The transfer to South Korea of two North Korean soldiers captured by Ukraine while fighting in Russia’s Kursk region has once again brought the security implications of the Russia–Ukraine War for the Korean Peninsula to the forefront. According to information released on September 28, 2026, the soldiers are expected to undergo interrogation and security screening in South Korea, after which their status will be assessed in accordance with existing legislation concerning North Korean defectors.[i] The arrival of the two soldiers in South Korea from the battlefield in Ukraine can be regarded as more than an individual transfer case; it represents a concrete indication of the increasingly close connection between the ongoing war in Europe and security dynamics in Northeast Asia.
North Korea’s role in the Russia–Ukraine War initially took the form of supplying Russia with weapons and ammunition, but later expanded to include the direct deployment of military personnel. According to assessments as of August 2026, Pyongyang is reported to have sent approximately 14,000–15,000 troops to Russia, while also supplying millions of artillery and mortar rounds, as well as hundreds of ballistic missiles. Additionally, Ukrainian intelligence has alleged that a North Korean missile unit consisting of approximately 90 personnel has been deployed to Russia’s Voronezh region.[ii] Accordingly, Pyongyang’s role in the war is evolving from that of an external actor supplying ammunition to Russia’s war economy into that of a military partner gaining direct operational experience under the conditions of modern warfare.
One of the institutional foundations of this transformation is the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed between Moscow and Pyongyang in 2024. The deepening of Russia–North Korea military relations is not limited to personnel deployments. According to a report by the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, there is evidence that artillery systems, ballistic missiles, and military vehicles have been transferred from North Korea to Russia, while Russia has provided North Korea with air defense systems and Russian forces have trained North Korean soldiers. The same report states that more than 11,000 North Korean troops have been deployed to Russia since October 2024.[iii] Consequently, the Russia–Ukraine War has played a significant role in transforming relations between the two countries from short-term military cooperation into a more comprehensive and institutionalized security partnership.
One of the most significant consequences of this development for the Korean Peninsula is that North Korean forces are gaining direct experience under modern warfare conditions. The activities of North Korean forces in Ukraine provide an important learning environment, particularly in relation to unmanned aerial vehicles, counter-drone measures, reconnaissance and surveillance systems, and small-unit tactics. While North Korean units were associated with high casualty rates during the early stages of the war, subsequent observations indicate that they have adapted in areas such as camouflage techniques, rapid redeployment, and conducting operations in smaller and more mobile formations. At the same time, operating alongside Russian forces allows North Korean units to observe the coordinated use of drone and artillery systems.[iv]
This experience has the potential to encourage the further integration of low-cost unmanned systems into North Korea’s asymmetric warfare capabilities. Battlefield learning is not taking place solely at the personnel level. The use of North Korean-made KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles under real combat conditions in Ukraine has the potential to provide Pyongyang with feedback on the performance of its weapons systems beyond the data previously obtainable only from test ranges. While there are assessments suggesting that accuracy problems reported during their initial use have subsequently decreased, uncertainty remains in open-source information regarding the extent of Russian technical support behind this development.[v]
However, the military gains generated by the Russia–Ukraine War for Pyongyang are not limited to battlefield experience. North Korea is assessed to have increased its access to economic resources and opportunities for military-technological cooperation in exchange for the troops, ammunition, and missile support it has provided to Russia. The current trajectory of Russia–North Korea relations also raises the possibility of greater integration between the two countries’ defense supply chains and the transfer of certain advanced military technologies.[vi] In this context, the potential gains North Korea may derive from the Russia–Ukraine War are developing through two distinct channels: on the one hand, operational experience gained directly on the battlefield and, on the other, deepening military and technological cooperation with Russia. The simultaneous development of these two processes is significant in terms of extending the effects of the war beyond Ukraine.
Nevertheless, it may be misleading to interpret the impact of battlefield experience on North Korea’s military capabilities as a direct strategic advantage. A significant portion of the experience gained in Ukraine has been limited to infantry and small-unit operations. There is insufficient evidence to suggest that North Korea’s air force, logistical elements, and artillery units have acquired a comparable level of direct combat experience. This constitutes an important limitation in terms of joint operations capability, one of the fundamental elements of modern warfare.[vii] Moreover, the significant casualties suffered by the units deployed to Russia indicate that the battlefield experience gained has also imposed certain military costs on Pyongyang. Therefore, the extent to which the experience acquired in Ukraine can be transferred to the distinct geographical, technological, and operational conditions of the Korean Peninsula remains uncertain.
Nevertheless, the deepening of military cooperation between Russia and North Korea is making it increasingly difficult to assess security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula solely in terms of the military balance between North and South Korea. The operational experience gained in Ukraine and the potential for military-technological cooperation with Russia to enhance North Korea’s capabilities are also creating new security concerns for South Korea. This process is increasing the strategic importance of Seoul’s cooperation with Euro-Atlantic security actors. During military talks held between NATO and South Korea in June 2026, the two sides discussed strengthening cooperation in areas such as interoperability, standardization, cyber exercises, and emerging technologies. NATO has also noted that security developments in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions are becoming increasingly interconnected, including through the broader implications of the Russia–Ukraine War.[viii]
In this context, North Korea’s participation in the Russia–Ukraine War can be regarded as part of a broader trend toward the interregionalization of international security. While the war in Europe has enabled Russia to obtain military support from North Korea, it has also provided Pyongyang with an opportunity to gain experience in modern warfare and deepen its relations with Moscow. Conversely, South Korea’s growing ties with Euro-Atlantic security actors constitute another dimension of this interregional interaction. As a result, a mutual interaction is emerging between security dynamics in Europe and Northeast Asia. This development suggests that it is becoming increasingly difficult to assess security threats and alliance relationships within geographically distinct regional frameworks.
In conclusion, the transfer of two North Korean soldiers from Ukraine to South Korea represents one of the most visible examples of the security linkage between the Russia–Ukraine War and the Korean Peninsula. However, the strategic significance of this connection lies less in the transfer of the soldiers themselves than in the operational experience Pyongyang has gained through the war, the use of North Korean weapons systems under real combat conditions, and the deepening of military-technological relations with Russia. The extent to which these gains will be reflected in North Korea’s military capabilities remains uncertain. Nevertheless, the current trajectory of Moscow–Pyongyang cooperation is making it increasingly difficult to assess the security environment on the Korean Peninsula independently of developments in Europe. The Russia–Ukraine War is therefore also acquiring the characteristics of an interregional security process that strengthens the links between Euro-Atlantic and Northeast Asian security dynamics.
[i] Kyu-seok Shim ve Hyun Young Yi, “What comes next for North Korea soldiers transferred from Ukraine to South Korea?”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/what-comes-next-north-korea-soldiers-transferred-ukraine-south-korea-2026-09-28/, (Accessed: 28 September 2026).
[ii] “What we know about North Korean forces joining Russia’s war against Ukraine”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/what-we-know-about-north-korean-forces-joining-russias-war-against-ukraine-2026-08-06/, (Accessed: 28 September 2026).
[iii] “Unlawful Military Cooperation Including Arms Transfers between North Korea and Russia”, Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, https://msmt.info/view/save/2025/06/20/6bb78b9d-aefd-44c4-b34a-8f545c0d9b3a-S_2025_340-EN.pdf, (Accessed: 28 September 2026).
[iv] Michael Aldeman, “Drones and Operational Shift: North Korea’s Adaptation to a Changing Warfare Environment”, 38 North, https://www.38north.org/2026/04/drones-and-operational-shift-north-koreas-adaptation-to-a-changing-warfare-environment/, (Accessed: 28 September 2026).
[v] Vann H. Van Diepen, “The KN-23 Goes to War: Has It Improved North Korea’s Missiles?”, 38 North, https://www.38north.org/2026/08/the-kn-23-goes-to-war-has-it-improved-north-koreas-missiles/, (Accessed: 28 September 2026).
[vi] Eul-Chul Lim ve Jong Eun Lee, “All the Way With Moscow? Pyongyang’s Strategic Calculations in Support of Russia’s War”, 38 North, https://www.38north.org/2026/08/all-the-way-with-moscow-pyongyangs-strategic-calculations-in-support-of-russias-war/, (Accessed: 28 September 2026).
[vii] Aldeman, a.g.e.
[viii] “NATO and the Republic of Korea discuss military cooperation”, NATO, https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2026/06/24/nato-and-the-republic-of-korea-discuss-military-cooperation, (Accessed: 28 September 2026).
