On 21 September 2026, on the sidelines of the 81st United Nations General Assembly, the “Partners for Multilateralism (P4M)” initiative was launched under the co-sponsorship of the European Union (EU), Australia, Barbados, Brazil, Canada, India, and Kenya, with the aim of strengthening international law and multilateral cooperation. The signatories to the declaration also included Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, Guatemala, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Moldova, Norway, San Marino, Slovakia, Spain, Türkiye, and Uruguay.[i] The initiative was presented as a response to “increasing polarization in the international system, armed conflicts, violations of international law, protectionism, the use of economic coercion, and the growing prevalence of power politics.”[ii]
The declaration emphasized the need to make multilateral institutions, particularly the United Nations, more effective, representative, inclusive, and responsive to current global realities. In this context, one of the initiative’s main objectives is to strengthen the UN’s capacity to prevent conflicts, respond to crises, promote sustainable development, advance fair trade, and uphold human rights and the rule of law. Its primary objective is to preserve and reform the multilateral international system based on the UN Charter in order to adapt it to changing global circumstances. The purpose is not to replace the United Nations, but rather to support and strengthen existing multilateral institutions and cooperation, with the UN at the forefront. In this respect, the initiative reaffirmed its commitments to upholding international law, supporting the principles of the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states, resolving disputes through peaceful means, and refraining from the use or threat of force.[iii]
Speaking at a press conference held at UN Headquarters in New York, President of the European Council Antonio Costa stated that global challenges cannot be resolved through the efforts of individual countries acting alone and that collective action and common solutions are essential.[iv] Recalling that the EU is a “reliable” and “predictable” partner and a steadfast supporter of the UN system, Costa announced that the EU was ready to work with countries from different continents in support of multilateralism. In an article published in the Financial Times, the founding leaders stressed that the initiative was not intended to create a new, exclusive international bloc. On the contrary, they described it as a flexible and open framework for countries from different regions and political traditions that are willing to cooperate.[v]
An examination of the seven co-sponsors of the P4M Initiative reveals that each continent is represented by one participant. In this regard, the seven co-sponsors comprise the EU from Europe, Australia from Oceania, Barbados from Central America and the Caribbean, Brazil from South America, Canada from North America, India from Asia, and Kenya from Africa. In other words, the EU, which has taken the lead in the initiative, has not merely created the illusion of symbolic global representation; it has also consolidated around its axis critical actors from different parts of the world known for their commitment to the rules-based international system. These selected actors are expected not only to adhere to the principles of the initiative, but also to serve as leverage points for expanding the multilateral network within their respective spheres of regional influence.
Particular attention should be paid to the strategic positioning adopted by Canada and India among the founding co-sponsors. Both actors have been shaken by the protectionist economic policies, unilateral tariffs, and bilateral trade crises that escalated with the return of the Trump administration in 2025 and 2026. In particular, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has repeatedly emphasized that the rules-based international order established after the Second World War is facing an “existential threat,” referring to the institutional revisionism emanating from Washington and the coercive diplomacy conducted through tariffs.[vi] In this regard, Ottawa has become one of the actors most willing to work closely with its European allies and like-minded states in restoring global governance, with the aim of balancing the deepening economic asymmetry and political pressure in its relations with Washington.
While a direct and overt trade and political crisis continues between Canada and Washington, India has sought to keep the tensions it faces with the Trump administration within highly sensitive yet manageable limits. Although New Delhi has faced US tariff measures and threats of sanctions because of its continued strategic energy supplies from Russia, it has managed to maintain a more constructive basis for dialogue with Washington by keeping pragmatic diplomatic channels open. At the same time, by signing the new Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU, which had been under negotiation for a considerable period, India has clearly signalled to the world—particularly to the United States—that it intends to deepen its integration with Europe within global supply chains while not compromising its strategic autonomy. However, the fundamental danger for India here lies in positioning itself as part of an “anti-US” or “anti-Trump” revisionist bloc and thereby entering a new cycle of direct confrontation with Washington. Meeting under the same institutional umbrella with actors such as Canada and the EU, which have structural problems with the Trump administration, could complicate New Delhi’s delicate economic and security equilibrium with Washington.
Although the leaders of the initiative frequently emphasize that they oppose the division of the world into rigid blocs based on dichotomies such as the “Global South” and the “Global North,” and that their objective is an inclusive form of “multilateralism,” it should be noted that Brazil and India are key actors seeking leadership of the Global South. The purpose here is to bring together actors that oppose bloc-based thinking. However, joining such a platform in support of multilateralism is, in essence, also a matter of geopolitical choice for states. In other words, even participation in platforms established to defend multilateralism has, in today’s increasingly polarized world, become a highly consequential and costly geopolitical choice for states.
Although the P4M Initiative promises an inclusive and rules-based model of cooperation, the bloc mentality prevailing in global politics confines every new formation to an arena of zero-sum competition. For example, while the EU defends the continuity of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the UN system in the name of the “global public interest,” it is essentially seeking to consolidate the existing order because it recognizes that this institutional architecture provides the best protection for its own normative influence and economic interests.
From the perspective of developing countries, the participation of actors such as Barbados and Kenya in the initiative demonstrates that multilateralism is not merely an arena for great-power competition; it is also a protective shield for small and medium-sized states struggling with existential challenges such as climate crises and debt restructuring. However, this does not eliminate the risk that P4M may be perceived as a Western-centered “order-preservation” project. In this transitional period, characterized by the rise of revisionist powers such as China and Russia and the United States’ retreat from its role as a rule-maker in favor of behavior increasingly resembling that of a rule-breaker, whether the P4M Initiative can move beyond normative rhetoric and evolve into a concrete alternative model of global governance will depend on the extent to which its member states are willing to commit themselves to the platform without sacrificing their bilateral relations with the United States.
[i] “Partnership Initiative for Multilateralism”, Küre Ansiklopedi, https://kureansiklopedi.com/en/detay/partnership-initiative-for-multilateralism-21702, (Date Accessed: 05.10.2026).
[ii] “Partners for multilateralism, international law, peace and prosperity summit”, Consilium, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/events/p4m-summit/, (Date Accessed: 05.10.2026).
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] “UN General Assembly, New York, 21-25 September 2026”, Consilium, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2026/09/21-25/, (Date Accessed: 05.10.2026).
[v] “Carney and Lula urge nations to join group to unite middle powers”, Japantimes, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/09/21/world/carney-lula-unite-middle-powers/, (Date Accessed: 05.10.2026).
[vi] “Read Mark Carney’s full speech on middle powers navigating a rapidly changing world”, CBC, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/mark-carney-speech-davos-rules-based-order-9.7053350, (Date Accessed: 05.10.2026).
