On 29 September 2026, the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of the European Union rejected Poland’s request to suspend the implementation of the Council of the EU decision allowing the provisional application of the EU–Mercosur Interim Trade Agreement. It was stated that Poland had not sufficiently demonstrated that implementation of the decision could cause serious and irreparable harm. The main action seeking the annulment of the Council decision is still ongoing, and a final judgment will be delivered at a later date.[i]While the ruling allows the provisional application of the agreement to continue, Poland’s objection also demonstrates that there is no full consensus within the EU on the agreement.
Poland’s objections to the agreement are based on both legal and agricultural concerns. Poland argues that the Council decision violates the EU Treaties, constitutes a misuse of powers, and breaches the principle of sincere cooperation. From the perspective of the agricultural sector, Poland maintains that the entry of cheaper products into the EU market could reduce farmers’ incomes, disrupt the functioning of agricultural markets, and create unfair competition, thereby negatively affecting farmers’ economic and social conditions. It also argues that the absence of “mirror clauses” requiring equivalent production standards in the EU and Mercosur countries could create risks for human and animal health and the environment within the EU.[ii]
Poland’s objections draw attention to the social dimension of free trade agreements. The overall economic gains that such agreements may generate do not necessarily mean that all sectors and social groups will benefit to the same extent. While some groups may take advantage of new commercial opportunities, others may face economic losses as a result of increased competition. From this perspective, Poland’s initiative does not conclusively demonstrate that the risks it identifies will materialise, but it does highlight the need to consider the potential effects of the agreement on farmers’ livelihoods.
Alongside these debates over the agreement’s social effects, its importance for the economic and strategic relationship between the EU and Mercosur should also be considered. Indeed, at the signing ceremony for the EU–Mercosur agreements held in Asunción, the capital of Paraguay, on 17 January 2026, European Council President António Costa emphasised the objectives of strengthening economic and political ties between the two regions and creating the world’s largest free-trade area. Costa presented the agreement as a demonstration of commitment to openness and cooperation, while also stating that it reflected an approach opposed to the use of trade as a geopolitical weapon.[iii]
From Mercosur’s perspective, the agreement provides preferential access to the EU market, which accounts for around 15% of the global economy and represents the world’s third-largest economy. With tariffs set to be eliminated on 92% of Mercosur exports to the EU, access to the European market is expected to expand and the competitiveness of businesses in the region to increase.[iv]
The expectations and statements of the two sides reflect a willingness to place their relations on a more institutional footing and to establish a more comprehensive framework for cooperation. Shaped by expectations of mutual benefit, this approach also points to a search for a more inclusive and balanced partnership. Such a partnership could also contribute to strengthening the EU’s ties with the Mercosur countries and, more broadly, to the development of its relations with South America.
However, the strategic importance of an agreement at the international level does not necessarily mean that it will enjoy full support within the domestic politics of all member states. From this perspective, Poland’s objections illustrate the tensions that can arise between the domestic political priorities of member states and the EU’s common external-policy objectives. At the same time, whether such objections can halt implementation of the agreement depends on the relevant legal requirements being met. Indeed, the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of the European Union rejected Poland’s request for suspension on the grounds that Poland had failed to demonstrate, with concrete evidence, both the likelihood and imminence of serious and irreparable harm, and a sufficient probability that provisional application of the agreement would disrupt the functioning of the EU agricultural market. [v]
Taken together, these developments show that although the EU is able to pursue a common objective, its member states continue to maintain different domestic political priorities, making full consensus in the Union’s external policy more difficult to achieve. At the same time, the continuation of the agreement’s provisional application demonstrates the EU’s capacity to act despite internal differences. However, the broader legal issues raised by Poland remain to be examined in the main proceedings. Nor does the continued application of the agreement mean that all sectors will benefit equally.
Although the agreement was signed on 17 January 2026 and Poland’s subsequent request to suspend its application was rejected, the road to signature was marked by considerable difficulties. Negotiations, which began in 2000, were suspended in 2004 because of significant disagreements over the liberalisation of agricultural products, services and public-procurement markets. They resumed in 2010 but stalled again in 2012. Agriculture remained one of the principal areas of contention throughout the process.[vi] Poland’s current objections indicate that disagreements in this area continue.
While the fact that implementation can legally continue represents an important stage, gaining and maintaining political confidence will depend on the credibility of the implementation process. Strengthening that confidence may require the safeguard mechanisms developed through lengthy negotiations to function effectively and the benefits of trade to be distributed in a balanced manner.
In this context, mechanisms that monitor the implementation process across different sectors could be useful in assessing the agreement’s success and effects. Tracking changes in imports, the impact on producers and compliance with the standards set out in the agreement from the beginning of implementation could play an important role in evaluating the effectiveness of the safeguard mechanisms. If implementation produces tangible benefits and helps address continuing concerns, it may become easier to manage the differences of opinion reflected in Poland’s objections. Otherwise, reaching consensus among member states may become more difficult and political opposition to the agreement may persist.
[i] Court of Justice of the European Union, “The Vice-President of the Court of Justice dismisses Poland’s application to suspend the operation of the Council’s decision authorising the provisional application of the EU-Mercosur Interim Trade Agreement”, Info.Curia, https://infocuria.curia.europa.eu/tabs/tout?publishedId=C-460%2F26+R&searchTerm=C%252D460%252F26%2520R, (Accessed: 01.10.2026).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] “Speech by President António Costa at the signing ceremony for the EU-Mercosur agreements”, Council of the European Union, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/01/17/speech-by-president-antonio-costa-at-the-signing-ceremony-of-the-eu-mercosur-agreements/, (Accessed: 01.10.2026).
[iv] “Comunicado Conjunto sobre la firma del Acuerdo de Asociación entre el MERCOSUR y la Unión Europea”, Mercosur, https://www.mercosur.int/comunicado-conjunto-sobre-la-firma-del-acuerdo-de-asociacion-entre-el-mercosur-y-la-union-europea, (Accessed: 01.10.2026).
[v] Court of Justice of the European Union, “The Vice-President of the Court of Justice dismisses Poland’s application..”, ibid.
[vi] “The trade pillar of the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement”, European Parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-global-europe-leveraging-our-power-and-partnerships/file-eu-mercosur-association-agreement?sid=1101, (Accessed: 02.10.2026).
