Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez’s statements regarding the recent migration crisis in Ceuta have once again brought to the fore a fundamental foreign policy dilemma that has long characterized Spain–Morocco relations.[i] On the one hand, Spain needs to unequivocally defend its sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla; on the other, it needs to maintain close cooperation with Morocco in order to manage irregular migration, ensure border security, and sustain returns. Sanchez’s decision not to hold the Moroccan authorities directly responsible despite tens of thousands of people reaching Ceuta within a short period demonstrates that Madrid has prioritized functional cooperation over diplomatic confrontation between these two imperatives.
This approach can best be understood by taking into account the asymmetric interdependence in Spain–Morocco relations. The two countries depend on one another across a range of areas, from economic relations and counterterrorism to irregular migration and border security. However, when it comes to migration management, Morocco’s operational capacity gives Rabat significant bargaining power. Although Spain controls one of the European Union’s (EU) southern borders, the effectiveness of this control depends to a considerable extent on the border surveillance carried out by Moroccan security forces on Moroccan territory. Consequently, a deterioration in political relations with Morocco would not merely create a diplomatic problem for Spain; it could quickly develop into a tangible border and migration management crisis.
Sanchez’s view that “the crisis would have worsened without coordination with Morocco” clearly demonstrates this interdependence. The Prime Minister’s particular emphasis on Rabat’s continuous communication with Spanish authorities on 30 and 31 July, and on the operational measures it began taking on 31 July, frames Morocco’s role during the crisis not as a source of threat but as a necessary partner in managing the crisis. In this way, the Madrid government emphasizes the necessity of security coordination between the two countries rather than blaming Morocco.[ii]
At the same time, this rhetoric carries a significant political cost. The fact that more than 70,000 people were able to reach Ceuta within a short period raises serious questions about the capacity of border management and the effectiveness of intelligence mechanisms. Sanchez’s statements that reports prepared by the National Intelligence Centre (CNI) and the National Police failed to anticipate the scale of the crisis indicate that the developments cannot be explained solely by external actors.[iii]
The narrative developed by the Sanchez government serves two main functions here. First, it seeks to prevent a new diplomatic crisis in relations with Rabat by limiting the debate over Morocco’s responsibility. Second, it shifts the source of the crisis away from inter-state relations and toward disinformation, social media networks, and transnational political actors. Sanchez’s accusation that international far-right organizations are using irregular migration to polarize European societies indicates that the government interprets the Ceuta crisis not primarily as a conventional border violation issue, but rather as a problem of hybrid threats and information manipulation.[iv]
On the other hand, the announcement that King Felipe VI of Spain will visit Ceuta and Melilla demonstrates Madrid’s notable balancing strategy in its Morocco policy.[v] Ceuta and Melilla are two autonomous cities that Morocco has historically regarded as disputed, but which Spain considers part of its sovereign territory. For this reason, a visit by the Spanish head of state to these cities would not be an ordinary protocol event. For Spain, the King’s visit would amount to a symbolic reaffirmation of sovereignty.
Spain’s migration policy reflects a broader European problem. The management of the EU’s external borders is becoming increasingly dependent on cooperation with third countries. Mechanisms established with Morocco, Türkiye, Tunisia, Libya, and other transit countries form part of European states’ efforts to control irregular migration movements before they reach their own borders. However, this approach gives third countries significant diplomatic bargaining capacity. The externalization of migration control can strengthen border security; at the same time, it can constrain the room for maneuver of European states during political crises with these countries.
This is particularly evident in the case of Ceuta. The costs that Spain could incur by losing cooperation with Morocco directly influence Madrid’s rhetoric toward Rabat. Sanchez’s explicit exculpation of Morocco can therefore be understood not merely as an assessment of the available evidence, but also within the framework of the strategic caution generated by Spain’s need to avoid losing cooperation with Morocco in border management.
In conclusion, the Ceuta crisis once again reveals the fundamental paradox of Spain–Morocco relations. From Madrid’s perspective, Rabat is simultaneously a strategic neighbor that must be managed and a partner whose cooperation in controlling irregular migration would be extremely costly to lose. Accordingly, the Sanchez government’s policy is built around avoiding direct confrontation with Morocco, maintaining security cooperation, and at the same time reaffirming Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla through symbolic means. Felipe VI’s planned visit represents the sovereignty dimension of this strategy, while the decision not to hold Morocco responsible for the crisis represents its functional cooperation dimension.
From a broader perspective, the events in Ceuta also expose a significant structural problem in European migration management: as border control becomes dependent on third countries, these countries gain greater diplomatic and strategic leverage vis-à-vis European states. Spain’s Morocco policy should therefore be assessed not only through the lens of bilateral relations, but also in terms of the interdependence and bargaining relationships produced by Europe’s strategy of externalizing irregular migration. From this perspective, the Ceuta crisis constitutes a multidimensional case at the intersection of migration management, sovereignty, foreign policy, and strategic dependence, extending beyond a border security crisis.
[i] Cué, Carlos E. “Sanchez exculpa a Marruecos por la crisis de Ceuta y avanza que el Rey la visitará por primera vez con este Gobierno.” El País, elpais.com/espana/2026-08-31/sanchez-destaca-la-cooperacion-instantanea-con-marruecos-y-asegura-que-el-rey-visitara-ceuta.html, (Date Accessed: 06.09.2026).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Ibid.
