venezuela deepens its strategic partnerships with Russia and China in energy and defense.
The diplomatic network of the Global South is growing: Caracas forges new ties with Eurasia and Africa.

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Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro’s visit to the Russian capital Moscow on May 9, 2025 was not only a participation in the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, but also a reflection of Venezuela’s foreign policy priorities and diplomatic alliances in a multipolar world order.[i] Maduro’s meetings with the presidents of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Cuba and Burkina Faso during this visit reveal Latin America’s efforts to reposition itself in global geopolitics.

Maduro’s visit officially began with a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and the signing of a “new strategic partnership agreement”.[ii] The agreement covers critical areas such as oil, gas, mining, military cooperation and technology transfer, and marks not only a symbolic but also a structural deepening of Venezuela’s relations with Russia.

The fact that Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino was directly with Maduro in the meeting emphasizes the importance of military cooperation, while the accompaniment of Venezuelan State Oil Company (VSOC) President Hector Obregon shows that investments in the energy field will be increased.[iii] The plan to increase Moscow-Karakas air flights indicates that both touristic and logistical relations will be institutionalized. These developments demonstrate a mutual strategic rapprochement that increases the interdependence of both countries, which are subject to Western sanctions.

This contact traffic reveals not only symbolic solidarity but also Maduro’s effort to rebuild Venezuela’s energy diplomacy. The relations with energy giants such as China, Russia and Kazakhstan, especially in the process of restructuring the VSOC, are directly linked to Venezuela’s goal of increasing its production capacity. By using the energy card, the Maduro administration is both breaking economic isolation and expanding its room for maneuver in the international arena. In this respect, the contacts in Moscow can be seen as part of long-term strategic goals, not just immediate diplomatic gains. For Venezuela, which is trying to gain a place in the global energy equation, this visit may herald a new foreign policy phase.

The dinner meeting with Xi Jinping, while symbolically important, did not evolve into an official working meeting this time. Nevertheless, recent visits to China by Vice President Delcy Rodriguez and meetings with China National Petroleum Corporation show that economic and energy-based relations between China and Venezuela remain uninterrupted.

In this context, China’s infrastructure investments in Venezuela, technological support in oil production and credit policies continue to play a fundamental role in Caracas’ economic survival. Maduro’s statements in Moscow describing the relationship as “resistant to all times and challenges” show that the bond between the two countries is not only economic, but also ideological.[iv] This is in line with China’s strategies to expand its sphere of influence in the Global South.

There was both an official intergovernmental meeting with Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel and a joint commemoration at the Simon Bolivar monument. Such symbolic gestures show that ideological solidarity between Havana and Caracas continues, even more consolidated under the new geopolitical conditions.

Since 1999, Cuba and Venezuela have carried out numerous cooperation programs in the fields of health, defense, education and energy. This visit reveals that the two countries continue to search for common grounds of struggle against the US sanctions and siege policies. Such contacts are concrete reflections of the desire to strengthen the Latin American pillar of the “anti-imperialist bloc”.

Maduro’s bilateral meeting with Kazakh President Kassym Jömert Tokayev can be considered as part of Venezuela’s strategy to diversify its alternative energy and investment partners in Eurasia. In particular, the expressed desire to cooperate with Kazakhstan’s state oil company Kazmunaygas indicates that Venezuela continues to need foreign technology and financing in oil production.

This development is an indication of Venezuela’s orientation towards a Eurasian model of state capitalism in the face of its exclusion from traditional Western capital and technology. It is also a pillar of the Maduro administration’s strategy of “multipolar partnership diplomacy” against international isolation.

The meeting with the interim leader of Burkina Faso, Captain Ibrahim Traore, who came to power after a military coup, is an example of Venezuela’s efforts to strengthen the discourse of anti-imperialist solidarity on the African continent. The signing of 22 strategic agreements shows that relations are not only at the rhetorical level, but also extend to areas such as education, mining and energy.[v]

Such relations with new military regimes in Africa are characterized by anti-French and anti-US rhetoric and reinforce Venezuela’s aspirations for leadership in the Global South.

On the surface, Nicolas Maduro’s visit to Moscow appears to be a mere participation in a commemorative ceremony, but it marks a concrete diplomatic offensive that demonstrates how Venezuela’s current foreign policy paradigm is adapting to the multipolar world. The visit was a stage for the strategic, ideological and economic ties that the Caracas administration is trying to establish with alternative centers of power to overcome its exclusion from the Western diplomatic system. Maduro’s contacts with the leaders of these countries show that Venezuela is not only an energy supplier, but also seeks a new international identity centered around the discourse of South-South cooperation.

These contacts can be seen as part of Venezuela’s response to the pressures on it in the international system. Seeking to break the economic impact of the US-led sanctions, the Maduro administration is deepening its strategic partnerships with great powers such as Russia and China, while at the same time consolidating solidarity relations with countries such as Cuba and Burkina Faso on the basis of ideological affinity. This style of diplomacy is not only aimed at economic and technological transfer, but is also fueled by shared historical experiences, a legacy of anti-imperialist struggle and a geopolitical stance in favor of multipolarity.

In conclusion, Maduro’s visit to Moscow confirms that Venezuela has evolved from being a marginalized actor in the international system to a country positioned on the line of resistance of the Global South and seeking to build structural alliances with non-Western blocs. This development constitutes an example that should be carefully followed by other countries in Latin America. In a world order in which multipolarity is institutionalized, countries like Venezuela may move from being marginalized to playing the role of a bridge between alternative poles. Therefore, these contacts in Moscow are not only momentary diplomatic gains, but also clues to the possible role Venezuela can play in the reshaping of the international system.



[i] Ferrer, Elias. “Who Did Maduro Meet with in Moscow?”, Guacamaya, https://guacamayave.com/en/who-did-maduro-meet-with-in-moscow-in-pictures/, (Accessed Date: 05.18.2025).

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Ibid.

Ali Caner İNCESU
Ali Caner İNCESU
Ali Caner İncesu graduated from Anadolu University Faculty of Business Administration in 2012. He continued his education with Cappadocia University Tourist Guidance associate degree program and graduated in 2017. In 2022, he successfully completed his master's degrees in International Relations at Hoca Ahmet Yesevi University and in Travel Management and Tourism Guidance at Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University. In 2024, he graduated from the United States University of Maryland Global Campus (UMGC) Political Science undergraduate program. As of 2023, he continues his doctoral studies at Cappadocia University, Department of Political Science and International Relations. In 2022, Mr. İncesu worked as a special advisor at the Embassy of the Republic of Paraguay in Ankara. He is fluent in Spanish and English and is a sworn translator in English and Spanish. His research interests include Latin America, International Law and Tourism.

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