In recent times, diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and Iran have reached a significant turning point in terms of strengthening regional cooperation and deepening multidimensional partnerships. The intensification of these relations has affected not only bilateral rapprochement but also directly influenced regional security and economic balances. While Azerbaijan has taken strategic diplomatic initiatives to consolidate its role in the regional balance of power, it has also pursued a careful balancing strategy in its relations with Iran, taking into account both economic independence and geopolitical interests. The agreements signed during this process, along with the institutionalization of diplomatic relations and the increase in economic cooperation, have marked significant steps toward making Azerbaijan a stronger regional actor in its foreign policy. The steps taken by both Azerbaijan and Iran, in line with their strategic priorities towards each other, have created impacts not only on bilateral relations but also on global power balances and regional security structures.
During March and April 2025, diplomatic contacts between Azerbaijan and Iran showed a marked intensification towards the normalization of bilateral relations and the deepening of cooperation. On March 12, 2025, during a meeting between Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov and Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi, the strategic importance of energy, transportation, and investment projects was emphasized, with particular reference to the critical regional role of transportation corridors passing through Iran and infrastructure projects that will connect Azerbaijan’s western regions with Nakhchivan. On March 25, Azerbaijan responded strongly to statements made by Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, demanding the elimination of Armenia’s territorial claims against Azerbaijan and the dissolution of the Minsk Group. On April 1, Bayramov, in a meeting with Mehdi Sanaei, Political Advisor to the President of Iran, emphasized the necessity of deepening bilateral relations between the two countries. On April 15, during consular consultations in Tehran, an agreement was reached to enhance cooperation in areas such as consular services and border security.
Subsequently, on April 28, 2025, a document exchange ceremony attended by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian carried the potential to become an important milestone in Azerbaijan–Iran relations. This ceremony not only demonstrated political rapprochement but also revealed the will to promote multilayered institutional cooperation. At the ceremony, a Joint Declaration signed at the leadership level and a political consultation program covering the years 2025–2027 between the foreign ministries laid the groundwork for the institutionalization of diplomatic contacts. In addition, a comprehensive cooperation memorandum covering the years 2025–2026 was signed between the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport of Azerbaijan and the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development of Iran, along with an agreement on the mutual recognition of maritime certificates. In the cultural sphere, a cultural exchange program covering the years 2025–2028 was signed between the Ministry of Culture of Azerbaijan and the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance of Iran, along with a memorandum of understanding envisaging cooperation in the media sector. These steps strengthen Azerbaijan’s regional security and economic interests while further deepening institutional ties with Iran.[1]
These intense diplomatic developments indicate a significant strategic shift in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. The dynamic growth of Azerbaijan’s foreign trade in the first quarter of 2025 has constituted a concrete step toward reducing economic dependence on Iran and reorienting the regional balance of power in its favor. Azerbaijan achieved a 43.8% increase in trade with Italy, which has accelerated Baku’s direct integration into European markets and reinforced its aspiration to establish an alternative energy corridor bypassing Iran. Trade with China grew by 37.4%, and exports experienced a 4.6–fold surge, drawing attention as part of Azerbaijan’s strategy not only to connect with the West but also with Asia through new economic routes bypassing Iran. Additionally, despite a decline in total trade with the United States, Azerbaijan’s exports to the U.S. increased by 27.3%, demonstrating Baku’s commitment to maintaining its position within the Western alliance and continuing its strategy to deepen Iran’s isolation.[2] This situation reflects Azerbaijan’s redrawing of not only geographical but also economic maps and highlights its growing determination to encircle Iran with a regional containment line.
The institutional deepening of Azerbaijan–Iran relations and the growth of foreign trade have also increased Azerbaijan’s influence on Iran’s regional strategies. Pezeshkian’s visit to Baku represents a strategic initiative aimed at the controlled easing of crisis issues that have accumulated in Azerbaijan–Iran relations in recent years and at establishing a new platform for cooperation. During the visit, tangible economic and logistical matters such as the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), bridge projects over the Aras River, and the transfer of Russian gas to Azerbaijan through Iran were prioritized. On the cultural front, Pezeshkian’s characterization of Azerbaijan as his “second homeland” drew significant attention. Iran’s softening of its previously rigid stance on the Zangezur Corridor is interpreted as a reflection of Tehran’s regional vulnerabilities and Pezeshkian’s pursuit of new diplomatic flexibility stemming from his ethnic identity. However, structural issues such as relations with Israel and the corridor matter continue to pose serious obstacles to building full trust between the parties.[3]
One notable aspect of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s visit to Baku was his statement: “We recognize the sovereignty of Azerbaijan and the esteemed Azerbaijani people over Karabakh and other Azerbaijani territories, and Azerbaijan is the rightful owner of these lands.”[4] This declaration signifies a reshaping of Iran’s policies and regional strategies toward Azerbaijan and demonstrates explicit support for Azerbaijan’s sovereignty. In addition to the acknowledgment of Pezeshkian’s Turkic heritage, the emphasis that “being in Baku is equivalent to being in Tabriz” points to Iran’s efforts to ease regional tensions. This can be interpreted as a step aimed at changing perceptions of Iran among Azerbaijani Turks and fostering politically based sympathy. In this context, while safeguarding its security and economic interests in the region, Iran continues to deepen its relations with Azerbaijan and maintains a balanced approach toward Armenia.
These developments in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy are viewed as part of a series of strategies aimed at strengthening its relations with global actors. The official visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Azerbaijan, scheduled for May 8–11, reinforces Baku’s role in establishing a new Syria–centered strategic bridge between Israel and Turkey. Netanyahu’s visit to Azerbaijan aims to strengthen Azerbaijan–Israel relations not only at the strategic level but also at historical and societal levels. This visit coincides with the anniversary of the death of Albert Agarunov, an Azerbaijani National Hero of Jewish origin who fell martyr while defending Shusha in 1992, adding significant symbolic and diplomatic importance to the occasion.[5] During this visit, Netanyahu, visiting Azerbaijan for the first time since 2016, is expected to emphasize the need to strengthen bilateral relations with President Aliyev. Additionally, it is anticipated that the President of the Republic of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, will visit Azerbaijan during the same period and participate in the meeting of the Turkey–Azerbaijan Joint Intergovernmental Commission. These two visits reflect Azerbaijan’s commitment to mediating efforts aimed at reducing tensions between Turkey and Israel and Baku’s desire to play an active role in peaceful solutions in the region. However, negotiations have not yet begun due to Turkey’s condition requiring Israel to halt its military operations in Gaza.[6]
The planned visit of Netanyahu to Azerbaijan, while reinforcing Baku’s role in establishing a Syria–centered strategic bridge between Israel and Turkey, also represents a challenge to Iran’s influence in the South Caucasus and the Levant. Azerbaijan’s deepening military cooperation with Israel has the potential to weaken Iran’s Tehran–Beirut corridor, while possible participation in the Abraham Accords could further deepen Iran’s isolation in the Islamic world. The joint Iran–Armenia military exercises serve as a defensive reflex against the shifts in power along the Azerbaijan–Israel–Turkey axis.[7] Azerbaijan, by deepening military cooperation with Israel and weakening Iran’s influence through economic and security strategies, also assumes a role in ensuring regional security by mediating with Turkey. However, tensions between Turkey and Israel complicate Azerbaijan’s balancing role and necessitate careful diplomacy.
These strategic moves in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy also increase the country’s influence at the global level. The visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Azerbaijan will reinforce Azerbaijan’s role in establishing a Syria–centered strategic bridge between Israel and Turkey. These developments indicate that Azerbaijan may continue its strategy of diplomatically and economically isolating Iran at the regional level and increase its effectiveness in its relations with global actors.
In conclusion, the diplomatic and economic relations that Azerbaijan maintains with Iran play an important role in reorienting the regional balance of power in Azerbaijan’s favor. By undertaking strategic moves aimed at strengthening its economic independence and increasing its influence in regional security, Azerbaijan also strengthens its relations with global powers. This process, by institutionalizing Azerbaijan’s relations with Iran and simultaneously accelerating its integration into Western and Asian markets, enables Azerbaijan to become a stronger actor in regional diplomacy and global strategies. Nevertheless, ongoing security concerns and regional tensions with Iran require Azerbaijan to pursue careful and rational diplomacy to maintain this balance.
[1] “Azerbaydzhan i Iran Obmenyalis Podpisannymi Dokumentami”, Report, https://report.az/ru/vneshnyaya-politika/mezhdu-azerbajdzhanom-i-iranom-podpisan-ryad-dokumentov, (Access Date: 28.04.2025).
[2] Tamilla Hasanova, “Azerbaijan Sees Significant Growth in Trade with Key Partners in Early 2025”, Caliber, https://caliber.az/en/post/azerbaijan-sees-significant-growth-in-trade-with-key-partners-in-early-2025, (Access Date: 28.04.2025).
[3] “Vizit Prezidenta Irana v Azerbaydzhan: Ukrepleniye Svyazey i Resheniye problem”, JAM News, https://l24.im/cnxoX, (Access Date: 28.04.2025).
[4] “Prezident Irana: Karabakh YAVLYAYETSYA NEOTYEMLEMOY CHASTYU Azerbaydzhana”, APA, https://ru.apa.az/vneshnyaya-politika/prezident-irana-karabax-yavlyaetsya-neotemlemoi-castyu-azerbaidzana-608989, (Access Date: 28.04.2025).
[5] “SMI: Binyamin Netanyakhu Posetit Azerbaydzhan 8 Maya”, Oxu.Az, https://oxu.az/ru/politika/smi-binyamin-netanyahu-posetit-azerbajdzhan-8-maya, (Access Date: 28.04.2025).
[6] “Stala Izvestna Data Vizita Netanyakhu v Baku. Vsled za Nim Priyedet Erdogan”, Haqqin, https://haqqin.az/news/346754, (Access Date: 28.04.2025).
[7] Alex Grinberg, “Netanyahu’s Expected Visit to Baku Sends Shockwaves Through Tehran”, The Jerusalem Post, https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-851365, (Access Date: 28.04.2025).
