Developments in northern Ethiopia have once again revealed the fragility of the peace order established in Pretoria in 2022. The seizure of control of the Mekelle, Aksum, and Shire airports by Tigray forces, the detention of federal officials, and the disruption of civilian flights have been evaluated by the African Union as a step contrary to the spirit of the agreement.[i] Although the changing hands of an airport may seem like a tactical gain on the front at first glance, the issue debated here is the central state’s authority over the country’s territory, airspace, and transportation.
The tension quickly crossed the borders of Tigray, and while heavy clashes occurred around Abala in Afar and in the North Wollo region of Amhara, the internet connection in the north of the country was also interrupted.[ii] The shutdown of communications reduces the access of ordinary people, who remain far from the noise of war, to their bank accounts, relatives, and reliable information. With the fear of siege seen in the previous war still fresh, the interruption means the return of anxiety about food, medicine, and security rather than a technical failure for the people of the region.
Prior to this military mobilization, seven armed organizations announced that they had united under the name of the Alliance of Ethiopian Peoples’ Survival Forces. It was noteworthy that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the Amhara Fano National Movement took part in the same structure. This is because the two sides were on opposing fronts in the 2020-2022 war, and organizations linked to Oromia, Afar, and Benishangul-Gumuz also joined the alliance.[iii] The gathering of different structures in a common text explains that the dissatisfaction with the Addis Ababa administration has come to the fore rather than the resolution of past disputes.
Among the justifications of the alliance, the complaint about the concentration of power in the center and the decrease in the political weight of the regions stands out. While the Abiy Ahmed administration tries to establish a common political order across the country, strong regional actors read this orientation as an intervention in their own jurisdictions. Thus, circles that considered each other a threat yesterday are now looking for a space to breathe by acting against the common center today. The unity here is based on the idea of feeling similar pressure in different places rather than an emotional affinity or a common future design.
However, the problems within the alliance should still not be ignored. While disputes between Tigray and Amhara actors over territory, displaced populations, and local administration continue, the priorities of organizations in the Oromo and Somali regions do not overlap with the calculations in the north. Geographical distance, disconnected command structures, and resource sharing may complicate joint military action. Therefore, the alliance can put political pressure on Addis Ababa; however, its transformation into a cohesive front depends on a more complex process than the announced joint declaration.
These developments also show why the Pretoria Agreement remains incomplete. The agreement had ensured the silencing of weapons, allowed the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the start of basic services, but a permanent consensus could not be produced regarding disarmament, the status of disputed regions, the return of displaced persons, and the future of the administration in Tigray. The peace text slowed down the pace of the war, but on the other hand, it failed to tie the security concerns of the parties to common institutions. Every unimplemented provision turned into evidence of the other party’s bad faith over time, and the trust carried by the agreement has eroded.
Airports, therefore, carry a greater meaning than ordinary infrastructure facilities. Control over Mekelle, Aksum, and Shire directly affects Tigray’s connection with the outside world and the federal administration’s access to the region, while who has control also determines the equivalent of sovereignty in daily life. The suspension of civilian flights limits the movement of patients, students, businesspeople, and aid organizations, rapidly widening the gap between military gain and social cost. The transformation of these areas into a symbol of victory for one of the parties may further reduce the trust needed for renegotiation.
The spread of the conflict to Afar, on the other hand, touches the economic vein of the country. According to World Bank data, more than 95 percent of Ethiopia’s import and export cargo by volume passes through the Addis Ababa-Djibouti corridor.[iv] Since fuel, food, and industrial inputs depend on this line, military pressure around Abala could lead to price increases and shortages of goods in cities miles away from the front. For landlocked Ethiopia, the Djibouti route is more than a trade option; it is the main supply line that maintains the daily operation of the state and major cities.
Ethiopia’s federal structure is also at the center of the tension. Although the regions were established with broad powers on the basis of language and identity, the control of security forces and the sharing of national resources have long created debate between Addis Ababa and regional elites. As the center emphasizes common citizenship and administrative integrity, some movements think that their identities and decision-making power are weakening. When a functioning political consensus cannot be established, elections and parliaments fade into the background, and armed force becomes a more effective way of making demands heard.
The crisis equally concerns the security of the Horn of Africa. Distrust between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the war in Sudan, and debates over access to the Red Sea increase the possibility of the conflict in the north becoming entangled in the calculations of neighboring countries. Despite this, every external contact does not mean direct military support, and unverified accusations can narrow the maneuvering space of diplomacy. As the impression that neighbors are choosing sides strengthens, actors in Ethiopia move away from local compromise and begin to build their own security through the search for regional support.
The way out is through translating the incomplete provisions of Pretoria into actionable steps rather than remembering it as a document of the past. First of all, the safety of civilian flights at airports can be ensured, the status of federal personnel can be clarified, and an independent monitoring mechanism can be established to reduce the humanitarian impact of communication interruptions. Subsequently, disarmament, disputed regions, and the return of displaced persons can be addressed with a clear timetable. The African Union appointing a senior representative who establishes regular contact on the ground could also transform mediation from an authority that issues statements into a mechanism that produces assurances.
The gathering of old enemies on the same front shows to what extent peace in Ethiopia has remained on the surface. The alliance may fall apart and its members may go in different directions, but new unifications will emerge unless the fear of centralization and the problem of representation that bring them together disappear. The military superiority of the federal government may change the direction of the conflict, but lasting stability depends on the regions feeling themselves as part of the common state in security, administration, and resource sharing. Pretoria’s final test is whether it can give the parties a ground to talk again, and if this opportunity is lost, the agreement will be remembered as a short break between two wars.
[i] “AUC Chairperson Calls For Utmost Restraint And Immediate De-Escalation In Northern Ethiopia”, African Union, https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20260923/chairperson-calls-restraint-and-immediate-de-escalation-northern-ethiopia, (Date of Access: 27 September 2026).
[ii] “Heavy fighting, internet disruption as Ethiopia conflict rages”, AFP, https://www.afp.com/en/heavy-fighting-internet-disruption-ethiopia-conflict-rages, (Date of Access: 27 September 2026).
[iii] “Seven Ethiopian armed groups announce anti-government alliance”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/seven-ethiopian-armed-groups-announce-anti-government-alliance-2026-09-21/, (Date of Access: 27 September 2026).
[iv] “Addis-Djibouti Corridor to Get Major Upgrade That is Key to Unlocking Connectivity and Trade for Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa”, World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/07/20/addis-djibouti-corridor-to-get-major-upgrade-that-is-key-to-unlocking-connectivity-and-trade-for-ethiopia-afe-hoa, (Date of Access: 27 September 2026).
