Sudan and Ethiopia’s recent mutual accusations indicate that the ongoing internal conflicts in the two countries are becoming increasingly intertwined with a broader regional security dynamic. Following Ethiopian Chief of General Staff Birhanu Jula’s accusation that Sudan and Egypt were supporting armed groups operating against the Ethiopian government, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) rejected the allegations on 28 September 2026. Sudan, in turn, alleged that Ethiopian territory was being used to provide training and logistical support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), as well as to facilitate drone operations.[i] Although the parties’ mutual accusations have not been independently and fully substantiated, these developments make it increasingly difficult to assess the internal security crises in Sudan and Ethiopia solely within the confines of their respective national borders.
Ethiopia’s security environment provides the backdrop to these tensions. On 21 September 2026, seven armed groups, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM), and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), announced the formation of a new alliance against the Ethiopian government. The fact that the TPLF and Amhara-linked elements, which had been on opposing sides during the 2020–2022 Tigray War, are now part of the same alliance highlights the fluid nature of relations among armed actors in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, geographical distance, political differences, and disparities in capabilities among the groups create uncertainty over the extent to which the alliance will be able to act in a coordinated manner.[ii] In response to renewed military activity in northern Ethiopia, the African Union’s call on 23 September for de-escalation and its reaffirmation of the 2022 Pretoria Agreement as the core framework for the peace process further underscore the fragility of the current security environment.[iii]
The link between the war in Sudan and Ethiopia indicates that the mutual accusations extend beyond a single diplomatic dispute. A study published in February 2026 presented findings indicating the existence of a camp in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, near the Sudanese border, where fighters linked to the RSF were reportedly being trained. According to Ethiopian security documents, approximately 4,300 fighters were undergoing training at the camp in early January, while its capacity was reportedly expected to reach 10,000.[iv] In May, the Sudanese Armed Forces alleged that drone strikes targeting various sites, including Khartoum International Airport, had been launched from Ethiopian territory. Addis Ababa rejected the allegations and, in turn, accused Sudan of supporting actors hostile to Ethiopia.[v] Accordingly, the tensions that became more visible in February with allegations of military training evolved into mutual accusations in May and, by September, into a broader security issue amid the renewed organization of armed groups in Ethiopia.
This process requires the conflicts in Sudan and Ethiopia to be assessed beyond a simple cross-border spillover effect. The regionalization of internal conflicts does not occur solely through refugee movements, arms trafficking, or security challenges emerging in border areas. When neighboring states develop political, logistical, or military ties with actors involved in each other’s internal conflicts, internal security crises that initially emerge from distinct causes can become interconnected within the same regional security network. This also corresponds with the Regional Security Complex Theory developed by Buzan and Wæver, which emphasizes how the security processes of geographically proximate actors can become so interdependent that they can no longer be examined independently of one another.[vi] In the case of Sudan and Ethiopia, regionalization therefore manifests itself not as the direct spillover of conflict from one country into the other, but rather as the interconnectedness of actors involved in distinct internal conflicts through cross-border networks of support.
These connections are creating conditions for cross-cutting linkages to emerge between the SAF–RSF conflict in Sudan and the Ethiopian federal government and armed opposition actors. According to a May 2026 assessment by Chatham House, the TPLF has strengthened its relations with the Sudanese Armed Forces and Eritrea, while some Tigrayan fighters based in Sudan have participated in combat alongside the SAF. The same assessment points to evidence suggesting that Ethiopia has facilitated support for the RSF and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N), both of which are rivals of the SAF.[vii] The regional positions of Eritrea and Egypt further complicate these relationships. Addis Ababa’s accusations that Eritrea is supporting armed Ethiopian groups, together with Egypt’s security ties with Sudan, demonstrate how internal conflicts can intersect with existing interstate rivalries.
Another dimension of regionalization involves support networks formed by actors outside the Horn of Africa. Allegations regarding the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) support for the RSF, together with the various partnerships developed by Gulf states in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, have caused local conflicts to intersect with broader geopolitical rivalries. A Reuters analysis published in February 2026 indicates that the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE has become increasingly intertwined with their security relationships in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.[viii] This demonstrates that the regionalization of the internal conflicts in Sudan and Ethiopia is not confined to relations among neighboring countries, but is developing within a broader structure that connects the security dynamics of the Horn of Africa with those of the Red Sea and the Gulf.
This structure also has the potential to generate a regional security dilemma. The perception that a state is supporting rival armed actors in a neighboring country may increase incentives for the opposing side to develop ties with its adversaries. In this regard, relationships established with cross-border armed actors have the potential to evolve into a balancing mechanism through which parties seek to influence each other’s security calculations indirectly, rather than engaging in direct interstate confrontation. When such relationships are perceived by the other state as a new threat, however, they may further deepen mutual distrust. Nevertheless, given that not all of these allegations have been independently substantiated and that the conflicts in Sudan and Ethiopia are rooted in distinct historical and political dynamics, there is insufficient evidence to characterize the current situation as a single regional war or an established proxy conflict.
In conclusion, the mutual accusations that emerged between Sudan and Ethiopia on 28 September 2026 reveal a broader security transformation unfolding in the Horn of Africa, extending beyond bilateral diplomatic tensions. The military networks associated with the war in Sudan and linked to Ethiopian territory, the renewed organization of armed groups in Ethiopia, and the relationships that regional actors have developed with these conflicts are increasingly blurring the distinction between internal and external security. Within this framework, the key trend is not so much the transformation of the conflicts in Sudan and Ethiopia into a single war, but rather the growing interconnectedness of the networks of support, threats, and security surrounding these conflicts. From the perspective of the security environment in the Horn of Africa, the central issue will be the extent to which these linkages become entrenched and whether they will transform the existing internal conflicts into a broader regional rivalry.
[i] “Sudan rejects claim it backs Ethiopian opposition, vows to protect sovereignty”, Anadolu Ajansı, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/sudan-rejects-claim-it-backs-ethiopian-opposition-vows-to-protect-sovereignty/4071104, (Date of Access: 28.09.2026).
[ii] “Seven Ethiopian armed groups announce anti-government alliance”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/seven-ethiopian-armed-groups-announce-anti-government-alliance-2026-09-21/, (Date of Access: 28.09.2026).
[iii] “AUC Chairperson Calls For Utmost Restraint And Immediate De-Escalation In Northern Ethiopia”, African Union, https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20260923/chairperson-calls-restraint-and-immediate-de-escalation-northern-ethiopia, (Date of Access: 28.09.2026).
[iv] “Ethiopia builds secret camp to train Sudan RSF fighters, sources say”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/investigations/ethiopia-builds-secret-camp-train-sudan-rsf-fighters-sources-say-2026-02-10/, (Date of Access: 28.09.2026).
[v] “Sudan army says UAE and Ethiopia linked to Khartoum drone attack”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/drones-shatter-months-relative-calm-khartoum-hit-airport-2026-05-04/, (Date of Access: 28.09.2026).
[vi] Barry Buzan ve Ole Wæver, “Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security”, Cambridge University Press, 2003, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491252, ss. 45-48.
[vii] “Ethiopia needs more than an election to calm internal and regional conflict”, Chatham House, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/05/ethiopia-needs-more-election-calm-internal-and-regional-conflict, (Date of Access: 28.09.2026).
[viii] “African Union summit clouded by Saudi-UAE rivalry in Horn of Africa”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/african-union-summit-clouded-by-saudi-uae-rivalry-horn-africa-2026-02-14/, (Date of Access: 28.09.2026).
