The summit held on February 4, 2026, at the Ittihadiye Palace in Cairo marks a strategic turning point that goes beyond the Gaza issue and directly concerns the map of the Eastern Mediterranean. In their joint press conference, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi emphasized the importance of maintaining the ceasefire in Gaza, ensuring the continuity of humanitarian aid, and pursuing a political solution, while subtly announcing a new chapter in economic cooperation, energy, and transportation. The target of increasing trade volume to $15 billion, the emphasis on the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council, and the characterization of Egypt as the “gateway to Africa,” highlighting key parameters that also lay the groundwork for discussions on maritime jurisdiction.[i]
The emphasis placed on developing cooperation in trade, energy, and transportation in the joint statement is a strong signal that the Eastern Mediterranean equation, where Ankara and Cairo are positioned on opposing sides, is being redesigned. While the Gaza issue generates moral and political legitimacy for the relationship between the two countries, the energy and trade aspects are forcing the two capitals to sit down at the table and engage in rational dialogue on maritime jurisdiction issues. Indeed, the $15 billion trade target is more than just a figure to be achieved through the buying and selling of goods; it necessitates the integration of logistics and energy infrastructures.[ii]
Throughout the 2010s in the Eastern Mediterranean, Türkiye and Egypt positioned themselves as opposing poles, balancing each other and attempting to thwart each other’s moves on the ground. The maritime delimitation agreements signed by Cairo with the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) in 2003 and with Greece in 2020 both caused unease in Ankara and triggered a sense of fait accompli on the ground. In response, Türkiye attempted to reverse this dynamic with the Maritime Delimitation Agreement signed with Libya in 2019, resulting in two separate maritime jurisdictional frameworks that effectively intersect each other.[iii] The current rapprochement between Ankara and Cairo raises a new and vital debate about whether this convergence can be revised through negotiation.
Türkiye’s approach to maritime jurisdiction is shaped around the principles of a “median line” and “mainland coastline length.” Ankara advocates for a median line drawn between the mainland coastlines of Türkiye and Egypt as the baseline, rejecting restrictive maps that grant full influence to the Greek islands. According to this perspective, the agreements signed by Egypt with the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) and Greece limit Türkiye’s continental shelf claims while minimizing Egypt’s potential gains. If Cairo were to seek revisions or additional arrangements to these agreements in the future, theoretically, a scenario could be possible that would allow both countries to gain a larger share of the maritime resources.
To analyze the impact of the Ankara-Cairo rapprochement on maritime jurisdiction areas, it is first necessary to correctly understand Egypt’s strategic motivations. Cairo is a pragmatic actor that benefits from energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean and aims to become a regional energy hub with its LNG facilities. However, criticism that the maritime jurisdiction agreements it has signed to date, especially the borders drawn with Greece, provide Egypt with a “sufficient and acceptable” area rather than a “maximum” area, is occasionally raised within the Egyptian bureaucracy and strategic circles. The new dialogue mechanism to be established with Türkiye will create a strategic maneuvering space for Egypt to strengthen its hand at the negotiating table.
For Türkiye, the issue is not limited to security and sovereignty. At a time when energy transit routes in the Eastern Mediterranean are being recalculated based on cost, time, and security parameters, cooperation rather than conflict with Egypt will offer Ankara both economic and diplomatic gains. Türkiye aims to position itself as an “energy terminal” and regional distribution hub. The integration of Egypt’s LNG capacity with Türkiye’s pipeline network necessitates addressing maritime boundaries with a cooperative rather than a confrontational approach.
Until now, the blocs formed in the Eastern Mediterranean have been interpreted through the lens of the “Egypt-Greece-GCA-Israel axis,” which seeks to push Türkiye out of the equation. The normalization process between Ankara and Cairo is increasing the fragility of this axis and making its structure more flexible. Egypt’s continuation of its relationship with Greece while seeking a flexible approach with Türkiye regarding maritime jurisdiction points to a multi-layered game plan. In other words, Egypt does not want to be confined to a “one-off” choice in the Eastern Mediterranean and is striving to expand its room for maneuver through multiple partnerships.
The first concrete area where Ankara-Cairo rapprochement will be discussed in the short term will be the re-examination of maritime jurisdiction lines through “silent diplomacy” using maps. Even if both sides avoid publicly discussing past agreements, conducting technical-level map studies and scenario modeling is a requirement of rational statecraft. Re-evaluating parameters such as coastline lengths, the impact of islands, existing drilling and exploration licenses, and the positioning of energy companies is an inevitable process.
The crucial question at this point is: Can the Ankara-Cairo line transform the maritime jurisdiction issue from a “zero-sum game” approach to a “win-win” one? Türkiye could try to bring Cairo to the table by highlighting the additional areas Egypt could gain against the maximalist maps of Greece and the Republic of GCA. Egypt, in turn, could use this Turkish approach as a bargaining chip and a balancing factor in its relations with Athens.
It can be argued that the issue is not limited to maps and energy, but is intertwined with military and security architecture. Maritime jurisdiction areas are directly linked to military presence, naval base planning, joint exercises, and maritime security architecture. Türkiye’s investments in its naval forces in recent years and the “Blue Homeland Doctrine” have transformed the Eastern Mediterranean into a security laboratory. Egypt’s strengthening of its Mediterranean fleet has made the two actors both rivals and potential partners in the same sea. This rapprochement offers an opportunity to place these parameters within a more predictable and manageable framework.
How third actors interpret this rapprochement is another critical dimension of the equation. Greece and the Republic of GCA view every positive move in Ankara-Cairo relations as a potential risk to their own maritime jurisdiction claims. Indeed, even Egypt’s initiation of technical talks with Türkiye is sufficient to demonstrate that the 2020 agreement is not “absolute and unchangeable.”
From Israel’s perspective, coordination between Türkiye and Egypt means diversification of energy projects. This could expand Tel Aviv’s room for maneuver in some areas, rather than narrow it. In short, the new situation that may emerge in maritime jurisdiction areas has the potential to redefine regional alliances.
From a normative perspective, the Ankara-Cairo rapprochement could pave the way for resolving maritime disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean through “bilateral and regional dialogue” mechanisms instead of “multilateral exclusion.” If Türkiye and Egypt reach an agreement on a fair framework consistent with the spirit of international law (especially the principle of equity), this model will set a precedent for other disputed areas. Otherwise, the normalization remaining merely a symbolic and short-lived snapshot carries the risk of triggering new crises in the Eastern Mediterranean. In conclusion, the Ankara-Cairo rapprochement is closely linked to maritime jurisdiction issues. The moral pressure created by Gaza, economic necessities, energy equations, and global power vacuums are inevitably bringing the two countries closer together.
[i] “Gaza on the agenda as Turkiye’s Erdogan meets Egypt’s el-Sisi in Cairo”, Al Jazeera, 4 Şubat 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/4/gaza-on-the-agenda-as-turkiyes-erdogan-meets-egypts-el-sisi-in-cairo (Access date: 05 Feb 2026).
[ii] “Joint Declaration of2 nd Meeting of High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council between Egypt, Türkiye”, Presidency of The Arab Republic of Egpyt, 4 Şubat 2026, https://www.presidency.eg/en/قسم-الأخبار/أخبار-رئاسية/news422026-2/, (Access date: 05 Feb 2026).
[iii] Yücel Acer, “Türkiye’s Legal Approach to Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea”, Insight Türkiye, 9 Mart 2021, https://www.insightTürkiye.com/articles/Türkiyes-legal-approach-to-maritime-boundary-delimitation-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-sea, (Access date: 05 Feb 2026).
