The Conference on Promoting African Peace, held in Nouakchott from February 10-12, demonstrates that the turmoil in the Sahel cannot be reduced to purely military issues.[1] The meeting, which opened at the Congress Palace with the theme “Africa and the Construction of Hope,” places the debate on legitimacy and social reconstruction at the heart of the crisis, alongside security. The Mauritanian government is making visible the idea that if reconciliation remains merely a political gesture, violence may return in another form. However, the prominence of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as the main sponsor of the conference, and the discussions of boycotting or distancing itself in some Arab capitals, are also generating a new legitimacy polemic around the discourse of peace.[2]
The conference’s symbolic gestures offer clues as to how the scales of legitimacy work in the region. The awarding of the African Peace Promotion Prize to Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby serves as a reminder of the performance indicators used to measure the search for “order-building leadership” around the Sahel.[3] The Nouakchott scene generates a scoring system based less on the election schedule and more on the state’s capacity to prevent disintegration, its claims to mediate, and its management of security.
The conference reveals a clear example of religious diplomacy being institutionalized as a tool. The prominent religious scholars at the meeting are attempting to construct a politics of meaning that undermines the social foundation of violence. Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayyah’s emphasis on reconciliation and coexistence offers a soft counter-narrative to the ideological dimension of radicalization in the Sahel.[4] This setting, created in conjunction with the awards ceremony, serves to present peace not only as a state project but also as a social contract.
Both geography and internal security approaches are decisive in Mauritania’s ability to assume this role. The fact that a country bordering Mali has been known for a relatively low level of violence for many years lends Nouakchott the claim of being a “working model.” This claim rests on a strategy that combines security with social cohesion, dialogue with religious authorities, and keeping local economic lifelines alive. The conference’s emphasis on “building hope” aims to complement the security discourse with the production of social consensus.
The most talked-about moment of the meeting was shaped by the speech of Malian religious leader Imam Mahmoud Dicko. Dicko described the crisis as a “breakdown of hope,” proposing a framework that doesn’t confine the waves of migration to a debate about loyalty. His linking the mobility of young people to demands for justice and representation as much as to economic hardship implies that reconciliation must move beyond the negotiating tables in the capitals and reach the neighborhood level.
The Malian example more sharply illustrates the domestic map of the struggle for legitimacy. In Bamako, the transitional government is restricting politics for security reasons, while a significant segment of society is highlighting the burdens of daily life, the lack of services, and the search for justice. The fact that the voices of actors like Dicko are echoing in Nouakchott shows that this internal tension has been transferred to a regional stage. This situation could facilitate the search for reconciliation, but it can also generate fragility in an atmosphere where the parties accuse each other of “usurping legitimacy.”
The conciliatory language in Nouakchott, when combined with the humanitarian pressure on the ground, touches upon a harsher reality. Projections for the region indicate that millions will struggle to meet their basic needs during a “famine season,” and food insecurity could fuel the cycle of conflict. The fact that a population in Mali is reportedly at risk of falling into the most severe hunger category reveals the link between the legitimacy crisis and the state’s capacity to cope.
The first impact of the Nouakchott meeting on the regional legitimacy struggle is evident in Mauritania’s positioning itself as a safe buffer zone. The hardening tone of Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey in their relations with the international arena makes mediation a valuable resource. Through this resource, Nouakchott is generating a voice in the security agenda for the Sahel and strengthening its role as a gateway between the Maghreb and the Sahel.
The second effect is the erosion of the debate that locks legitimacy into the dichotomy of the ballot box versus a coup. The prolongation of the security crisis fuels a tendency to prioritize the idea of an “effective state” over electoral legitimacy. The conference’s language presents the state’s capacity to protect society and its ability to build social peace as the primary measure of legitimacy. This framework may pave the way for transitional governments to more easily circulate the argument of “I am providing security.”
The third dimension is the more visible inclusion of religious authority in the political equation. The religious figures prominent in Nouakchott aim to generate social consent through a moral foundation of reconciliation. Religious networks can strengthen local mediation channels on the ground and expand the scope of traditional mechanisms in conflict resolution. Whether this happens depends on the nature of the relationship that religious authority establishes with local government.
A delicate area of risk emerges at this point. If the discourse of reconciliation becomes a political veneer covering up past violations, the public’s expectation of justice could evolve into an even harsher rupture. Peace narratives constructed without addressing the local-level violence, disappearances, and dispossessions in the Sahel may produce calm in the short term. However, in the medium term, they also carry the risk of opening new lines of radicalization. The window opened by Nouakchott will remain narrow unless it is supported by transitional justice and local service capacity.
The fourth effect is evident in the legitimacy competition among regional organizations. As state-society relations weaken in the Sahel, approaches relying on sanctions reinforce the perception of “external imposition” in some capitals. An emphasis on consensus and dialogue, however, can create a softer language of legitimacy, opening up room for maneuver for regional actors. This language offers an alternative social foundation to the harsh legitimacy claims established through security institutions.
The fifth dimension is the attempt to bridge the fragmentation in the approach of external actors to the Sahel. Military cooperation, development financing, migration management, and religious diplomacy often proceed as disconnected files. Nouakchott seeks to bring these files together into a single narrative, emphasizing that state capacity and social peace are linked to regional legitimacy. If this framework is adopted, packages for the Sahel can be designed more holistically, and project fatigue on the ground can be partially reduced.
Another effect of the conference is its potential to indirectly shape the tone of politics within the Sahel. The call for reconciliation targets both armed groups and domestic actors, and calls into question the accountability of the security apparatus. This debate could strengthen the national unity rhetoric of transitional governments, but it could also raise demands for “representation” from the opposition and civil society. The legitimacy contest is therefore unfolding in two channels, with security performance and justice capacity testing each other.
Viewed more broadly, the Nouakchott axis contributes to the proliferation of platforms generating legitimacy in the Sahel. Military transitional governments, regional organizations, religious authorities, and external partners are entering the field with different criteria for legitimacy. The real test of the conference is whether it can transform these criteria into a common minimum ground, rather than creating a showcase that pits them against each other.
The crucial question in the coming months will be whether the Nouakchott line can be transformed into a concrete follow-up mechanism. If regular contact groups, technical teams to monitor local reconciliation files, and a framework bringing together humanitarian aid and security coordination can be established, the meeting could rise above its symbolic level. Without such institutionalization, the conference will remain a strong photo opportunity, and tensions on the ground will continue at their own pace.
Ultimately, the Nouakchott meeting is redefining the struggle for legitimacy in the Sahel. On the one hand, it can provide a lifeline internationally by opening a showcase for dialogue to transitional governments; on the other hand, it can offer communities the opportunity to build a more cohesive language around demands for justice and citizenship. In the Sahel, the order established by force of arms can only be perpetuated through a social contract that generates legitimacy. The true impact of Nouakchott will be measured not so much by the poses leaders strike, but by whether it opens up a future where young people find it reasonable to stay in the country rather than emigrate.
[1] “Au milieu de crises et de coups d’état en Afrique, Nouakchott accueille la 6ème conférence africaine pour la consolidation de la paix”, Sahara Media, https://fr.saharamedias.net/au-milieu-de-crises-et-de-coups-detat-en-afrique-nouakchott-accueille-la-6eme-conference-africaine-pour-la-consolidation-de-la-paix/, (Access date: 15 Feb 2026).
[2] “Crise diplomatique: Large boycott arabe à Nouakchott, le Maroc voix de raison”, Libre Entreprise, https://librentreprise.ma/2026/02/10/crise-diplomatique-large-boycott-arabe-a-nouakchott-le-maroc-voix-de-raison/, (Access date: 15 Feb 2026).
[3] “Conférence de Nouakchott : Appel à l’espoir et à la paix”, Apa News, https://fr.apanews.net/news/appel-a-lespoir-et-a-la-paix-lors-dune-conference-internationale-a-nouakchott/, (Access date: 15 Feb 2026).
[4] Ibid.
