Information released on 10 August indicates that the space dimension of the war in Ukraine is expanding rapidly. The low Earth orbit satellite internet network that Russia is building under the name “Rassvet” currently relies on 16 satellites. Moscow’s plan to expand the constellation to 292 satellites in 2027 and 924 in 2035 points to a long-term move that could alter the balance of communications superiority on the battlefield.[i]
The significance of Rassvet goes beyond providing Russia with a new internet service. The war in Ukraine has shown that communications infrastructure can be as decisive as artillery, missiles and unmanned systems. In an environment where units operate in dispersed formations, terrestrial networks are struck and electronic jamming intensifies, the side that maintains connectivity can see, decide and direct firepower more quickly.
Starlink has made this reality visible to Kyiv’s advantage. Through satellite terminals, Ukrainian forces have been able to establish flexible communications among frontline command posts, reconnaissance teams and fire-support elements. The system has also facilitated the transmission of imagery from unmanned aerial and maritime vehicles. Thus, a network developed for commercial purposes has become one of the pillars of the battlefield command structure.[ii]
The use by Russian forces of Starlink terminals obtained through the grey market, however, has shown that this advantage can shift to the other side. The disabling of those terminals following Kyiv’s efforts has yielded an important lesson for Moscow. The fact that a state’s military communications can be cut off by a foreign company’s access decision demonstrates how technological dependence can translate directly into operational risk.
Rassvet is a strategic response to this dependence. The system is being developed to operate in low Earth orbit at an altitude of approximately 800 kilometres. It is designed to deliver speeds of up to 1 gigabit per second per user and latency below 70 milliseconds.[iii] Inter-satellite laser links and a 5G non-terrestrial network architecture could enable data to be transmitted rapidly across vast areas with fewer ground stations.
Current capacity cannot yet provide uninterrupted service. A connection can be established for limited periods when one of the satellites passes over Ukraine. This prevents Rassvet from being regarded as a fully fledged wartime network today. Nevertheless, the placement of the first operational satellites into orbit on 23 March and the acceleration of the timetable indicate that the project is moving from an experimental phase toward an actual service infrastructure.[iv]
If the first large constellation of 292 satellites is deployed, connectivity windows will widen and handovers from one satellite to another will become easier. This capacity could provide a more stable flow of data among command centres, mobile units, reconnaissance vehicles and long-range platforms. Russia would thus be able to rely on a backup backbone under its own control even when terrestrial communications towers are damaged.
The military effects will be most evident in unmanned systems. Real-time imagery, targeting data and route updates increase the value of long-range drone operations. Satellite connectivity can take maritime vehicles beyond coastal coverage. Ground forces can also shorten the sensor-to-shooter cycle. Rassvet’s success will depend on the Russian military’s ability to bring its different platforms together through a common data language.
This development will not eliminate overnight the advantage Ukraine has gained through Starlink. Terminal production, encryption security, ground stations, launch frequency and network management matter just as much as the number of satellites. Producing hundreds of satellites, carrying them into orbit and keeping them operational requires considerable industrial discipline. Rassvet’s timetable will be tested alongside its production capacity.
For this reason, the project’s actual success will be measured not first by the number of satellites in orbit, but by how long the service remains uninterrupted on the battlefield. The ability of terminals to function in harsh weather, connect to moving platforms and transmit data under intense jamming will be decisive. Unless the Russian military supports technical capacity with doctrine, training and field maintenance, a large satellite investment may fail to produce the expected military outcome. This test will reveal the project’s true value.
Countermeasures will also define this new domain of warfare. Electronic jamming, detection of user terminals, cyberattacks on ground stations and competition over frequencies could come to the fore. Physically targeting satellites, however, carries the risks of debris, escalation and damage to the shared use of space. The contest may therefore focus less on direct destruction than on degrading the network, deceiving it and denying access.
Rassvet’s civilian dimension also carries strategic value. Across Russia’s vast geography, mining sites, railways, ships, aircraft, health services and emergency units require uninterrupted connectivity. Given the cost of laying cable in northern regions, a low Earth orbit system could support economic integration. Military demand could thereby foster a larger technological ecosystem sustained by the civilian market.
The foreign-policy dimension of the project may become more visible over time. Countries that struggle to build their own satellite infrastructure may be interested in packages combining connectivity, terminals and ground stations. By adding satellite services to its partnerships in energy, defence and nuclear technology, Russia could extend its relationships into a new field. Such an expansion could accelerate the fragmentation of the global internet into national and regional networks.
For Ukraine, the answer lies in diversifying communications rather than becoming more dependent on a single system. Different satellite providers, terrestrial fibre-optic lines, tactical radios, mobile networks and autonomous systems capable of continuing their missions even after losing connectivity can be used together. If one network is cut off, another can take over, making communications superiority less vulnerable to the commercial or political decisions of a single company.
A similar lesson applies to European countries. Rapidly integrating commercial satellites into military operations provides important flexibility. Yet the conditions governing service continuity, data security and access during a crisis must be set in advance. Countries that use state-owned satellites and private networks as complementary layers can manage the vulnerabilities of space-based communications in a more balanced way.
Türkiye is closely monitoring this transformation. The commissioning of Türksat 6A, with more than 80 percent of its components produced domestically, has strengthened the country’s capacity to design and manufacture communications satellites.[v] The next objective could be to combine this expertise with low Earth orbit communications, mobile terminals, laser links and secure military networks. Sovereignty involves managing the terminal, software and encryption keys as much as manufacturing the satellite itself.
Ankara’s strong defence industry offers an important advantage in this area. Integrating unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned surface vehicles and ground vehicles into a shared architecture through satellite communications could enhance Türkiye’s operational and peace-support capabilities over wide geographic areas. Projects that combine civilian connectivity services with security requirements in Africa, Central Asia and maritime basins could give the Turkish space industry an international scale.
In conclusion, Rassvet is turning the expansion of war into space from a metaphor into a concrete reality. Satellites may not fire directly, but they determine which unit sees first, which drone reaches farther and which commander can issue orders without interruption. Russia’s network is still in its initial stage. Once the planned constellation is deployed, space-based internet could become a lasting component of the balance of power in the war in Ukraine.
[i] “Russia rolling out Starlink-style network faster than expected, Kyiv says”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/russia-rolling-out-starlink-style-network-faster-than-expected-kyiv-says-2026-08-10/, (Accessed: 14 August 2026).
[ii] Seth G. Jones, Riley McCabe and Alexander Palmer, “Ukrainian Innovation in a War of Attrition”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukrainian-innovation-war-attrition, (Accessed: 14 August 2026).
[iii] “Russian Aerospace Company: Developing a Low Earth Orbit Satellite System for Global Broadband Data Delivery”, Bureau 1440, https://1440.space/en/, (Accessed: 14 August 2026).
[iv] “Russia launches first batch of 16 Rassvet satellites as Starlink rival”, Anadolu Agency, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/russia-launches-first-batch-of-16-rassvet-satellites-as-starlink-rival/3876839, (Accessed: 14 August 2026).
[v] “Türksat 6A Commissioned in a Ceremony Attended by President Erdoğan”, TÜRKSAT, https://www.turksat.com.tr/en/news/turksat-6a-commissioned-ceremony-attended-president-erdogan, (Accessed: 14 August 2026).
