Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Georgia began a process of integration with the West, marking a profound transformation in the country’s foreign policy. Beginning in the early 1990s, this orientation emerged as a clear strategic choice aimed at Western-style institutionalization and democratization. This foreign policy shift gained momentum especially after the 2003 Rose Revolution, during which integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions became the main axis of Georgia’s foreign policy.
In 2008, steps taken toward NATO membership and the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union (EU),[1] marked a milestone in Georgia’s relations with the West. That same year, the outbreak of the Russia-Georgia War revealed the geopolitical risks of Western alignment and Moscow’s determination to maintain influence in the Caucasus.
The 2014 Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA)[2] with the EU strengthened economic ties and paved the way for structural reforms aligning Georgian law with EU norms. Provisions such as tariff reduction, investment promotion, and transparency in financial regulations became reference points in Georgia’s reform process. These developments also enabled EU-backed projects in areas such as judicial independence, anti-corruption efforts, and public administration reform.
Despite these positive developments, Georgia’s relations with the EU have followed a fluctuating path rather than a stable one. Differences among political elites, oligarchic structures, restrictions on civil society, and political interference in the judiciary have occasionally caused major tensions in the integration process. Ahead of the 2024 elections, growing political polarization and restrictions on media freedom drew criticism from EU institutions, posing significant obstacles to Georgia’s path toward candidate status.
The parliamentary elections held on October 26, 2024, are considered the beginning of a new political era in Georgia. The Georgian Dream Party’s victory with 53.94% of the vote signaled a significant shift in the country’s political orientation. The structural difficulties faced by pro-Western opposition parties during the election process raised concerns about democratic standards. Early government actions in 2025, including the suspension of certain EU alignment laws under the guise of ‘protecting national sovereignty,’ escalated tensions between Tbilisi and Brussels.
The European Commission openly expressed its concerns about legal changes that could undermine the rule of law in Georgia, slowing the country’s progress toward EU candidacy. Meanwhile, the new government’s cautious and pragmatic approach to relations with Russia has drawn attention. With approximately 20% of Georgia’s territory still under Russian control, this policy direction has sparked heated domestic debate. The government defends its stance as a ‘conflict-avoidance’ strategy, while opposition parties and civil society view it as a ‘drift away from the West.’ Restrictions on media freedom, freedom of expression, and pressure on civil society organizations have increased in the post-election period, as reflected negatively in EU progress reports. In May 2025, the European Parliament announced that financial support to Georgia would be conditional, warning that sanctions could be imposed if democratic reforms were reversed.
Following the 2024 election victory of the Georgian Dream Party, the shift in the country’s foreign policy necessitates a multifaceted assessment of the future of EU-Georgia relations. Georgia’s long-standing European integration policy is now being tested under the practices and discourse of the current government. Three key dynamics are likely to shape the course of future EU-Georgia relations: domestic political stability, regional geopolitical developments, and revisions to the EU’s enlargement strategy.[3]
First, maintaining democratic values and institutional transparency is a prerequisite for progress in EU relations. Any backsliding in fundamental principles such as judicial independence, freedom of expression, and the rule of law could jeopardize Georgia’s candidate status and trigger EU sanctions. Such outcomes would harm Georgia’s international reputation and deter foreign investment and development projects.
Second, Russia’s efforts to expand its influence in the South Caucasus constrain Georgia’s foreign policy space. The Georgian Dream Party’s strategy of pursuing a ‘low-tension policy’ with Moscow may prevent conflict in the short term, but it risks fostering distrust in relations with the West. The unresolved status of regions like Abkhazia and South Ossetia remains a major obstacle to integration with both the EU and NATO.
Third, the EU’s efforts in the 2020s to redefine its relations with the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries present both risks and opportunities for Georgia. Enlargement fatigue and the lack of consensus among member states have slowed the integration processes of candidate countries like Georgia. However, cooperation in strategic areas such as energy security, logistics (especially the Middle Corridor), and green transformation could enhance Georgia’s position in the European agenda.
In conclusion, the foreign policy preferences of the Georgian Dream Party will be decisive in the country’s relations with Europe. These preferences will be shaped not only by the government’s diplomatic stance but also by civil society, media, and the younger generation’s commitment to European values. The sustainability of Georgia’s European integration depends directly on its sincerity in pursuing internal reforms and its ability to balance external relations.
[1] European Council (2003). A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy. Brussels, December 12, 2003. www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf
[2] Özçelik, A. O., & Zandaradze, S. (2020). Avrupa Birliği Doğu Ortaklığı Projesinin Gürcistan’a etkisi. Marmara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Dergisi, 8(1), 167–193. https://doi.org/10.14782/marmarasbd.712957
[3] Mkrtchyan, T., Huseynov, T., & Gogolashvili, K. (2009). The European Union and the South Caucasus: Three perspectives on the future of the European project from the Caucasus (Europe in Dialogue 2009/01). Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.
