Russian President Vladimir Putin’s first visit to Iturup/Etorofu Island on August 13, 2026, has reignited the Kuril Islands dispute between Russia and Japan, an issue that has remained unresolved since the end of the Second World War. Following this development, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi described the visit as “unacceptable,” and the Russian ambassador to Tokyo was summoned to the Foreign Ministry.[i] Moscow rejected Japan’s reaction, reiterating its position on sovereignty over the islands. Five days later, Russia summoned Japan’s ambassador to Moscow, Akira Muto, to protest the statements made by Takaichi and Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi.[ii] At first glance, these reciprocal diplomatic responses might be seen as a new link in the chain of tensions in a territorial dispute spanning over eighty years. However, the significance of the visit does not stem solely from the renewed assertion of sovereignty by both sides. Recent developments in the Kuril dispute highlight a shift not only in the fundamental positions of the parties but also in their methods of managing the conflict.
The roots of the Kuril Islands dispute extend back to the final stages of World War II. Japan maintains its claim to sovereignty over Iturup/Etorofu, Kunashir/Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai, located in the southern part of the island chain that was seized by the Soviet Union in 1945, and refers to these areas as the “Northern Territories.” Russia, on the other hand, considers these islands to be part of its territory. The importance of the islands is not limited solely to the historical sovereignty dispute. The Kuril chain’s location between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific Ocean, and the fact that the Sea of Okhotsk is one of the main areas of operation for Russian strategic submarines, gives the region strategic importance in terms of Russia’s Pacific security approach.[iii] The dispute between the parties remains one of the main obstacles to signing a comprehensive peace treaty since the end of the war.[iv]
However, the existence of the dispute did not mean that the search for a solution between the two countries had completely disappeared. Diplomatic relations were re-established with the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration, and it was decided to continue peace treaty negotiations. Contacts, which gained momentum especially during Shinzo Abe’s presidency, led to an approach aimed at managing the territorial dispute within the framework of broader economic and social relations. After 2016, the development of joint economic activities on the islands came to the forefront, while humanitarian mechanisms facilitating visits by former island residents were also advanced. In 2018, Abe and Putin agreed to accelerate peace treaty talks based on the 1956 Joint Declaration; in subsequent years, despite their differences, the parties continued to keep channels of negotiation and joint economic activity open.[v]
In this context, 2022 represents a significant watershed moment. The Russo-Ukrainian War did not alter the sovereignty issue underlying the Kuril dispute, but it significantly transformed the political and diplomatic environment in which the dispute was managed. Following Japan’s participation in imposing sanctions on Russia after the Russo-Ukrainian War, Moscow announced in March 2022 that it would no longer continue peace treaty negotiations; it suspended the four island exchange programs and withdrew from dialogue on joint economic activities.[vi]
Therefore, interpreting the changes that emerged after 2022 solely as a general deterioration in Russia-Japan relations is insufficient. A more significant transformation is the narrowing of the political space within which the parties can manage their dispute over sovereignty. In the previous period, while the territorial issue persisted, peace treaty negotiations, joint economic projects, and humanitarian contacts were able to create a certain area of cooperation around the conflict. Following the Russia-Ukraine War, however, the issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity became central to broader international discussions, and the deepening political divergence in Russia-Japan relations led to the Kuril issue being evaluated within a new diplomatic context.
Putin’s visit to Iturup in August 2026 can therefore be seen not as creating an entirely new situation in the Kuril dispute, but rather as a symbolic development that underscores the transformation that has emerged since 2022. Russia’s summoning of the Japanese ambassador following Japan’s official protest against the visit demonstrates that in an environment where solution-oriented political contacts have weakened, mutual sovereignty rhetoric and diplomatic reactions have become more prominent. The fact that Moscow’s August 18 statement also mentioned Japan’s sanctions against Russia and its support for Ukraine is noteworthy, as it shows that the Kuril issue is no longer being addressed in a diplomatic arena isolated from broader geopolitical conflicts.
However, the narrowing of the political solution space does not mean that all functional contacts in Russia-Japan relations have disappeared. In June 2026, the two countries held the 42nd meeting of the Japan-Russia Fisheries Commission and agreed on fishing conditions to be applied in their respective 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zones for 2026. Under the agreement, a reciprocal fishing quota of 19,000 tons was established for each side.[vii] This shows that despite the weakening of high-level political dialogue on the peace treaty and territorial issues, certain cooperation mechanisms necessitated by geographical proximity and mutual needs can continue. In other words, the picture that emerged after 2022 points not to a complete diplomatic break, but rather to a form of relationship where political solution mechanisms and pragmatic cooperation channels are increasingly diverging.
In the current context of the Kuril dispute, the regional political context should not be entirely ignored. The joint statement issued by the Russian and Chinese ambassadors to Tokyo on the same day as Putin’s visit, opposing a reinterpretation of the outcomes of World War II, demonstrates that the issue can also be linked to broader discourses concerning the post-war regional order and historical memory. However, this statement does not necessarily mean that China explicitly recognizes Russia’s claim to sovereignty over the Kuril Islands. Therefore, it is more meaningful to consider China’s stance not as directly making it a party to the territorial dispute, but rather as an indicator of the broader regional political context in which the Russia-Japan dispute is situated.
In conclusion, Putin’s visit to Iturup is a current indicator of the transformation in how the Kuril dispute is managed, a transformation that became evident after 2022. While the narrowing of peace treaty negotiations and the search for a joint solution strengthens the likelihood of the current political status quo continuing in the short term, the fisheries cooperation that can be sustained until 2026 shows that bilateral relations have not become entirely dysfunctional. Therefore, the course of the Kuril issue in the coming period will depend not only on the sovereign positions of the parties, but also on the extent to which this divergence between political disagreement and pragmatic cooperation can be sustained. While the resumption of peace treaty negotiations in the longer term remains a possibility depending on changes in political conditions, the current situation indicates that a status quo of controlled management of the dispute is more prominent than a search for a solution.
[i] “Putin visits disputed island near Japan, drawing Tokyo’s ire”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/russias-putin-visits-disputed-kuril-islands-samples-fish-roe-media-say-2026-08-13/, (Date Accessed: 14.08.2026).
[ii] “Russia protests to Japanese ambassador over Takaichi’s ‘anti-Russian’ remarks”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russia-protests-japanese-ambassador-over-takaichis-anti-russian-remarks-2026-08-18/, (Date Accessed: 18.08.2026).
[iii] Ike Barrash, “Russia’s Militarization of the Kuril Islands, CSIS, https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/russias-militarization-kuril-islands, (Date Accessed: 18.08.2026).
[iv] “Putin’s first trip to the Pacific island chain claimed by Japan draws a protest from Tokyo”, AP News, https://apnews.com/article/russia-putin-japan-kuril-islands-northern-territories-iturup-bc9cf6a0aa3fdbed5264d32297d740b4, (Date Accessed: 18.08.2026).
[v] “Section 6 Russia, Central Asia and Caucasus” (Diplomatic Bluebook 2022 Chapter 2: Japan’s Foreign Policy by Region), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2022/en_html/chapter2/c020601.html, Date Accessed: 18.08.2026).
[vi] “Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. MORI summons Mr. Mikhail Y. GALUZIN, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Japan”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_003103.html, (Date Accessed: 18.08.2026); “Kremlin: US military presence in Japan impedes any peace treaty with Tokyo”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/kremlin-us-military-presence-japan-impedes-any-peace-treaty-with-tokyo-2024-04-08/, (Date Accessed: 18.08.2026).
[vii] “Russia-Japan Agree on Reduced 2026 Fishing Quotas and Operational Restrictions in Exclusive Economic Zones”, Tridge Insights,https://insights.tridge.com/speaker-product-news-reports/KJLyFXpzJzgKuB1Gqsm5QUKHGgR43AVdqLCpLpmZn3fC3iekGNWCVL6m, (Date Accessed: 18.08.2026).
