The Hungarian elections held on April 12, 2026, were considered not only a change in government at the national level but also a significant development in European politics. The loss of power by Viktor Orbán, long considered one of the most prominent representatives of the “illiberal democracy” model in Europe, and the rise of the opposition led by Péter Magyar have significant consequences for both the internal dynamics of the European Union (EU) and the future of the populist right. However, the degree to which this development marks a structural transformation and whether the political model known as “Orbánism” has truly come to an end remains a topic of debate. Although the election results appear to represent a leadership change, the institutional, ideological, and social dynamics underlying this change reveal a much more complex picture.
The political structure Orbán has created in Hungary over his nearly sixteen years in power has transformed the functioning of the state, going beyond a mere change of government in the classical sense. The concentration of media ownership, influence over the judiciary, and bureaucratic appointments are among the key elements of this model. For this reason, the election results can be seen not only as a loss of power but also as a test of how durable this structure is. Indeed, some analyses suggest that despite Orbán’s electoral defeat, the system he established will not disappear completely, but rather could be recreated by different actors. In this context, “Orbánism” is assessed as a political approach that is not limited to a specific leader; it brings together a strong executive branch, nationalist rhetoric, and an occasionally confrontational stance toward the EU.[i]
It is evident that economic and social factors played a decisive role in the election results. High inflation, rising living costs, and difficulties in accessing EU funds have directly influenced the behavior of voters. In particular, the freezing of financial resources due to the tensions with the EU has placed significant pressure on the Hungarian economy. This situation indicates that voters made their decisions not only based on ideological preferences but also in terms of economic expectations. The opposition led by Péter Magyar succeeded in mobilizing this economic dissatisfaction, forming a broad voter coalition. However, the ideologically heterogeneous structure of this coalition points to the challenges the new government may face in the policy-making process.[ii]
How the new government will manage relations with the EU is one of the most critical issues in the post-election period. Tensions with Brussels during the Orbán era have centered particularly on areas such as the rule of law, judicial independence, and media freedom. These tensions have restricted Hungary’s access to EU funds and made the country’s position within Europe a subject of debate. The new government to be formed under Péter Magyar’s leadership seems inclined to establish a more constructive and cooperative relationship with the EU.[iii] However, this does not necessarily mean full alignment will be achieved. This is because the emphasis on national sovereignty and a guarded approach toward the EU remain strong within Hungarian society. Therefore, the new administration will need to strike a pragmatic balance in its relations with the EU.
The elections in Hungary also represent an important test for the EU. While Brussels hopes to work with a government that is more aligned with the rule of law and democratic standards, it is unclear to what extent Hungary’s domestic political dynamics will allow for such alignment. While a significant number of voters support EU membership, they also attach great importance to the protection of national interests. This dual expectation requires the new government to strike a careful balance in both domestic and foreign policy. Consequently, rather than a sharp shift in relations with the EU, a softer and more negotiating tone is expected to emerge.
One of the debates that followed the elections has centered on the new administration’s internal political choices and appointments. In particular, the appointment of individuals from Péter Magyar’s inner circle to key positions has raised concerns regarding nepotism and institutional impartiality. This situation creates uncertainty about the extent to which the “new politics” that voters had expected will be realized.[iv] After all, a significant portion of the criticism directed at the Orbán era centered on the politicization of state institutions and a lack of transparency. The fact that the new administration is facing similar criticisms is raising questions about the depth of the change.
Looking at the future of Orbánism, it is difficult to say that this model has completely disappeared despite the election defeat. On the contrary, some analyses claim that Orbánism could take on a more flexible and adaptable form.[v] This situation is significant not only for Hungary but also for the evolution of the populist right throughout Europe. The political rhetoric Orbán has developed over the years( National sovereignty, opposition to immigration, and a critical stance toward the EU) is still shared by a broad base of voters. For this reason, Orbánism could continue to exist at the social level even if the leader changes.
The impact of the election results in Hungary on European politics is also remarkable. Orbán has long served as a point of reference for right-wing populist movements within Europe. His loss of power through the electoral process carries significant symbolic weight for these movements. However, interpreting this development as a complete retreat of the populist right could be a mistake. On the contrary, in some countries, a more pragmatic and EU-compatible form of right-wing populism appears to be gaining strength. This suggests that populism can continue to exist in European politics by adapting its form.
Another important aspect of the Hungarian elections is their impact on NATO and transatlantic relations. Orbán’s close ties with Russia and his periodic tensions with the West have placed Hungary in a controversial position within the alliance. If the new administration pursues a more balanced foreign policy, it could strengthen coordination within Europe and NATO, particularly in the context of the Russia-Ukraine War.[vi] However, a more measured approach is expected to be adopted here rather than a sharp policy shift. This suggests that Hungary will recalibrate its current position rather than completely changing course in foreign policy.
As a result, while the 2026 Hungarian Elections mark a significant turning point in European politics, the nature of this shift can be considered a gradual transformation rather than a radical change. The end of Viktor Orbán’s rule does not mean the complete disappearance of “Orbánism”; on the contrary, it suggests that this model could continue to exist in different forms. The success of the new administration led by Péter Magyar will depend both on its capacity to carry out domestic institutional reforms and on its ability to establish a balanced relationship with the EU. This process has the potential to shape not only Hungary’s future but also the future of democratic transformation debates across Europe.
[i] Grégoire Roos, “Hungary election: Orbán has been defeated – but will Orbánism survive?”, Chatham House, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/04/hungary-election-orban-has-been-defeated-will-orbanism-survive, (Date Accessed: 02.05.2026).
[ii] Paul Kirby, “Hungary’s next PM says frozen EU funds will be paid out soon”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c392ln77w30o, (Date Accessed: 02.05.2026).
[iii] Nigel Gould-Davies, “Hungary’s election: significance and implications”, IISS, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2026/04/hungarys-election-significance-and-implications/, (Date Accessed: 02.05.2026).
[iv] Gábor Tanács, “Hungary’s Péter Magyar defends appointing brother-in-law as country’s justice minister”, Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/05/01/hungarys-peter-magyar-defends-appointing-brother-in-law-as-countrys-justice-minister, (Date Accessed: 02.05.2026).
[v] Ibid.
[vi] “Hungary and Bulgaria elections: EU’s new ally and new adversary?”, France 24, https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/talking-europe/20260501-hungary-and-bulgaria-elections-eu-s-new-ally-and-new-adversary, (Date Accessed: 02.05.2026).
