Russian President Vladimir Putin may be trying to elevate the discussion surrounding the war in Ukraine to a broader international order level. On October 9, 2026, during a phone call, Putin proposed a trilateral meeting with United States (US) President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping.[i]Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed that this possibility was discussed; however, he noted that no official proposal or agenda has yet been formulated. The proposed meeting could take place on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit scheduled to be held in Shenzhen on November 18–19, 2026.[ii]
This proposal could carry broader strategic consequences beyond the direct goal of ending the Russia-Ukraine War. A meeting among the leaders of the US, Russia, and China could provide a platform to address these countries’ competing strategic objectives in Europe, Eurasia, and the Indo-Pacific. This format is reminiscent of the February 1945 Yalta Conference, where the US, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union negotiated various elements of the post-war order. Although the Yalta Conference did not establish a comprehensive legal framework dividing the world into exclusive spheres of influence, it became a symbol of great powers determining the political future of smaller states through diplomatic negotiations.
The timing of Putin’s initiative is also notable; on the very day Trump spoke with Putin on the phone, he announced a regulation regarding the supply of Russian diesel fuel to the US and global markets. Washington lifted sanctions imposed on Russian fuel to restrict Moscow’s revenues used for the Ukraine War. These developments occurred at a time when diesel prices were rising ahead of the US midterm elections on November 3, 2026, creating additional domestic economic incentives for the Trump administration to secure supplemental fuel supplies. In this context, Moscow has an interest in converting its economic engagement with Washington into diplomatic leverage. Trump, on the other hand, has incentives to demonstrate progress toward ending the war and to alleviate domestic economic pressures. The trilateral summit or “New Yalta” envisioned by Putin could focus on securing recognition of Russia’s strategic perimeter through broader bargaining covering energy, sanctions, and the distribution of international power.
For Moscow, the primary objective is to secure recognition of Russia’s privileged position in the post-Soviet space and to reverse what it considers the strategic consequences of NATO’s eastward expansion. Draft security agreements submitted by Russia in December 2021 provide concrete indicators of these goals. Moscow demanded an end to further NATO expansion and sought limits on the alliance’s military deployments in countries that joined after 1997. Russia’s proposals also called for restricting NATO’s military activities in Ukraine and other parts of the former Soviet space.[iii] A new compromise established among the great powers could offer Moscow the opportunity to pursue these objectives through negotiations with Washington rather than relying solely on military pressure.
Ukraine will continue to lie at the center of the European security architecture preferred by Russia. Moscow will aim to retain the territories it has occupied and restrict long-term Western military aid to Kyiv. A compromise that excludes Ukraine from initial negotiations would allow Russia to address these goals directly with Washington and Beijing while diminishing Kyiv’s influence over the framework of a potential peace agreement. A summit among Russia, the US, and China without the participation of European governments could offer Moscow the opportunity to make these demands part of a broader discussion on European security. However, the consequences of such an approach could spread across the entire post-Soviet space. In addition to Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan could also fall within the geographic scope of Russia’s preferred strategic perimeter.
A similar arrangement in Europe could involve reducing the alliance’s military presence in countries that joined NATO after 1997, including Poland, the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. Even if these countries formally retain their NATO membership, restrictions on the deployment of allied forces, military infrastructure, and reinforcement capabilities could weaken the practical credibility of collective defense. For Russia, such a proposal could yield significant strategic advantages by enhancing security along its borders, reducing Western military activities in its near abroad, and re-establishing Moscow’s position as an indispensable actor in European security.
For Beijing, a compromise reached among the great powers could present opportunities to consolidate its regional standing and mitigate the constraints imposed by US military alliances and partnerships. Nevertheless, China has not publicly endorsed dividing the world into exclusive spheres of influence, and its participation in the proposed trilateral format remains unconfirmed. China’s primary strategic interests are concentrated in the Western Pacific, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. Beijing aims to strengthen its regional position while reducing external powers’ capacity to limit its objectives. Taiwan stands at the center of the competition between Beijing and Washington. Any compromise that reduces US military intervention or weakens Washington’s resolve to support Taiwan could alter the regional balance of power, even if it does not lead to an immediate change in the island’s political status. The South China Sea poses a similar issue. China’s maritime claims overlap with the interests of Vietnam, the Philippines, and other Southeast Asian nations. Consequently, a reduction in US military engagement could expand Beijing’s strategic room for maneuver and alter the security calculations of governments throughout the region.
For Beijing, the appeal of a broader compromise lies in lessening an external power’s capacity to limit China’s regional goals. Greater recognition of China’s interests in the Indo-Pacific could provide Beijing with additional diplomatic flexibility and reduce the risk of direct conflict with Washington. However, China’s interests cannot be reduced to accepting a geographical division of responsibility with Russia and the US. China’s global economic reach relies on large-scale commercial activities, investment projects, and supply chains that extend beyond regional boundaries.
A simple division model granting regional dominance to China would ignore the complexity of relations between Beijing and Moscow. Central Asia represents a key example of this challenge. Moscow may view the region as part of its traditional security perimeter; however, China has expanded its economic presence through trade, infrastructure, and energy partnerships. Beijing’s interests in the region are not limited to accepting Russian leadership; they also encompass protecting Chinese investments and developing regional connectivity. Therefore, Beijing may seek greater strategic flexibility without formally accepting an arrangement that limits its global ambitions. China’s participation in a summit would not imply that an agreement has been reached regarding Taiwan, the South China Sea, or Central Asia.
Washington, for its part, would likely aim to gain greater freedom to focus on the Western Hemisphere and reduce the cost of extensive military commitments in Europe and Asia. Washington could adopt an approach that prioritizes continental security and economic interests in North and South America, distributing its international commitments more selectively. In this scenario, the US might expect Russia and China to refrain from expanding their military and strategic influence in the Western Hemisphere in exchange for its own self-restraint in continental Europe and parts of Asia. This logic resembles an updated interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, where Washington attempts to preserve its regional dominance while granting other great powers broader room for maneuver elsewhere.
For Trump, a more selective global role could be presented as a way to reduce the financial and political costs associated with extensive international commitments. Negotiations with Moscow and Beijing on nuclear arms, economic cooperation, or regional security could also create opportunities to realize specific American priorities without requiring the US to maintain the same level of engagement in every region. Nevertheless, the costs of such an approach could also produce broader political and strategic ramifications. The US derives its strategic influence not only from its armed forces but also from its network of alliances and security guarantees.
If European and Asian security were to become the subject of bargaining among the great powers, American allies might question the permanence of Washington’s commitments. Directly negotiating restrictions on NATO’s military presence on its eastern flank with Moscow could provide European governments with a rationale to reassess their defense policies. Asian partners might reach similar conclusions regarding Washington’s willingness to support them in disputes with China. Consequently, a more fragmented security environment could emerge, in which regional governments build alternative partnerships and seek greater strategic autonomy.
The fundamental flaw of any revived spheres-of-influence model is that the countries potentially affected are not passive territories awaiting allocation by external powers. These countries already have their own interests and political preferences. For Ukraine, a settlement negotiated by Washington, Moscow, and Beijing without Kyiv’s participation could define the parameters of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and security future. However, an agreement among external powers would not automatically resolve whether the Ukrainian government and society will accept those terms. The Kremlin itself has acknowledged that a final peace agreement will require Ukraine’s involvement.[iv] A meeting held among great powers could shape the diplomatic framework; however, it cannot guarantee a sustainable compromise on its own. The same issue applies to Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The strategic orientations of these countries cannot be reduced to a simple division between Russian and Western influence.
Central Asia presents a particularly significant difficulty for the proposed logic. Russia maintains important security, economic, and societal ties in the region; however, China’s economic presence has expanded, and the five Central Asian republics pursue multi-vector foreign policies in varying ways. For Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, recognition of an exclusive Russian sphere of influence could narrow their security cooperation options, access to investment, and freedom to develop diplomatic relations. Astana and Tashkent have a self-interest in preserving international connectivity and avoiding overdependence on any single power. The governments of these countries have consistently sought to diversify their partnerships rather than making a permanent choice among Russia, China, the US, and Europe.
The same principle applies to the South Caucasus and NATO’s eastern members. Poland, the Baltic states, and Romania have their own assessments of Russian military power. Armenia and Azerbaijan pursue different regional strategies, while Georgia’s political and security orientation continues to be shaped by its internal and external conditions. The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act affirmed the sovereignty and independence of states, as well as their right to choose the means to ensure their security. In short, great powers can negotiate strategic agreements among themselves; however, implementing a stable division of influence will require them to account for the interests and resilience of the affected states.
In conclusion, Putin’s proposed summit with Trump and Xi reflects Moscow’s goal of transforming the war in Ukraine into a broader negotiation over global power. The Kremlin demands recognition of Russia’s strategic dominance in the post-Soviet space. Energy cooperation and sanctions relief could become part of this bargaining process. Washington and Beijing may also seek greater freedom of action in their respective regions. However, such an arrangement will face resistance from states unwilling to surrender their strategic autonomy. These include Ukraine, European NATO members, and countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The significance of Putin’s proposed format lies in its attempt to legitimize an international order in which great powers dictate the security choices of smaller states. Nevertheless, attempting to impose a great-power compromise without the consent of the affected states risks deepening insecurity rather than establishing a stable international order.
[i] “Putin Floats a Summit with Trump and Xi to Discuss Ukraine Deal”, The Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/putin-floats-a-summit-with-trump-and-xi-to-decide-ukraines-fate-1cf6acc1, (Accessed: 25.10.2026).
[ii] “Kremlin says Putin, Trump and Xi could hold a three-way meeting in Chine next month”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/kremlin-says-putin-trump-xi-could-hold-three-way-meeting-china-next-month-2026-10-19/, (Accessed: 25.10.2026).
[iii] “Treaty between The United States of America and the Russian Federation on security guarantees”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790818/?lang=en, Accessed: 25.10.2026).
[iv] “Kremlin says final settlement in Ukraine is unlikely without Kyiv’s involvement”, Reuters Connect, https://www.reutersconnect.com/collection/kremlin-says-final-settlement-in-ukraine-is-unlikely-without-kyivs-involvement/dGFnOnJldXRlcnMuY29tLDIwMjY6bmV3c21sX1ZBMTMzMzE5MTAyMDI2UlAx, (Accessed: 25.10.2026).
