The signing of a military-technical cooperation agreement between the Russian Federation and the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on May 27, 2026,[i] has brought back into focus Moscow’s developing ties with the Taliban and its increasing role in regional security. The question of which actors would fill the power vacuum created by the United States’ (US) withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 had become an important topic of discussion. During this process, the prominent actors were Russia and China, while Central Asian states, Pakistan, Iran, and India also closely engaged with the “Taliban” issue in Afghanistan and attempted to find a solution to the problem.
On July 18, 2026, the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism warned that the Al-Qaeda threat in Afghanistan continues and that the organization maintains its ties with the Taliban.[ii] On the same date, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized that the ISIS-Khorasan (ISKP) terrorist organization wants to use Afghanistan as a “springboard” for regional expansion.[iii] On the other hand, the continued presence of the “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan” (TTP) organization along the Afghanistan border and the ongoing conflict between Pakistan and the Taliban administration indicate that the issue of terrorism and security in Afghanistan has reached an almost insurmountable point.
In such a period, Russia signing a military-technical agreement with the Taliban, as well as the Kremlin removing the Taliban from the list of banned terrorist organizations, and most importantly, Russia being the first and only country to diplomatically recognize the Taliban government, raises questions about what role Russia might play in resolving the terrorism and security issues in Afghanistan.
The Taliban’s reluctance to cooperate with other states after regaining control in 2021, its closed-off demeanor, and its disregard for the demands of the international community, which has prevented its integration into the United Nations system, further deepens the security issues in Afghanistan. Due to these factors, it is observed that states are not inclined to cooperate with the Taliban on various issues and are avoiding providing it with security support. In this regard, the Taliban still retains the characteristic of being an “unreliable non-state actor” in the eyes of the international community and is considered a “terrorist organization” by many states.
The Taliban and the security vacuum in Afghanistan are of particular concern to neighboring states. When looking at its southern and western neighbors, the delicate geopolitical balances between Pakistan, China, and India, as well as the border issues in Kashmir, prevent the formation of a stable belt in South Asia. This situation is one of the primary factors leading to the strengthening of the Taliban’s cooperation with radical groups in the region. The inability of Pakistan, India, and China to come together on the Kashmir issue can be considered the most fundamental factor in the emergence of extremist groups in the region.
China is one of the actors trying to maintain good relations with the Taliban in order to ensure the security of both the border region and the corridor in Pakistan. Recently, India has also become involved in this. New Delhi’s rapprochement with the Taliban[iv] can be interpreted as taking advantage of the discord between Pakistan and the Taliban (even more). Unlike these actors, Russia, which has established official relations with the Taliban and signed security agreements, appears to be an actor seeking a “real” solution to the problems in Afghanistan. Indeed, the security of Central Asia, Afghanistan’s northern neighbor, is one of Russia’s primary areas of interest. Unlike Western states, Moscow acts with pragmatic rationality by recognizing the de facto power of the Taliban instead of filtering it thru a normative (values-based) lens. The Kremlin may aim to legitimize the Taliban and provide it with military-technical support, using the Kabul administration as a “buffer force” in the fight against radical elements (especially ISKP).
China views Afghanistan more in terms of economic corridors, while India looks at it from the perspective of balancing Pakistan. Russia, on the other hand, considers the Taliban and the Afghanistan issue as a “security problem” that directly threatens its Near Abroad (Central Asia). Because a possible wave of radicalism in Central Asia has the potential to directly threaten Russia’s internal security. Russia’s military-technical cooperation agreement with the Taliban can also be considered in this context. This move contributes to Russia’s role as a “regional security provider” in the security architecture of Eurasia. Moscow, by engaging with the Taliban, which the international community has isolated, is both consolidating its influence over Kabul and trying to absorb security risks that could head toward Central Asia while still within Afghanistan’s borders. This situation positions Russia as the most critical actor in the resolution of the Afghanistan Crisis, requiring it to move beyond rhetoric and produce genuinely structural solutions on the ground.
Russia’s return to Afghanistan thru cooperation with the Taliban could lead to a new Great Game in the region. Moscow and Beijing believe that the U.S. should be kept out of the region, and therefore these actors are working together to maintain good relations with the Taliban. However, China views the issue from an economic security perspective. Russia, on the other hand, is known for its hard security moves in its immediate vicinity. Therefore, Russia may be trying to maintain a monopoly on “hard security” in the region thru the military-technical agreements it has signed.
As a result, Russia’s military cooperation with the Taliban is also shaking the power balances in the region. Pakistan, which is in conflict with the Taliban, is closely monitoring Russia’s moves over Kabul. Similarly, India is among the actors closely monitoring the direction in which the pragmatic rapprochement between the Taliban and Russia will evolve. In this context, Russia’s return to the Afghan arena thru military-technical agreements could initiate the multipolar Great Game of the 21st century. This game will be decisive in the construction of a new non-Western Eurasian security architecture. With this move, Russia is rewriting the rules of the game in its favor by connecting an isolated geography to its own geopolitical periphery.
[i] “Russia and Afghanistan Sign Military Cooperation Agreement”, Jamestown, https://jamestown.org/russia-and-afghanistan-sign-military-cooperation-agreement/, (Erişim Tarihi: 20.07.2026).
[ii] “Al-Qaeda Remains In Afghanistan & Maintains Taliban Ties, Says UN Official”, AFINTL, https://www.afintl.com/en/202607183553, (Erişim Tarihi: 20.07.2026).
[iii] “ISIS-K Wants Afghanistan As Base For Regional Expansion, Says Russian FM”, AFINTL, https://www.afintl.com/en/202607185472, (Erişim Tarihi: 20.07.2026).
[iv] “Amid the Afghanistan-Pakistan Conflict, India-Taliban Diplomatic Ties Are Strengthening”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2026/07/amid-the-afghanistan-pakistan-conflict-india-taliban-diplomatic-ties-are-strengthening/, (Erişim Tarihi: 20.07.2026).
